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Abstract  
This thesis introduces an overlooked perspective on Chinese foreign policy, that of 
interest groups.  I use environmental foreign relations as a vantage point to examine 
how domestic interest groups exert influence on China’s environmental foreign 
relations. The proposed theoretical framework, constructivist utilitarianism, provides a 
bridge between the constructivist school and rationalistic institutionalism in the IR 
debate to explain the discursive turn of the Chinese government in global 
environmental governance. The discursive turn refers to the changing attitudes 
towards environmental governance based on learning, shared experiences, and 
offering an alternative norm to replace liberal environmentalism. 
The interest groups under scrutiny are line ministries, state-owned enterprises, 
environmental non-governmental organisations, local governors, and intellectuals. 
They each represent a distinct interest, and demonstrate different pathways for 
influencing foreign relations. The focus on domestic players supplements the 
traditional focus on international systemic factors to explain the behaviour of China on 
the global stage and in bilateral relations. The empirical chapters are organised 
according to three dimensions: international environmental treaty implementation, 
sharing the Chinese experience, and offering an alternative environmental norm. Each 
chapter focuses on one factor, in the following order: environmental diplomacy, the 
Chinese experience, and ecological civilisation. These three dimensions reflect the 
trend of the discursive turn, which is closely linked to China’s desire to establish a good 
national image.  
My findings show that interest groups in China utilise the strategic concepts of 
environmental diplomacy and the Chinese experience to maximise their interests. The 
emergence of the discourse of ecological civilisation creates space for different groups 
to jump onto the bandwagon by interpreting the concept in favour of their interests. In 
this process, identity politics becomes a mechanism by which to aggregate and rank 
domestic preferences in such a way that economic interests outweigh environmental 
ones at the state level.  This thesis calls for more future research to examine other 
foreign relations issues through the lens of interest groups, to better comprehend the 
complex dynamics of China’s role in the world.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
“It is harder to touch one’s interests than to touch their souls.” 
--Qu Geping (Director of the State Environmental Agency) 
 
 
1.1 Subject and context 
This thesis poses the hypothesis that China’s policies towards global 
environmental governance can only be understood by taking into account the 
role of domestic interest groups. When I introduced this hypothesis to those 
who were interested in my research, my audience was puzzled about two sub-
questions: are there any interest groups in China? And why do domestic groups 
matter in China’s foreign relations, considering China is an authoritarian regime 
featured by a top-down decision-making? In fact, interest groups are frequently 
criticised by the public in China, as they are seen as opposing political reform 
and as the root of stagnated environmental policy implementation. Yet, their 
image remains blurred and the discussion of their role in both China’s domestic 
and foreign policies is constrained1, despite the fact that the role of domestic 
players has become increasingly relevant as diplomatic strategy has evolved 
from the covert United Front to the so-called “people-to-people” diplomacy2 
which is predicated on the perception that foreign relations cannot be sustained 
                                                          
1 Yuwen Deng, “The Seven Vested Interest Groups in China,” Chinascope, no. 63 (April 24, 2013): 
41. 
2 Shichen Wang, “China’s People-to-People Diplomacy and Its Importance to China-EU Relations,” 
in UACES 45th Annual Conference (UACES 45th Annual Conference, Bilbao, 2015), 
http://www.uaces.org/documents/papers/1501/Wang.pdf. 
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without public support3.  Only by understanding how domestic groups take part 
in China’s foreign relations can we better comprehend its role and behaviour in 
global environmental governance.  
The quote above is in fact Qu Geping’s answer to the question: “what is the 
biggest resistance and bottleneck in smog reduction”4. His reply addresses 
other environmental problems China faces. As the first director of the State 
Environmental Protection Agency 5 , the retired official identified vested 
interests as the “elephant in the room” regarding China’s environmental 
governance. In a more frequently cited quote in an interview with the Southern 
Weekend 南方周末 newspaper in 2013, he goes so far as to warn that 
environmental issues are of equal importance to the battle against corruption, 
because both have potential to overthrow the Party-state and are matters of the 
very survival of the regime (original quote in Chinese: buxiaochu huanjingwuran, 
bu baohuhao huanjing, yeyao wangdangwangguo 不消除环境污染，不保护好环
境，也要亡党亡国)6. 
                                                          
3 Zhiqun Zhu, “The Power of People-to-People Diplomacy in Japan-China Relations,” China Policy 
Institute: Analysis, February 27, 2015, https://cpianalysis.org/2015/02/27/the-power-of-
people-to-people-diplomacy-in-japan-china-relations/. 
 
4 Lei 雷 Zheng 郑, “‘bu Bao Hu Hao Sheng Tai Huan Jing, Ye Yao Wang Dang Wang Guo 不保护好
生态环境, 也要亡党亡国’ [Ecological Crisis May Threaten the Survival of the Party-State],” Qu Lu 
Wan Bao 齐鲁晚报[Qilu EveningNews], March 24, 2014, 
http://epaper.qlwb.com.cn/qlwb/content/20140324/ArticelA04002FM.htm. 
5 Qu is the chief architect designing measures to integrate environmental protection policies 
with economic development, and his efforts in environmental governance made him to be the 
very first Chinese citizen who was awarded with United Nations Environment Programme 
Sasakawa Prize.  
6 Geping 格平 Qu 曲, “Guo jia huan bao ju shou ren ju zhang: bu xiao chu huan jing wu ran hui 
wang dang wang guo” 国家环保局首任局长：不消除环境污染会亡党亡国, [Ecological crisis 
may threaten the survival of the Party-state], interview by Tao 韬 Wang 汪 and Hongjun 红军 
Zhu 朱, June 7, 2013, 
http://news.ifeng.com/shendu/nfzm/detail_2013_06/07/26205127_0.shtml. 
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Qu Geping’s warning might have struck a cacophonous chord in the 
“hymn” to China’s economic achievements. Even if one disagrees with the 
claimed severity of the threat posed by environmental protection to the 
regime’s survival, it is almost impossible to deny the fact that China is an 
environmentally-weak country (huanjing ruoguo环境弱国), in contrast to its 
economic clout and military muscle. In an article titled “Environmental 
Problems Are Fully Weakening China” published in the Party-owned Global 
Times环球时报, Feng Zhaokui, an expert in Sino-Japanese relations, clarified 
that the term “environmentally-weak country” acknowledges how the fragile 
ecology in China has a weakening effect on the country. Using the statistics from 
the World Bank, Chinese Academy of Science and State Environmental 
Protection Bureau in 2007, he demonstrates that the annual loss caused by 
environmental pollution occupies around 10% of GDP7. A more recent report by 
the National Audit Office seems to support Feng’s worries about the economic 
loss related to environmental problems. The nationwide survey administered 
by the National Audit Office on 883 water pollution and treatment projects 
reveals that about $2.5 billion worth of special funding has been “either ignored 
or misappropriated”, with $430 million unused, 40million wasted, and more 
than 9 million embezzled8. Economic loss due to environmental pollution 
results mainly from the efforts of various interest groups to preserve their 
                                                          
7 Zhaokui 昭奎 Feng 冯, “Huan Jing Wen Ti Zheng Quan Mian ‘Ruo Hua’ Zhong Guo 环境问题正
全面‘弱化’中国[Environmental Problems Are Comprehensively Weakening China],” Huan Qiu 
Shi Bao 环球时报 [Global Times], October 11, 2014, 
http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2014-10/5162705.html. 
8“170 Duo Yi Shui Wu Ran Fang Zhi Zi Jin Wei You Xiao Shi Yong, Cun Zai Wei Ji Shi Bo Fu Zi Jin 
Xian Zhi Lang Fei Deng Wen ti’170 多亿水污染防治资金未有效使用 存在未及时拨付、资金闲
置浪费等问题 [Ineffective Usage of Water Pollution Prevention Fund due to Idle Funds],” Zhong 
Guo Huan Jing Bao 中国环境报 [China Environment News], July 1, 2016, 
http://www.zhb.gov.cn/xxgk/hjyw/201607/t20160701_356570.shtml. 
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interests at the cost of the environment. To put this into perspective, the money 
wasted on water treatment alone is more than the GDP of sovereign states like 
Bhutan and Liberia 9. 
Both Qu Geping and Feng Zhaokui seem to contradict the optimistic 
evaluation of Thomas Friedman of the efficiency of  a one-party autocracy, due 
to its ability to “impose the politically difficult but critically important policies 
needed to move a society forward in the 21st century”, which is based on his 
observation of the Chinese government’s investment in clean energy10. In fact, 
different views, whether optimistic or pessimistic, on China’s behaviour in 
environmental governance typify a paradoxical national image, featuring what 
Callahan summarises as a disjuncture between great ambition and middling 
abilities11. The contrast between a pessimistic self-evaluation of environmental 
performance by Chinese officials and commentators on the one hand and the 
optimism of Western journalists like Friedman on the other, results from their 
different conceptualisations of China’s political system. Whereas Friedman 
views China as an autocracy ruled by a small number of enlightened political 
elites who are able to mobilise resources to achieve what is good for the public, 
Qu and Fang see a much more complicated picture, in which a plurality of 
political actors play their parts in environmental governance, some promoting 
and others prohibiting environmental protection. The way Friedman 
understands China is used to highlight the shortcomings of the democratic 
system in the US, and therefore, the difference between autocratic regime and 
                                                          
9 The statistics of GDP is retrieved from the database of the World Bank.  
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf 
10 Thomas L. Friedman, “Our One-Party Democracy,” The New York Times, September 8, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/09/opinion/09friedman.html. 
11William Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
p.199. 
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democracies is stressed, and even inflated. However, insiders such as Qu and 
Fang capture the common problem faced by both autocracies and democracies: 
the presence and influence of interest groups.  
The relevance of various domestic groups in the political landscape in 
China is convincingly theorised by Lieberthal and Oksenberg as “a fragmented 
structure of authority” 12 in an onion-shaped decision making system, with a 
core group of the highest ranking leaders at the heart and line ministries 
implementing policies in the outer layer. Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s research is 
taken further by Andrew Mertha in the context of an increasingly pluralised 
authoritarian regime. The authoritarian regime 2.0 model, as Mertha terms it, 
includes previously excluded actors such as peripheral officials, journalists, and 
social organisations13. The system defined by Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 
together with Mertha, not only opens up the possibility of better understanding 
the domestic policy making process, but also establishes the research agenda 
for our understanding of Chinese foreign policy and how China portrays herself 
as a global power.  
Perhaps the biggest contribution of the concept of fragmented 
authoritarianism studies to my research is the reminder that interests are 
diverse and groups or individuals see the same issue differently, based on their 
cost-benefit analysis. As far as environmental issues are concerned, the internal 
calculation yields relevance to international relations, starting from the 
individual level. Findings from the Hurun report “Immigration and the Chinese 
                                                          
12 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and 
Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p.22. 
13 Andrew Mertha, “‘Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0’: Political Pluralization in the Chinese 
Policy Process,” The China Quarterly 200 (2009): p.997. 
 
16 
 
High Net Wealth Individual (HNWI) 2015” reveal that the top three reasons 
behind HNWI’s decisions to emigrate are issues of education (22%), 
environmental pollution (20%), and food safety (18%)14. That is to say, one fifth 
of HNWIs seek a new life abroad due to their concerns about environmental 
problems in China, and a polluted homeland has harmed their personal 
interests. The statistics reflect the salience of environmental pollution in 
individuals’ interest, and capture the trend of seeing emigration as a “solution” 
to the national environmental challenge.  
The historical context for the rise of interest groups and new actors 
dates back to Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992, after which business 
interests started making inroads into political life. As the most influential 
reformist leader, Deng diluted the importance of ideological conflicts between 
socialism and capitalism, which helped to maintain the Communist Party’s 
monopoly on power 15. As paraphrased by Deng’s former interpreter, Gao 
Zhikai, Deng’s 1992 speech claimed that “China had to refuse to be bogged 
down by ideological labelling and ossification” 16  and should focus on 
development and prosperity. Deng’s speech was received as legitimating and 
encouraging the private pursuit of material wealth.  
Deng’s speech encouraged people to enter the business world and 
pursue wealth (xiahai 下海). Statistics from the China Business Times suggests 
that more than 100,000 elite party members quit their “iron rice bowl” (tie 
fanwan铁饭碗) and started their businesses. This batch of elite individuals was 
                                                          
14 “2015 zhong guo tou zi yi min bai pi shu2015 中国投资移民白皮书” [White paper on China’s 
investment emigrants in 2015], Hurun report胡润百富. 2015. 
http://up.hurun.net/Hufiles/201512/201511/20151130101018776.pdf.  
15 Christopher Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era (London: Routledge, 2006), p.49. 
16 Zhikai Victor Gao, “Deng’s Pragmatic Heritage Example for Leaders Worldwide,” Global Times, 
February 5, 2012. 
17 
 
named after this critical year, the “1992 group” (jiu’er pai 九二派). They all had 
prominent positions in the government, which allowed them to translate 
political resources (experience, expertise, networks, etc) into advantage in the 
market economy. In this light, bureaucratic interests existing before 1992 were 
partly transformed into business interests. Furthermore, the 92 entrepreneurs 
represented a change of interests from the state to the private sphere. To a 
great extent, the Southern Tour paved the way for the development of interest 
groups in the Communist regime and made it possible for domestic groups 
representing different interests to participate in the political sphere 
systematically.   
This growth of interest groups is parallel with the intensification of 
international environmental cooperation in the 1990s and the two became 
connected with the rise and development of the environmental protection 
industry. The government accepted the concept of an environmental protection 
industry as a new area for business in the process of environmental cooperation, 
and the new industry benefitted from foreign sources of funding and technology 
transfer. In the 1990s, around 15% of total spending on environmental 
management in China was from multilateral and bilateral sources and aid 
budgets17. The World Bank, Asian Development Bank and UNDP were the most 
important multilateral sources of funding. The former played a particularly 
active role in the building of environmental infrastructure, water supply, waste 
treatment and management. The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) was the central organisation to provide grants for environmental 
                                                          
17 Bruce Tremayne and Penny de Waal, “Business Opportunities for Foreign Firms Related to 
China’s Environment,” The China Quarterly 156 (December 1998): p.1030.  
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projects focusing on training, environmental consulting and equipment 
procurement, in cooperation with the then Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation, now the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). In addition, 
the process of international treaty implementation further promoted the 
growth of the environmental protection industry in China. The implementation 
of the Montreal Protocol, which will be elaborated in Chapter 5, epitomises how 
international funding to improve the environmental protection industry can be 
taken advantage of by interest groups.  
In the early 1990s, the government defined this industry as the “sunrise” 
industry (zhaoyang qiye 朝阳企业 ), which enjoyed the privilege of 
governmental support and preferential policies. In the first environmental 
protection industry meeting in 1992, the government promised enterprises 
specialising in protecting the environment that the majority of environmental 
protection products would continue to be provided by domestic firms18. The 
China Environmental Protection Industry Association was established in 1993 
to coordinate and guide the young industry and facilitate the role of the 
environmental protection industry as a window of international cooperation19.  
In spite of the central government’s support, the environmental 
protection industry has traditionally been scattered and dominated by small-
sized township and village enterprises (TVEs).  Due to backward technology 
and a lack of resources, these are vulnerable to competition from multinational 
                                                          
18 “GATT Chuang Jin Guo Men Yi Hou GATT 闯进国门以后 [After GATT Entered China],” China 
Environment News 中国环境报, January 30, 1993. 
19 Ting 霆 Chen 陈, “‘Zhong Guo Huan Bao Chan Ye Xie Hui Ming Ri Cheng Li: Zhao Yang Chan Ye 
Hu Huan Guo Jia Dui’ 中国环保产业协会明日成立：朝阳产业呼唤国家队 [The Establishment of 
the China Environmental Protection Industry Association: Sunrise Industry Calling for National 
Team],” China Environment News 中国环境报, March 4, 1993. 
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corporations. In the field of water treatment and management, for instance, the 
Chinese domestic market has been dominated by Vivendi (Veolia since 2003) 
and Suez Environment from France, and Thames Water from the United 
Kingdom 20 . No domestic enterprises can compete with these foreign 
corporations due to their possession of advanced technology and considerable 
amounts of capital, which makes them preferable for local governments21. The 
expansion of multinational corporations in the Chinese water market ultimately 
reached such a degree that their efforts were described as a strategy to 
construct a “water empire” in an article published by the official Xinhua news 
agency in 200622. 
This foreign competition prompted decision-makers to adopt two 
strategies: the promulgation of protectionist policies for the domestic 
environmental protection industry; and the encouragement of the burgeoning 
sector to explore overseas markets, as part of the “Go Global” strategy. The 
primary destination for Chinese firms was developing countries, which could be 
used as a springboard for exploration of the overseas environmental protection 
market23.  
                                                          
20 “‘Yang Shui Wu Yong Ru Zhong Guo Shi chang’洋水务"涌入中国市场[Foreign Water 
Companies Are Occupying the Chinese Market],” Shi Chang Bao市场报[ Market Newspaper], 
February 7, 2001, http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/2001/Feb/19676.htm. 
21 Yunxiao 云霄 Min 闵, “‘Yang Shui Wu Jin Jun Guo Nei Shui Wu Shi Chang Jiu Fen Bu Duan, Bei 
Zhi Tui Gao Shui Jia’洋水务进军国内水务市场纠纷不断 被指推高水价 [Foreign Water 
Companies Occupydomestic Market Accused of Raising the Water Bill],” Zhong Guo Qi Ye Bao 中
国企业报[China Enterprise News], April 22, 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20140422/022718872196.shtml. 
22 “‘Yang Shui Wu Zhong Guo Mou Ju, Zai Hua Gou Jian Shui Wu Di Guo Lu Xian Tu’‘洋水务’中国
谋局 在华构建‘水务帝国’路线图[The Plot of Foreign Water Companies, the Roadmap of the 
‘Water Empire’ in China],” Zhong Guo Jing Ying Bao 中国经营报[China Business], September 3, 
2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-09/23/content_5127217.htm. 
23 Yong 勇 Huang 黄, “‘fa Zhan Shuang Bian He Zuo, Jia Qiang Duo Bian He Zuo, Huan Jing Bao 
Hu Guo Ji He Zuo Fang Zhen Ping Shu’发展双边合作 加强多边合作: 环境保护国际合作方针评述 
[Develop Bilateral Cooperation and Strengthen Bilateral Cooperation: Comments on 
International Environmental Cooperation],” China Environment News, February 15, 2003. 
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Fast forwarding to 2010, the State Council promulgated a decision which 
defines the energy saving and environmental protection industry as “emerging 
industries of strategic importance” (zhanlüe xing xinxing chanye 战略性新兴产
业). They are industries that will “lead the future social and economic 
development”, which will in turn help China to “seize the high ground in a new 
round of economic and technological development” 24 . Comparing the 
Environmental Protection Law of 1989 with the revised one of 2015, one 
notable difference is the explicit presence of the environmental protection 
industry in articles 7 and 21 of the newer version. This policy change indicates 
the central government’s support for the scientific research of the industry and 
its willingness to use preferential policies to facilitate its development25. 
Moreover, Chinese capital now targets lucrative and low-risk industries 
associated with the building of environmental protection infrastructure in 
developed countries. The most recent example is the 8.68% stake in Thames 
Water acquired by the China Investment Corporation, China’s  $410 billion-
worth sovereign wealth fund 26.  
The evolution of China’s environmental protection industry is thus a 
microcosm of the intertwined, yet competing domestic and foreign interests 
that are involved in international environmental cooperation. The industry in 
China is also, in itself, a reflection of the breakdown of the “national interest” 
implicit in the industrial development plan and hence a testimony to the 
                                                          
24 State Council, Decision of the State Council on Accelerating the Fostering and Development of 
Strategic Emerging Industries, vol. No 32 [2010], 2010, 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8570. 
25 A clear comparison is available online: http://www.croplifechina.org/china.pdf 
26 Anousha Sakoui, “China Buys Stake in Thames Water,” Financial Times, January 20, 2012, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7b19ca2e-42c0-11e1-b756-00144feab49a.html#axzz4ISkIEWem. 
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broader relevance of domestic interest groups in foreign relations. Furthermore, 
the move from the initial process of learning from abroad to the stage of going 
abroad to compete shows how China’s environmental international relations 
and its role in global environmental governance has moved from a process of 
input to output and from the role of benefactor to contributor, or even 
competitor.  
 
 
1.2 The literature 
One reason why the interest group perspective is neglected in the 
literature on China’s role in the global environmental governance is the 
mainstream tendency to investigate the causal link between regime type and 
the environmental performance. The central debate in this strand of research is 
whether democracies or autocracies are more likely to display 
environmentally-friendly behaviour in the global environmental governance. 
Researchers advocating democracy tend to be more environmentally-friendly 
and have high expectations of the positive influence of political plurality on 
environmental governance. Payne, for example, outlines five values that are 
prevalent in democracies and help solve global ecological crisis: 1) Individual 
rights and the free dissemination of ideas make it easier for the public to 
participate and harder for those in power to cheat. 2) Regime responsiveness 
that results from elections and the political interest of politicians to get elected. 
3) The ability of both officials and the public to learn from successful and failed 
experiences, like “policy laboratories”, which also means that the universal 
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application of one democracy’s experience to other contexts. 4) Democrats’ 
faith in international organisations and a preference for using cooperation to 
solve shared problems. 5) Open markets, which are critical for shaping 
enterprise production through green consumerism27. Fredriksson et al 28 
further add that that the presence of lobby groups and electoral competition 
positively correlates with the stringency of environmental policies.  
However, this optimistic view of democracy is challenged by the 
postulation that authoritarian regimes are more capable and efficient in 
addressing complex political and environmental issues, because autocrats can 
bypass the institutional constraints which may hinder leaders in democratic 
countries. Neumayer29 thus delinks the correlation between democracy and 
environmental outcomes, although his findings do at least suggest a close 
connection between the nature of democracies and their stance on 
environmental commitment. Beeson goes further, and paints the “dispiriting 
reality” of the Asia-Pacific region that “authoritarian regimes - unattractive as 
they may be - may even prove more capable of responding to the complex 
political and environmental pressures in the region than some of its 
democracies” 30. This is because the issue of environmental protection requires 
state capacity, which is strengthened in authoritarian polities and weakened in 
democracies. Echoing Beeson’s prediction is Leinaweaver’s quantitative 
analysis of decisions by autocrats to ratify environmental treaties. He observes 
                                                          
27 Rodger A. Payne, “Freedom and the Environment,” Journal of Democracy 6, no. 3 (1995): 
pp.41–55. 
28 Per G. Fredriksson et al., “Environmentalism, Democracy, and Pollution Control,” Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 49, no. 2 (March 2005): pp.343–65. 
29 Eric Neumayer, “Do Democracies Exhibit Stronger International Environmental Commitment? 
A Cross-Country Analysis,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 2 (2002): p.139. 
30 Mark Beeson, “The Coming of Environmental Authoritarianism,” Environmental Politics 19, no. 
2 (2010): p.276. 
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that dictators ratified up to 50% of environmental accords which autocracies 
were invited to join and that the key explanatory for this is the concern of 
dictators for political survival31. Hence “autocratic ratification” is in fact 
“environmental cooperation to prolong survival”32.    
Both of the above perspectives, however, ignore intra-group variation, 
namely the differences within democratic countries and autocracies. Moving 
beyond this approach, Böhmelt deploys the theory of public goods to open the 
“black box” of autocracies33, which be breaks down into four types: one-party 
regime, personalist dictatorship, monarchy, and military rule. He then examines 
the role of environmental NGOs (ENGOs) in ratification of environmental 
international accords in each of these categories. His research is inspired by 
Bernauer and Koubi’s research on the provision of public goods in democracies 
and is predicated on the thesis that the size of the winning coalition explains the 
likelihood of political systems to provide environmental public goods34.  He 
observes a substantial variation among autocracies regarding the ENGOs’ role 
in autocracies’ commitment to environmental treaties, and argues that the 
ENGO plays a more obvious role in personalist dictatorship, due to the small 
winning coalition size, which creates a significant margin for ENGOs to exert 
influence.  
                                                          
31 Justin Leinaweaver, “Autocratic Ratification: Environmental Cooperation to Prolong Survival,” 
SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, June 15, 2012), p.37, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2084866. 
32 Ibid, p.1. 
33 Tobias Böhmelt, “Environmental Interest Groups and Authoritarian Regime Diversity,” 
VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 26, no. 1 (December 
10, 2013): pp.315–35. 
34 Thomas Bernauer and Vally Koubi, “Effects of Political Institutions on Air Quality,” Ecological 
Economics 68, no. 5 (March 15, 2009): pp.1355–65. 
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However, there are two flaws in this argument. One, which is identified 
by himself, is that while it may hold true that in a personal dictatorship, ENGOs 
have a bigger potential to influence environmental commitment, their presence 
is very much subject to the hostile attitudes of autocrats in the beginning. Hence, 
the primary challenge is more one of survival than of influence. Secondly, he 
assumes that a one-party system is more likely to provide public goods because 
the size of the winning coalition is too big for the autocrat to afford to reward 
each ally. This assumption ignores the dynamics of issue linkage between 
environmental protection and economic development in developing countries, 
such as China. Environmental public goods are not the only public good in China 
and the improvement of economic conditions is also deemed as a public good. 
Therefore, to further improve his research, one must look at the ways in which 
interests are aligned within China. This leads us to the national Chinese 
discussion of how environmental interests are related to other interests.  
Unlike the heavy emphasis placed on the correlation between regime 
type and environmental cooperation in the above approaches, research by 
Chinese scholars on environmental diplomacy tends to focus on national 
interests, business interests and China’s role in global environmental 
governance.  
National interests: these are understood as embedded in the conflict of 
interests between the Southern and Northern countries, or the developing and 
developed countries35. Security and the national image are the two principal 
constituents of the national interest in the post-Cold War world order. The 
                                                          
35 Haibin 海滨 Zhang 张, “‘zhong guo huan jing wai jiao chu tan’中国环境外交初探[A probe to 
China’s environmental diplomacy],” 北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),Journal of Peking 
University(Humanities and Social Sciences), no. 05 (1993): pp.37–43. 
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latter plays an increasingly important role, as political ideological differences 
have been diluted and the “green image” has become a defining factor in how a 
state is perceived in the international community36. National image matters to 
the Chinese government, as it demonstrates the international status of China as 
a rising power, which craves respect and prestige37. An improvement in the 
national image may also dilute what is called the “China threat” thesis from the 
West and ensure a benign political environment in which to facilitate China’s 
“peaceful rise”38.  
This focus on national image building can be seen from the “new 
environmental diplomacy perspective” (xin huanjing waijiaoguan 新环境外交观) 
of Wu Zhaoxue and Li Yuanzhe 39. They contend that this “new” perspective 
aims at constructing a harmonious world based on mutual help and the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.  The novelty of 
environmental diplomacy is echoed by Pan Yue who suggests that a new 
strategy must be developed in line with Hu Jintao’s “scientific outlook of 
development”, the dominant ideological line at the time40. Scholars like Yuan 
                                                          
36 Yi 毅 Wang 王, “‘huan jing wai jiao yu zhong guo’环境外交与中国 [Environmental diplomacy 
and China],” 科技潮 [Science and Culture], no. 01 (2000): p.13. 
37 Jie 捷 Zheng 郑, “‘Zhong Guo Huan Jing Wai Jiao de Fa Zhan Li Cheng Ji Qi Zai Guo Ji She Hui 
Zhong de Di Wei He Zuo Yong’中国环境外交的发展历程及其在国际社会中的地位和作用 [The 
Course and Its International Status and Role of China Environmental Diplomacy],” 福建环境
[Fujian Environment] 1 (2001). 
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Century],” 南京政治学院学报[Journal O F PLA Na Njing Institute of Politics] 24, no. 4 (2008): 
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39 Zhaoxue 兆雪 Wu 吴 and Yuanzhe 渊喆 Li 李, “‘He Hu Di Qiu Jia Yuan Gou Jian He Xie Shi Jie-
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境外交观 [A Brief Discussion of the New Environmental Diplomacy Perspective],” 理论建设
Theory Research 1 (2008): pp.34-35. 
40 Yue 岳 Pan 潘, “‘Ke Xue Fa Zhan Yu Huan Jing Bao hu’科学发展与环境保护[Scientific Outlook 
of Development and Environmental Protection],” Zi Guang Ge紫光阁  4 (2008): p.23. 
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Lihong 41 further propose adding Chinese characteristics to environmental 
diplomacy to use its political advantages to change the PRC’s vulnerable 
position in the globalisation of capitalism. Ye Jing goes further, linking 
traditional culture with environmental diplomacy, and emphasises the unity 
between nature and human beings as the ecological view for promoting the 
CCP’s orthodox foreign policy vision of a “harmonious world” 42.  No matter how 
new the perspective is, that China has a dual identity in global governance 
seems to be a consensus among academics. On the one hand, it is a developing 
country that is still in need of international assistance; on the other, the 
government portrays the image of a “responsible power” with the ambition of 
not only fulfilling commitments but also contributing more to global 
environmental governance43.  
Business interests: Around the time when China prepared to enter the 
WTO, discussion revolving around environmental diplomacy was shifting 
towards business interests with a particular concern about environmental trade 
barriers, or “green barriers”. For instance, Zhu argues that the environmental 
management standard of ISO 14000 imposed by European countries may pose a 
challenge for China’s exports and that Chinese enterprises should adopt this 
standard and seize the “green business opportunity” (lüse shangji绿色商机)44. 
                                                          
41 Lihong 丽红 Yuan 原, “从环境外交困境看中国生态文明建设,” 南京林业大学学报 [Journal of 
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Environmental cooperation was also expected by Chinese academics to be a 
diplomatic tool to solve trade disputes and references to the environment were 
held to be merely empty rhetoric45 . Zhu also highlights the role of transnational 
companies as bearers of higher environmental standards in global governance, 
which creates an intimate relationship between environmental cooperation and 
foreign trade and investment 46 .  Views on the relationship between 
environmental diplomacy and the green barrier have changed after more than 
ten years of discussion, however. Liu Dongguo from Renmin University, for 
example, refutes the idea that one must use diplomatic resources to “fight the 
battle of the green trade barrier”. Instead, the green transformation of the 
Chinese economy is the way to deal with non-tariff barriers47. The thesis of 
using international pressure to improve the domestic economic structure is 
echoed by Yu Hongyuan, who suggests that environmental diplomacy is a 
catalyst for the new energy industry in China48.  
Whereas Chinese researchers focus on the pursuit of Chinese interests in 
environmental cooperation, the English-language literature provides a rich 
understanding of how multilateral, regional, and bilateral interests shape or 
facilitate reform in the environmental protection sector. Choi, for example, 
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highlights how regional interests in Northeast Asia require environmental 
reform within China, as its trans-border pollution poses threats to the 
sustainable development of neighbouring countries49. The reason for this lies in 
the fact that China shares a land border with fourteen countries and rivers with 
fifteen countries50.  
Bilateral interest in China’s environmental condition is also linked to its 
significant presence in global trade. Ellis and Turner, for example, use the case 
of US-China cooperation on food safety to explain why decision-makers in the 
US are motivated to improve food security in China. The global food trade ties 
the food security challenge in China with those in the US as problems travel 
with products. Consequently, the US benefited from “sowing the seeds” in 
China51. Katherine Morton further advances our understanding regarding the 
willingness to cooperate and address a more challenging question of how to 
efficiently use bilateral and multilateral efforts to maximise output down to the 
local level. The assumption in her book is that environmental protection reform 
in China serves donor countries’ and organisations’ interests, and hence the 
effectiveness of invested environmental protection projects is positively linked 
to international donors’ interests 52 . To put it differently, enhancing 
environmental protection means not only making the effort to “tame the yellow 
dragon”, but also to benefit the green donors.  
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International sources of influence are indeed of critical importance, 
particularly in the early stage of environmental governance in China. Since the 
1970s, the country has been socialised into the international environmental 
community through learning and integration with global trade, which has 
facilitated the upgrade of environmental standards53. The permeation of 
globalisation through transnational linkages further prompts adjustment of 
industrial policies54 in a way that new issues such as environmental protection 
are addressed. Lü Jie summarises the different patterns of interaction between 
environmental diplomacy and domestic environmental governance in 
developed and developing countries. The key difference is that in developed 
countries, appeals are made to export environmental awareness and use 
international cooperation to solve problems.  Conversely, in developing 
countries, environmental awareness is imported and domestic political players 
absorb environmental protection, technology and international funding, which 
motivates environmental cooperation55. His model, though arguably over-
simplistic, has the virtue of making salient the way in which domestic interest 
groups adapt to international norms. Put differently, interest groups and 
environmental cooperation are connected not so much regarding how private 
interests are defended, or how global norms are observed. Instead, what is 
important is the way in which environmental cooperation influences the 
formation of interests groups and vice versa.  
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The focus of this research is thus to give domestic interests and interest 
groups equal value with international systematic factors, so as to understand 
the political dynamics of international environmental cooperation.  With 
China’s economic rise and ambition to portray itself as a leader in international 
environmental cooperation, it is increasingly important to examine not only 
how national leaders seek to derive benefits from environmental issues, but 
also how they manage to mobilise domestic resources behind the effort to make 
China a “green leader”.   Failure to factor in domestic group politics will result in 
understanding the gap between what China commits to and what it does as a 
fait accompli, instead of a subject to be scrutinised and a phenomenon to be 
explained. It is not to suggest that domestic groups are more important than 
international factors. Instead, this new perspective can be used to explain 
China’s performance in global environmental governance.  It also promises to 
shed light on the broader puzzle of the self-contradictory images of China as a 
“partial power”, in the words of David Shambaugh56.  
This survey of the literature on China’s domestic environmental 
governance, however, illustrates the puzzle of a discourse that is about interests 
yet lacks any focus on real interest groups. Lo and Leung, for example, highlight 
the permanent conflicts that take place between economic and environmental 
interests by analysing environmental governance through the lens of 
bureaucratic politics. It allows them to demonstrate that both central and local 
governments prioritise economic interests over environmental ones when the 
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two come into conflict57. Another pair of interests is domestic versus foreign 
interests in terms of environmental protection, which can be seen from articles 
discussing civil society organisations. Lu Yiyi thus indicates the awkward 
position of ENGOs in China’s environmental governance due to their close 
relationship with foreign funding58. In other words, ENGOs face the challenge of 
balancing pressure from international donors and domestic interests, which 
makes their participation in local environmental governance increasingly 
difficult. Even though environmental interests are advocated, the policy 
initiative which reflects them is short-lived, and tends to be ad hoc. Li Wanxin 
examines the effort of environmental information transparency and 
environmental violation sanctions and concludes that coalitions or pressure 
groups are constrained when it comes to addressing particular concerns, and 
are not united by a belief which enables them to persist59.  
The issue-based and ephemeral nature of environmental coalitions is 
further worsened by the rotation mechanism of local cadres in China. Eaton and 
Kotska thus find that a high turnover of chief provincial governors prompts a 
short-time horizon of local cadres60. As the leaders, usually party secretaries, 
decide on what priority is on their political agenda, the relationship between 
economic performance and political promotion leads to the habit of prioritising 
economic projects over environmental ones, and hence hinders the green 
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initiatives advocated by the central government. Even though local governors 
have an environmental awareness or a long-time horizon, this does not mean 
that their concerns with the environment will be translated into concrete 
policies. Tong Yanqi conducted surveys in six Chinese cities, investigating the 
perception of local elites, including officials and enterprise managers, of 
environmental governance. The survey results suggest that there is little 
correlation between environmental awareness and policy supportive of 
environmental protection. The top three causes of poor implementation of 
environmental initiatives are 1) conflict with economic development; 2) 
enterprises’ narrow interest; and 3) lack of environmental awareness among 
the public61. 
Whereas the abovementioned research highlights the importance of 
interests in analysing environmental politics in China, the following efforts go 
one step further regarding identifying groups and their matching benefits. 
Researchers have also devoted time to exploring interests of different political 
groups. Zhou et al identify three logics of Chinese bureaucracies in 
environmental governance: 1) meeting targets; 2) building coalitions; 3) and 
providing incentives62. I regard these three logics as the political interests of 
government agencies because they reflect the criteria of local cadre’s 
performance evaluation.  
Mertha deploys the concept of policy entrepreneurs - those who are 
willing to invest their resources for a political decision which is in their favour - 
so as to identify who is important as the authoritarian regime becomes 
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increasingly pluralised. He examines the issue of hydropower politics, and 
teases out three types of policy entrepreneurs: peripheral officials, journalists, 
and non-governmental organisations63. The focus of Mertha, however, is on the 
strategy of issue framing used by policy entrepreneurs, which treats the ability 
of policy entrepreneurs to tell a compelling story as an independent variable to 
explain policy outcomes. However, one of the case studies he uses as a 
successful example of policy entrepreneurs changing policies, namely the Nu 
River Hydropower Station, also proves to be the same case that undermines his 
argument.   
The Nu River controversy refers to the environmental campaign against 
the decision of the Yunnan government to dam the Nu River. In this case, 
environmental activists conveyed three key messages to the public: 1) The Nu 
River is a UNESCO world heritage site; 2) The project serves the interests of 
developers at the cost of those of residents; 3) Legal references are an 
important constituent of the controversy over the Nu River dam project 64. 
Environmental NGOs, both in Yunnan and Beijing, used these argument, to 
mobilise support and generate media attention on the Nu River project and 
their concerns finally arrived at the desk of former Premier Wen Jiabao, who 
decided to suspend the project after almost one year of the campaign. However, 
the dam has been secretly developed by China Huadian Corporation in the past 
decade. Sixty-six tributaries of the Nu River have been dammed by small 
hydropower stations and relocation and resettlement has taken place, while the 
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preparatory work has been conducted in secrecy65. The behaviour of Huadian is 
further approved by National Energy Administration which issued a notice 
regarding the Lancang River Hydropower development (No. 257) which grants 
Huadian’s responsibility for the Nujiang River hydropower stations66, indicating 
that the Nu River controversy is operationalised despite the media exposure a 
decade ago.  
It may seem to be an unfair criticism of Mertha’s analysis in 2009, as he 
could not foresee the decision in 2012. However, the development of the Nu 
River project from being a controversy and symbol of the successful 
participation of environmental activists to a project which was resumed due to 
enormous economic interests reveals the weakness of framing as a method. It is 
somewhat misleading to focus only on how policy entrepreneurs frame the 
issues because it masks the importance of interests and generates the illusion of 
their irrelevance. Furthermore, it confirms the necessity to take a closer look at 
the interest alignment, particularly how environmental interests penetrate and 
become embedded within economic ones. Furthermore, the example of the Nu 
River project verifies the need to bring research on interest groups into work on 
China’s environmental governance and foreign relations.  
By looking through the lens of interest groups it is therefore possible to 
modify the current debate over whether international or domestic factors play a 
bigger role in environmental protection reform in China. Instead, the crucial 
question asked and addressed here is how private groups localise the 
international norm of environmental protection based on their interests.  
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It should be stressed that interest groups, used in this research, are 
neutral. Rather than treating them as a necessary evil to environmental 
protection, I prefer to develop the premise that domestic interest groups in 
China can both promote and prohibit China’s international environmental 
cooperation and national environmental protection reform. What is certain is 
that interest is the main driver, and yet what is uncertain is the impact of their 
calculation on domestic and international environmental governance.   Interest 
groups can influence the policy making process as they have access, formal or 
informal, to decision-makers, and in the meantime, their pressure is a matter of 
the political survival of national leaders 67. The connection between the political 
future of autocratic rulers and the preferences of interest groups means that 
their fates are intertwined, which necessitates the forging of the political 
alliances that shape policy outcomes.   
 
 
1.3 Puzzles to solve 
This research seeks to solve two puzzles: one empirical and one 
theoretical. The empirical problem is how to understand a China that appears to 
be riddled with paradoxes when it comes to environmental governance: 
whereas Western scholars tend to laud China’s international environmental 
governance, Chinese academics and officials are more alert over its capabilities 
to deal with domestic environmental problems. The contradictory behaviour of 
the Chinese government leads Zhang Haibin, a renowned expert in China’s 
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environmental diplomacy, to state that “we are generous to the international 
community and outside world, but are mean to ourselves”. His comment is 
indicative of the contrast between the determination of the Chinese government 
in international environmental governance and the stagnant condition of 
environmental protection reform within China.  
The theoretical puzzle is how to theorise the role of interest groups in 
China’s environmental foreign relations. Interest groups as a theoretical 
framework have been off the radar in the current scholarly work. When Carter 
and Mol compare the similarities and differences between China and other 
developed countries in environmental governance, interest groups are neither 
mentioned in the similarities nor the differences. Instead, the similarities 
between China and other industrialised countries are summarised to be 
“decentralisation and flexibility”, “shift away from hierarchical command-and-
control system”, “hands-off approach to regulation” meaning an increasing role 
of the market; whereas the differences are “central role of the state”, 
“privatisation”, and, accordingly to Carter and Mol, a neglected and 
understudied “innovation” in China’s environmental governance 68 .  
Nevertheless, the similarities Carter and Mol foreground point to the 
significance of interest groups as decentralisation, the waning command-and-
control system, and increasing role of the market, all create space for non-state 
sectors to participate in policy-making and different interests to be considered 
in this process.  
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1.4 Case selection 
As shown before, I divide the existing literature into two broad 
categories, depending on the main variables, to explain China’s environmental 
foreign relations. One stream emphasises systemic factors and the other 
contends that domestic interests play a bigger role in the decision and 
realisation of environmental cooperation. Both streams examine questions such 
as how policies are made and treaties are negotiated, and yet these issues are 
just the beginning of China’s integration into the international system and set 
our expectation of China’s behaviour. This approach proves useful, and provides 
us with powerful insights into the motivation of key decision-makers to join the 
international environmental order. But the downside is that such an approach 
may lose the big picture. The question left unaddressed in these two strands is 
what happens next? Whereas “China has made impressive gains and developed 
a robust set of environmental laws” concerning legislation and standards-
setting, when attention shifts towards enforcement and implementation, “the 
picture looks different”69.  
Cooperation is more than making policy and signing environmental 
treaties. This research is designed to address the gaps and broaden the scope of 
existing research by extending the focus to three dimensions: treaty 
implementation, accumulation of experiences, and provision of an alternative 
norm. In other words, what happens after the national leaders commit to 
environmental cooperation is equally important as what happens before, 
particularly in the following up activities of implementation, accumulating 
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experience, and ultimately establishing distinct discursive power. Although 
these three dimensions are not necessarily linear, and in no ways take place in a 
chronological manner, they represent a trend of the paradigm of cooperation 
between China and the outside world and indicate the increasing ambition of 
China on the global stage. Furthermore, these three dimensions reflect the 
changing role of China from “a passive and defensive participant” to “an active 
organiser”70 . Unlike the literature discussed in the preceding section, this 
research aims to examine what happens after policies are made, commitments 
are declared, treaties are signed, and the ruling elites set a foreign policy 
position. Instead of treating poor implementation as an obstacle of policy 
making, I regard it as a dependent variable, or something to be explained.   
Domestic interest groups discussed in this thesis include line ministries, 
environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs), industrial sectors, 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), local governments, and intellectuals.  Line 
ministries, the main venue where foreign policy is formulated and projects 
approved, seem to be a self-evident type of interest group and represents 
bureaucratic interests. It has also become a fashion to use “civil society” to 
study the linkage between China’s international environmental governance and 
domestic environmental reform, which will be elaborated in the theory chapter. 
Indeed, civil society literature offers valuable insights into our understanding of 
state-society relations. ENGOs attempt to contribute to a more sustained 
environmental foreign relation through their information, expertise, and the 
ability to localise international norms. Moreover, the ambition of Chinese 
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ENGOs is not limited to influencing national governments, and, over time, they 
reach out to foreign territories, a trend dubbed as “NGOs Going Out”. Although 
their presence and influence remain weak, they have become a crucial 
component in China’s environmental relations71. Industrial sectors and SOEs’ 
role in environmental foreign relations are primarily on the dimension of 
implementation and business negotiation. However, their behaviour generates 
a significant impact on both the national image of China and on the credibility of 
China’s international commitments.  
 The importance of local governments is worth elaborating on here. As 
one type of interest group, local officials, in theory, represent interests that 
come within their jurisdiction. They can influence the central government in 
foreign relations by casting their perspectives on how local benefits can benefit 
from regional, bilateral, and multilateral cooperation. Joseph Cheng showcases 
the importance of provinces in regional economic cooperation as a platform to 
articulate the national interest and promote multi-polarity. Also, having 
provinces at the front of sub-regional cooperation allows China to “maintain a 
relatively low profile while seeking leadership and reducing external 
pressures”72. The second reason why local governments are an essential factor 
in environmental foreign relations comes from the projects which are 
implemented in various local jurisdictions, covering different levels of 
government: from Beijing to villages in backward provinces. Hence, local 
governments are not only a platform to implement international environmental 
initiatives, but also a place to generate Chinese experience from hands-on 
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implementation. For these two reasons, local governments are selected as an 
interest group that is under scrutiny, particularly in Chapter 7.  
 
 
1.5 Research question 
Growing out of the central hypothesis, the main research question this 
study aims to answer is how Chinese interest groups influence environmental 
foreign relations. I conceptualise environmental foreign relations across the 
spectrum which reflects the changing paradigms of environmental cooperation 
between China and the outside world. On one end of the spectrum is learning 
from best practice abroad, and on the other end is the provision of alternative 
methods, ideas, and norms which are claimed to be intrinsically Chinese. This 
spectrum is also indicative of the dual identity of the Chinese state in the global 
environmental governance: a follower and at the same time a prospective 
leader in global environmental governance. In accordance with this 
conceptualisation, this thesis examines three representative points along the 
spectrum, which can be understood as three dimensions of China’s 
environmental foreign relations. They are treaty implementation, the 
development of the Chinese experience, and the provision of an alternative 
norm to replace liberal environmentalism. Treaty implementation is situated at 
the end of learning, as this is an effort to follow suit and comply with 
international environmental norms. On the other end is the provision of the 
alternative norm of “ecological civilisation”. This notion, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 4, highlights the deployment of Chinese culture and philosophy in 
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pursuit of sustainable development.  Between these two ends there is located 
the development of the Chinese experience, which reflects a process by which 
the best practice of environmental governance from abroad is localised in China. 
Moreover, through trial and error, various exercises provide ingredients of the 
Chinese experience in which a Chinese environmental norm such as “ecological 
civilisation” is grounded.  
All these three dimensions involve a plurality of participants and groups 
which represent different interests. In order to answer the primary research 
question, three sub-questions are proposed to investigate three representative 
dimensions: how do interest groups influence China’s environmental foreign 
relations through 1) treaty implementation; 2) the development and 
deployment of the Chinese experience; 3) the provision of an alternative 
environmental norm.   
To address the first sub-question, I assume that interest groups in China 
can influence environmental treaty implementation so that treaties that are in 
line with group interests are better implemented than those which challenge 
their interests. Hence, the first sub-question provides a possible answer as to 
(Chapter 5) why some international environmental treaties are more 
substantively implemented than others. The second sub-question is predicated 
upon the basis that the Chinese experience, as a practice and a discourse, 
encapsulates interests of groups which are active in overseas economic and 
political activities. Therefore, Chapter 6 investigates how interest groups define, 
interpret, and deploy the Chinese experience to facilitate their pursuit of 
interests abroad. The third sub-question looks at groups which actively 
participate in the definition and realisation of “ecological civilisation” and 
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examines how interest groups make the alternative norms malleable to their 
specific interests (Chapter 7).  
 
 
1.6 Hypothesis 
 Lead hypothesis: The effective development and implementation of policies 
related to China’s environmental foreign relations depends on the 
correlation of those policies with the interests of particular domestic 
interest groups. 
 Theoretical hypothesis (Chapter 2): Interest groups use ideational factors to 
legitimise their interest maximisation in ways that make identity politics 
aggregate the various preferences that shape environmental foreign 
relations.  
 
 
1.7 Overview of my arguments 
I argue that the apparent contradictions in China’s domestic and 
international behaviour are a reflection of the bargaining of different domestic 
interest groups. By focusing on the dimensions of treaty implementation, the 
sharing of experience, and the provision of alternative norms, I identify the 
rationale underlying the ways in which domestic groups influence foreign 
relations. Industrial sectors and SOEs use environmental cooperation to 
enhance their competitiveness over foreign counterparts and open overseas 
markets; ENGOs, on the other hand, strive to achieve relevance in foreign policy 
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making by assisting the Chinese government to launch bilateral projects to 
disseminate Chinese experience, and by facilitating SOEs in investing that 
experience overseas. While it would be over-simplistic to assert that ENGOs 
have a better idea than the government of how to initiate and implement 
environmental cooperation projects, their vision, expertise, and experience 
affords them a place in environmental foreign relations. In terms of line 
ministries, bureaucratic interests include achieving leadership position in the 
complex dynamic of environmental governance, acquisition of resources, and 
the inertia that prevents sharing power with other government departments. 
The local governor’s interest in environmental foreign relations is to get the 
attention of the central government and international community, and to attract 
foreign investment to boost the local economy. 
The interests of intellectuals are in slightly similar vein, regarding their 
desire to gain the attention of the major decision makers. Also, the political 
interest of intellectuals is to remind the national leaders of the political 
boundary of developmentalist policies.  
In the process of coalition formation, the strategic concepts of 
environmental diplomacy and the Chinese experience, together with the 
composite ideology of ecological civilisation, justify interest groups’ efforts to 
pursue their interests. However, the economic substance behind these concepts 
limits the extent to which China can convincingly project its green national 
image and its leadership position in global environmental governance.  
Last but not least, my findings suggest that a lack of a shared 
environmental norms among domestic groups renders it inevitable that it is an 
economic identity that emerges and prevails in environmental cooperation. This 
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empirical observation results in the ranking and aggregation of different 
interests against the criteria of economic gain and loss rather than 
environmental norms. To provide an alternative norm to the current view on 
sustainable development, or the low-carbon economy, the Chinese government 
thus has to work with interest groups to find a way to go beyond this 
submission of policy to the narrow criteria of economic development.  
 
 
1.8 Thesis outline 
Chapter 2 starts by establishing a theoretical framework to examine how 
domestic groups influence foreign relations and to what degree interest groups 
in China play a role in China’s international environmental cooperation. My 
approach to the theory chapter is to combine mainstream IR theory with an 
understanding of politics in China. It is of particular importance to understand 
how the concept of “interest” is perceived in China and what practical concerns 
arise in the analysis of the phenomenon of “interest groups” in an authoritarian 
regime. The benefit of such an approach is that it allows me to base my 
analytical framework on local conditions and expose the limitations of IR 
theories.  
The starting point of the theoretical discussion is the rationalistic 
institutionalism advocated by Milner, as it suggests that there is a causal 
mechanism between domestic factors that shapes international cooperation. It 
is during the application of this rationalistic framework to China (which was 
originally tested against the cases in Great Britain and the United States), that 
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the ideational dimension and the issue of identity emerge as other two 
explanatory elements.  
I then refer to Woodruff Smith’s idea of a “composite ideology” and Jack 
Snyder’s use of the logrolling model of decision-making to explore the 
interaction between ideas and interests. It allows the identity politics of China 
to be incorporated as a factor into the last section, to demonstrate that the 
biggest shortcoming of applying rationalist institutionalism to China is that 
institutions cannot aggregate domestic preferences. Rather, this depends on 
identity politics, meaning that the way in which China’s role is articulated 
shapes decisions made about how China interacts with the rest of the world.  At 
the end of this chapter, I propose a framework of constructivist utilitarianism to 
incorporate interests, ideas, and identity to explain China’s performance in 
international environmental cooperation. The main theoretical argument is 
thus that ideas are used to justify interests and national identity is used to 
aggregate domestic preferences.  
Chapter 3 goes on to explain the methodological tools I use to gather 
evidence, which are both quantitative and qualitative. Archival research was 
used primarily for Chapter 4, content analysis for Chapters 5 and 7, semi-
structured interviews and comparative case studies for all the empirical 
chapters, and participant observation for Chapter 7. The justification for each 
method, together with their limitations, will be provided in this section.  
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the interests, institutions, ideas, and 
identity politics that are related to environmental foreign relations. I find that 
the institutions in charge of environmental foreign relations are poorly 
established and far from being a platform that can effectively aggregate 
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domestic preferences. What is more important is to bypass institutional 
constraints to reach a certain objective. With regards to ideas and identity, 
strategic concepts are explained and the relationship between environmental 
protection and nationalism is explored.   
As this thesis covers environmental foreign relations from 1984 to 2015, 
I roughly categorise three stages of China’s engagement in environmental 
foreign relations: 1984 to 2000 as the phase of learning; 2000 to 2010 as the 
stage of pinpointing the problems and challenges of international cooperation; 
and from 2010 onwards Beijing puts more effort into projecting itself as a 
discursive power and hence works on the normative dimension of global 
environmental governance. In line with this categorisation, I choose three 
dimensions to reflect the changing attitudes towards China’s role in the global 
environmental governance and examine how interest groups exert their 
influence in these three aspects. As mentioned above, these are treaty 
implementation, sharing the Chinese experience, and setting alternative norms.   
Chapters 5 to 7 present three pairs of comparative case studies from the 
aspects of treaty implementation (Chapter 5), sharing Chinese experience 
(Chapter 6), and setting alternative norms (Chapter 7). Each empirical chapter 
illustrates a distinct pattern of interaction among interests, ideas, and identity 
and yet all verify that China’s environmental foreign relations are fractured by 
the actions of interest groups. Interest groups relevant to these chapters include 
industrial sectors, government institutions, social organisations, SOEs, local 
governments and the academic community.  
Chapter 5 investigates the empirical question of why some international 
environmental treaties are better implemented than others. It is predicated on 
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the assumption that implementation has political implications and is an 
important way for domestic actors to have their voices heard. It starts with a 
discussion of environmental diplomacy as a strategic concept in the ideational 
dimension, which is used to justify international cooperation. From this 
perspective, “environmental diplomacy” can be used to build compromise 
between nationalistic, inward-looking ideological concerns and the practical 
need to borrow from other countries’ experiences. While this justifies China’s 
willingness to engage in multilateral, bilateral, and regional platforms, however, 
it does not rationalise why domestic groups should follow the commitments 
that are made by the government. Consequently, domestic interests continue to 
play an active part in treaty implementation.  
I use the implementation of the Montreal Protocol and Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) to examine what makes successful implementation 
possible and to tease out the important variable of domestic interests. This 
verifies the claim that groups that see direct benefits from treaty 
implementation are more likely to implement environmental agreements. The 
definitional issue of “better implementation” is solved by the category of 
enforcement versus compliance, as well as substantive versus procedural 
patterns of implementation. The distinction between compliance versus 
enforcement is made to differentiate governments’ efforts to regulate and 
interest groups’ desire to follow regulations. In this way, implementation can be 
understood as political, because non-implementation functions as a form of 
protest.  
The distinction of substantive and procedural categories thus makes it 
possible to assess whether efforts serve the objectives of a particular 
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international agreement. I suggest that the tactic for building a compromise 
between global commitment and domestic opposition is to give preference to 
procedural performance over substantive efforts. The pro forma style of 
implementation that this implies reflects how domestic interests override the 
idea of environmental diplomacy. It, however, does not mean that the ideational 
dimension is not critical; instead, an “opponent” concept is deployed. This can 
be seen in the role played by the idea of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in 
the discussion of the Convention on Biological Diversity. IPRs functions as 
protective of the Chinese Traditional Medicine Industry, whereas CBD sets 
limits on it. Therefore, IPR as an idea is deemed to have a priority over 
environmental diplomacy. The reason why IPR “steals the thunder” of 
environmental diplomacy is that the former justifies the interests of a strategic 
industry, which plugs in the formation of national identity.  
Chapter 6 process-traces Global Environmental Institution’s (GEI) 
overseas operation, which is aimed at sharing “Chinese experience” with other 
developing countries. Since the introduction of the Going Global policy, Chinese 
social organisations have been enthusiastic about facilitating Chinese 
companies’ adventures overseas and a wave of “Chinese NGOs going out” has 
become a new fashion, particularly since Chinese NGOs can be more active in 
international cooperation than at home. The primary asset of Chinese social 
organisations, despite their lack of resources and personnel, is their expertise, 
knowledge and professionalism. It is this that is boiled down to the formula of 
the “Chinese experience”. It reflects a mode of South-South Cooperation, as it is 
shared among other developing countries that consider China is the fastest-
growing developing country in the world. GEI, sharing the same mentality, 
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proposed a sustainable land management project between the newly 
established National Land Management Authority in the neighbouring Laos and 
the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), which hoped to share the experience of 
environmental governance in China with the impoverished neighbour. However, 
this project did not come into fruition, mainly because the officials from 
MOFCOM did not see the direct economic benefits from this project. Not being 
able to establish a government partnership, GEI works instead to cooperate 
with Sinohydro, a Chinese SOE investing hydropower station in Laos, with GEI 
advocating the need for Sinohydro to fulfil its Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) expectations.  
The reason why Sinohydro was willing to partner with GEI derives from 
GEI’s experience in biogas digester installation. In addition, GEI’s assistance in 
environmental and social action not only lowers the risk of Sinohydro but 
accumulates the latter’s experience in overseas investment. The aborted project 
of GEI and MOFCOM and the cooperation between GEI and Sinohydro point to 
the conclusion that Chinese experience is not an unconditionally convenience 
concept for the Chinese government to advocate: on the one hand, it justifies 
GEI’s efforts to contribute to environmental foreign relations; and on the other 
hand, it draws the attention to the fact that the government institutions are very 
inexperienced in environmental cooperation and hence have to share power 
with actors that are traditionally excluded from foreign relations.   
Chapter 7 builds on the findings of Chapters 5 and 6 by further 
examining how interest groups fight for the interpretation of one single concept 
so as to ensure their preferences are reflected. Instead of using the term 
“strategic concept”, however, I deploy the idea of a “composite ideology” to 
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scrutinise the nature of “ecological civilisation”, due to its comprehensive 
features and the appearance of an alternative norm. Various players are   at   
play in the complex game of ecological civilisation. Bureacaries such as MEP and 
NDRC fought over the leadership position. Leftist and bureaucrats argue over 
the boundary of developmentalism. Last but not least, local governors compete 
with each other to secure high-quality investment by implementing ecological 
civilisation. I observe the rise of new, weak interest groups and their tactic of 
using international attention to promote their domestic agenda. The ideational 
dimension is particularly salient in this chapter particularly when a political 
slogan is in the embryonic stage, which leaves space for different interest 
groups to influence its interpretation. Whether their preferences find a place in 
foreign policy remains to be seen, but a more direct consequence is that each 
has garnered its international audience, and together, they represent different 
images and transmit different messages of China to the outside world.  
 Chapter 8 concludes with a summary of the findings, limitations and 
suggestions for future research, theoretical implications and policy 
recommendations.  
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Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
 
 
2.1 “Foreign relations” as subject field 
This research situates itself between Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and 
International Relations (IR). FPA is what Hudson calls “actor-specific theory and 
the Ground of International Relations”73. Unlike previous research, this paper 
does not examine how foreign policy is made by closed-door elite negotiation, 
and confine the focus to a limited number of decision makers. Instead, what 
interests me is how domestic players influence the motivation and performance 
of China’s environmental cooperation in the process of implementation. 
Implementation is largely ignored in FPA, as observed and reflected upon by 
Alden and Aran74 .  Yet the importance of implementation is articulated by 
Clarke namely that “implementation is in itself a highly political part of the 
decision process”, rather than purely “technical or administrative in nature” 75.  
Implementation is political because it engenders policy change. The 
connection between policy implementation and policy change used here is 
inspired by Kellee Tsai’s analytical framework of adaptive informal institutions 
in her case study of private entrepreneurs in China. Adaptive informal 
institutions refer to “responses to the chasm between formal institutions and 
practical interests and desires”76. She argues that even in authoritarian regimes, 
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institutions are “not simply imposed and enforced by state agents and other 
proprietors of formal institutions”, but “depend on human interaction for their 
survival and transformation”, bringing the “relational and interactive 
ontology”77  to our understanding of institutions and how to explain “regime 
durability amid change” 78.  What Tsai contributes to the study of Foreign Policy 
is that policy formulation is not the end point, and the way in which policy 
changes gradually through implementation helps us to develop a more realistic 
expectation regarding the fate of a negotiated policy and national stance. More 
importantly, acknowledging the salience of the implementation of policy affords 
a better understanding of how domestic players play their part in foreign affairs.  
In this respect, foreign policy is not the primary focus of this research.  
Rather, it is the formulation of the broader set of foreign relations that is more 
relevant to the research question of how domestic groups play their part in 
China’s international cooperation. The relational dimension has two 
connotations: first, it refers to relations among domestic and international 
players, which are expected to be a useful constituent of inter-state relations; 
second and more abstractly, it acknowledges the relationship between policy 
formulation and implementation, the interaction of which engenders change.   
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2.2 Explanatory factors: Interests, Ideas, Institutions and Identity 
 
2.2.1 Rationalist institutionalism (RI) 
The rationalist institutionalist research agenda, proposed by Milner aims 
to take domestic factors seriously in the field of International Relations79. 
Whereas Kenneth Waltz distinguishes international and domestic factors80, 
Milner argues, a decade later, that “each of the international factors logically 
works through domestic variables to have an impact on a state’s preferences 
and policies” 81 .  In her previous work, Milner surveys mainstream IR 
approaches, which explain why countries cooperate primarily by international 
forces and categorises them into four types: “the distribution of power”, “sense 
of threat”, “structure of the game among states”, and “the existence of 
international regimes” 82.  She criticises these four theses as being built upon a 
false assumption that all states act and react to a similar situation in the same 
way, and as a consequence, the differences among states are glossed over.   
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Moreover, Milner theorises international cooperation through the 
dimensions of domestic preferences (Interests), domestic distribution of power 
(Institutions) and information distribution (Information)83. She argues that 
states cooperate not merely because of international pressure, but as an 
extension of domestic bargaining and interaction of preferences. By bringing 
domestic actors, in her case executive, legislative and interest groups, to the 
agenda of explaining international cooperation, Milner further questions the 
realist assumption that the international system is anarchic. Instead, anarchy 
and hierarchy may be seen to be two poles of any political system, domestic and 
international, and the international system is polyarchic, meaning that “actors’ 
preferences differ” and “decision making must be shared”84. 
The assumption that underpins rationalist institutionalism is that 
institutions are expected to “aggregate diverse preferences into a collective 
outcome”85 depending on the norms, rules, and procedures of institutions. The 
strength of the assumption regarding the institution-interests nexus is that it 
allows the rationalist institutionalist model to be applied to other political 
contexts. Nonetheless, the downside, as acknowledged by Milner herself, is 
whether the importance of institutions questions the capability of institutions 
to aggregate preferences.   
The following efforts are made to explore how to operationalise rational 
institutionalism by examining units of analysis based on discussions about the 
configuration of China’s state-society relations in the context of the Party-State 
authoritarian regime. I identify three candidates as the unit of analysis: civil 
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society, policy network and interest groups. All three are premised on the 
political plurality and de-centralisation of power in China since the Reform and 
Open Policy, and differ in ways which they break down state-society relations 
into manageable units.   
2.2.1.1 Unit of Analysis: Civil Society 
The study of civil society groups in China is controversial because it is 
liable to generate expectations of political transformation and ignites hopes of 
change in the authoritarian regime86.  For instance, the broad usage of the 
Internet by the Chinese is said to “energise” civil society and arguably 
contribute to China’s democratisation87.  The concept of civil society as a means 
of understanding the changing state-society dynamics in the environmental 
governance has a level of appeal among both Chinese and Western scholars 88 
At the same time, the degree to which environmental organisations reinvigorate 
civil society and bring change to the political reality in China is contested. 
Whereas some argue for a positive change brought about by environmental 
activists and organisations albeit with political constraints89, others would 
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rather support the claim that environmental organisations are co-opted to the 
existing political system, and the primary task for these organisations is to 
adapt to, not to oppose the authoritarian regime90 . 
The critique of applying the value-laden concept of civil society to an 
authoritarian regime derives mostly from the question of autonomy. Treating 
Government-organised NGOs (GONGOs) as a subject epitomises the concerns of 
autonomy. GONGOs were created in 1998 by the national government to 
provide jobs for laid-off government officials and staff in SOEs, and the 
organisation was used as a magnet to attract foreign aid, talents and 
technology91.  What GONGOs reflect on is beyond the question of autonomy; 
instead, they beg the question of power distribution between state and non-
state actors.  
The institutional set-up to regulate civil society actors provides a 
vantage point in terms of how the state manages and controls non-state actors. 
Hildebrandt observes that the procedures for registering social organisations 
are so complicated that many NGOs prefer not to register. The unregistered 
status of social groups places them in an indefensible position, as they are more 
vulnerable to local government control, which further limits their capabilities 
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and the scope of their political activities92. Social organisations must be 
affiliated with a governmental agency and operate within the purview of the 
state apparatus. The most recent example of limiting NGO’s role through 
legislation is the passage of the Management of Foreign NGOs’ Activities within 
Mainland China adopted by the 12th National People’s Congress in April 2016. 
The Law grants more power to public security organs to limit the funding and 
sets a harshly high threshold of registration, such as the consent of a Chinese 
supervisory unit, which effectively screens out many foreign NGOs from even 
registering93. Ironically, the law uses the banner of legal protection to repress 
the development of NGO and the passage of this law typifies how vulnerable 
social organisations are in the current institutional setup. The practical concern 
of social organisations is thus not autonomy, but the resources which can be 
used in the limited political space.  
This leads to an increasing focus on the dimension of policy, which 
revolves around the question of how actors and groups within the authoritarian 
regime influence policy-making and implementation. Personal charisma as an 
explanatory factor constitutes one stream of civil society studies94. Perhaps 
there is no more telling example of personal charisma than Liang Congjie, the 
founder of China’s first environmental NGO, “Friends of Nature”. Liang has been 
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in the committee of Population Resources and Environment under the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference since 1989. Having witnessed the 
worsening ecological condition of China, he established the first ENGO in 1993, 
which was warmly welcomed by governmental officials95 . Liang’s distinguised 
family background facilitates his cause of   environmental protection: the son of 
Liang Sicheng (the “father” of modern Chinese architecture) and Lin Huiyin 
(renowned modern architect and writer), and the grandson of Liang Qichao, the 
most significant reformist philosopher and a leader of the Hundred Days’ 
Reform during the late Qing dynasty. Liang’s efforts, together with his family 
background, augment the aura surrounding him and represent the ardent 
enthusiasm of patriotic intellectuals.     
Hildebrandt contextualises and incorporates the personal factors into 
the opportunity structure. He adds other dimensions including the political 
opportunities created by government policies and economic opportunities, such 
as funding sources 96 . Whereas Hildebrandt demonstrates where the 
opportunities are, Mertha and Teets identify strategies used by social 
organisations, addressing the question of how to seize the opportunity and 
influence the decision-making process. Mertha focuses on issue framing, 
articulation and amplification97, as a strategy for traditionally excluded actors 
to gain access to the decision making process. Teets, meanwhile, observes two 
channels through which a social organisation’s messages come to be heard 
more effectively, namely, information dissemination and interpersonal 
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connections98. She construes a model of consultative authoritarianism that can 
capture the interaction between social organisations and local governments as 
the ability of the former to create “positive learning experiences”, which for the 
latter results in a new type of state-society relationship.  
The literature mentioned above offers an insightful examination of the 
role of social organisation, its limitations, strategies and influence on the 
authoritarian regime. Such empirical observations and analytical frameworks 
discount the importance of institutions as alternative factors, while making 
factors such as individual charisma and networks are more empirically salient. 
What we observe is not the institution as a mechanism to aggregate domestic 
preferences, but rather, as an obstacle which prevents a diversity of preferences 
and which must be overcome by informal channels. In fact, NGOs in China are 
confined to provide services and social welfare to the disadvantaged. By 
institutional design, which is not in support of social organisations, their ability 
to represent and express interests is neglected, if not repressed. The 
institutional bias is sharply observed by Howell regarding how the idea of civil 
society is translated into Chinese, reflecting the localisation of this concept to 
the political context99.  
He Baogang documents how Chinese intellectuals wrestle with the idea 
and the essence of civil society through the process of translation, and observes 
different emphases100. Chinese scholars offer three translations, depicting a 
nuanced cognitive diversity and various functions of civil society. The first 
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attempt to comprehend this notion is an emphasis on the urban population and 
business relations. Shen Yue, for instance, terms the burgeoning social 
organisations as “townspeople society”(shiminshehui 市民社会  ) 101 . An 
alternative conceptualisation is that of “gongminshehui”公民社会 , as 
interpreted by Liu Zhiguang and Wang Suli102. Gong means public and gongmin 
translates to citizens. Gongminshehui generates a sense of public sphere 
expounded by Jürgen Habermas103. This translation demonstrates intellectuals’ 
yearning for a public domain in which individual rights and equality may be 
promoted. This translation has its caveats though. Calling the Chinese citizens, 
instead of masses which is preferred in the official lingo, irritates the 
Communist Party elites because it empowers the people. It was thus forbidden 
in 2011 to discuss citizens and civil society in official Chinese newspapers104. 
Gongmin has been replaced by gonggong 公共 (public) to avoid the implication 
of empowered citizens. The third translation is minjianshehui 民间社会, adding 
a confrontational dimension. Minjianshehui pits civil society against the state, 
and puts civil society beyond the control of the Communist Party. Chen Kuide, a 
prominent Chinese scholar who was forced into exile due to the 1989 
Tiananmen crackdown, enshrines the principle of independence from the state 
within his discussion of China’s civil society.105 Inspired by the Solidarity 
movement in Poland, Chen’s conceptualisation regards civil society as 
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antithetical to despotism. From shiminshehui to minjianshehui, the term is 
increasingly politicised, and yet the concrete interest that civil society 
represents remains blurred; once the interest is clearer, it is banned. As a result, 
civil society organisations are preferably called “social organisations”, and are 
expected to shoulder some social responsibilities that the state is unable to 
conduct.  
For analytical purposes, and in order to maximise the benefits of civil 
society discussion to this research, I draw on Howell’s definition of civil society 
as “the realm of independent civic association around shared concerns through 
deliberative processes and actions” to allow an in-depth analysis of “a range of 
organizational forms that vary in their degree of formality”106 and their 
influence on China’s foreign relations. 
2.2.1.2 Unit of Analysis: Interest Groups 
Howell calls for the need to bring capitalism into the civil society 
discussion to get out of the binary frame of state versus society and scrutinise 
the role of the market in the transitional period. To operationalise this direction, 
I include interest groups in the “realm of independent civil association” to fill 
the gap between civil society organisations and organisations that can 
represent special interests. The value of group politics and the interest group 
perspective is underestimated in the study of China’s politics. It is partly 
because the very idea of special interest is traditionally neither justified nor 
recognised in the political culture of China as people were instilled with the 
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tenet that “it was improper and dangerous to assert self-interest in making any 
claims upon the political system”107.  
However, the cultural taboo does not help us to understand the 
dynamics of political activities in contemporary China and the group 
perspective transcends cultural barriers. Interest groups might be culturally 
downplayed, and yet their political significance cannot be neglected. Indeed, 
Bentley states that “all phenomena of government are phenomena of groups 
pressing one another, forming one another, and pushing out new groups and 
group representatives to mediate the adjustments”108.  
Deriving from studies of American politics, the study of interest groups 
looks at “the organisation, aggregation, articulation, and intermediation of 
societal interests that seek to shape public policies”109. The hallmarks of interest 
groups, accordingly, are organisational, political interests and informality110.  
The power of interest groups derives from the type of interest and resource 
endowment111. Interest group is categorised by Clive based on the criterion of 
membership, highlighting the identity of individual members such as farmers 
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and students, organisational interests such as trade associations, and 
institutional interests like government agencies112.   
Interest groups are thus a universal phenomenon and a particularly 
useful perspective for understanding authoritarian regimes. Since the 1980s, in 
fact, the study of politics in China has been inspired by interest groups in the 
Soviet Union (USSR). For instance, Waller categorises the USSR and China as the 
communist regime type, and differentiates the role of interest groups from 
those in liberal democracy. Instead of being pressure groups as in liberal 
democracies, they interact within “a wide…almost ubiquitous governmental 
administration”113. Scholars applying group politics in the communist countries 
thus jettison the assumption that each communist regime is a unitary actor. 
Furthermore, the group perspective places the fragmentation of political power 
at the forefront in highly-controlled states like the Soviet Union and China114.  
Lieberthal and Oksenberg systematically examine the fragmented structure of 
authority under the category of “fragmented authoritarianism”. They observe 
four tiers of policy making from core to periphery, and stress the salience of 
consensus building as a consequence of fragmented authority115. 
The highlighting of fragmentation redefines the milieu of decision-
making, as policy making is made in a “complex and multi-levelled” 
environment and involves building coalitions among those who share similar 
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interests and beliefs116 . Research thus proceeds to investigate the role of the 
individual, social organisation, business groups and the state apparatus, as well 
as different levels of government, so as to present the dynamic decision-making 
process. The function of key individuals includes “political broker and 
middleman” such as local governors in Goodman’s analysis117. Individuals like 
provincial leaders in China thus need on the one hand to “win recognition from 
central leaders” and on the other hand, to satisfy local constituencies118. 
Jakobson and Knox draw our attention to new foreign policy actors in China 
against the backdrop of fragmented authoritarianism. Included are business 
elites, military staff, academia and research institutions, media, and civil society 
organisations. They are, however, not suggesting that these new actors can 
directly influence foreign policy. Rather, their presence sets hurdles for 
coordinating foreign policy making and, to some extent, complicates the 
calculation of the “national interest” as domestic preferences have to be taken 
into account by decision makers119.  
This fragmented nature of authority raises the question of how central 
government manages decentralised policy making and to what extent it should 
get involved. Brodsgaard contends that decision making can be integrated via 
personnel control, specifically incorporating business groups in the 
nomenklatura system. This response is against the backcloth of economic 
reform and the emergence of new interest groups which “derived legitimacy by 
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symbolising China’s economic rise”120 . The nomenklatura system, as an 
institutional design from the Soviet Union, ties up the economic interests of 
business groups with political careers so tightly that economic liberalisation is 
kept under political control.   
Instead of arguing for this kind of “integrated fragmentation thesis”, 
Harrison and Kostka look at the balancing of priorities and the alignment of 
interests in China and India121. They argue that a strong authoritarianism with a 
high degree of decentralisation determines that the Chinese government takes a 
state-signalling approach. This means that the national government provides 
guidelines and targets to steer policy implementation. In contrast, India adopts 
a market-plus approach using the mechanism of price to motivate energy-
efficient industries. Different players sharing a common interest form an 
informal coalition, balance priorities, and collectively push forward certain 
policies. The state-signalling approach indicates that the state’s capabilities to 
micro-manage policies are limited, and it is up to domestic groups to respond to 
those signals.  
The above valuable insights into the nature of politics in an authoritarian 
regime lead me to choose interest group perspective as a unit of analysis as the 
first step to apply rationalistic institutionalism to the context of China. The 
survey of civil society literature demonstrates that environmental governance 
in China involves a plurality of state and non-state actors. The role of 
institutions, is, however, discounted due to the common usage of informal 
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channels for non-state actors to express their concerns. Furthermore, 
institutions are far from a mechanism to aggregate domestic preferences as civil 
society organisations are reduced to service providers and their articulation of 
interests are muted. Instead of labelling social organisations as civil society 
actors, I regard them as interest groups, and examine how the interests of 
business groups and bureaucracies are maximised, reconciled, or compromised.  
2.2.1.3 Definition of Interest and Categorisation of Interest Groups 
An additional advantage of using interest groups as the unit of analysis is 
that it helps to enhance sensitivity to the cultural context. This is because there 
has been an intense debate in China over the implications of the rise of new 
interest groups, which has generated a body of academic analysis in Chinese. 
The fact that this debate is taking place at all is prima facia evidence that the 
topic is of political importance in China. 
The definition of “interest”, when translated into Chinese as liyi 利益, is 
contested among Chinese scholars as Chen Shuisheng summarises122. Hong 
Yuanpeng and Gao Fan offer a comprehensive overview of current 
interpretations which respectively conceptualises interests as 1) benefit; 
2)need; 3)value; 4)rights; 5)capability, 6)relationship/guanxi123. The first thesis 
that interest is “benefit” derives from the etymology of the word, as interest is 
translated into a word comprising two Chinese characters: li 利 and yi 益. The 
first character 利 refers to the action of using farm tools to harvest crops and 
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collect fruits, and its extended meaning is a useful device for human beings. The 
second character 益 is a phonetic loan character, or interchangeable character, 
of 溢 which means overflow and thereby 益 expresses the increase in quantity. 
Putting these two characters together, liyi 利益 is directly translated into 
increased benefits124.  
One step beyond the etymological understanding is the second claim that 
interest is a need, both materialistic and spiritual125. The third thesis is built 
upon the argument of need and argues that interest is the realisation and 
recognition of values which determines the degree of satisfaction of various 
needs126. The value/interest connection introduces subjectivity and a sense of 
personal judgement to the discussion of “interest”. The fourth claim is the 
flipside of the previous one, which links interest with rights, and argues that the 
realisation of benefits is intimately associated with the arrangements of rights. 
Interests, according to this understanding, are the fundamental motivation of 
human behaviour127. We can contextualise the value and rights theses in the 
structure-agency dichotomy: the former emphasises the role of the agency with 
a highlighted importance of subjectivity and judgment, whereas the latter 
perceives interest as a structure within which rights can be exercised and 
protected.  
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The fifth thesis explores the question of what makes the realisation of 
interests possible, and points to the dimension of capabilities 128 . This 
interpretation extends etymological deconstruction of interest, liyi, by 
understanding the first character li not only as a fact of using farm tools, but 
also the ability to do so to achieve harvests, or generally, goals.  The final 
interpretation pays extra attention to the relational aspect of interest, and 
contends that the societal attribute of interest is the relationship and network 
(guanxi 关系)129. The sociological interpretation of interest foregrounds the 
process within which a network is formulated to realise particular interests 
inevitably through the exchange of social capital.  
Two observations from the Chinese academic discussion of defining 
interest emerge: interests have a normative dimension, as they involve a 
subjective judgment; and secondly, the relational aspect plays an important part 
in the realisation of certain interests. These various and yet interrelated 
conceptualisations of interest within the Chinese academic community are 
boiled down by Chen Shuisheng to two generic categorisations: materialistic 
and “value-related” (jiazhixing 价值性) interest130. The problem with this 
categorisation is that although it is succinct and overarching, his terminology of 
value-related is misleading. Within the value-related category are both 
materialistically-oriented elements of power, prestige, social status, and 
influence, and normative factors such as beliefs.  
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Therefore, to clarify the different understandings of interest without 
emphasising the differences within them, I decide to categorise them along the 
line of materialistic and value-based interests from three perspectives: 
economic, political, and social. Economic interests can be measured in monetary 
terms. One good example of economic interest is profitability for enterprises or 
commercial venues obtained by local governments. Political interests, on the 
hand, refer to the capabilities, resources, and access to the policy-making 
sphere and epitomising this dimension are power, prestige, and influence. 
Social interests are largely normative and attend to public goods. A telling 
example of social interest would be environmental social organisations’ 
advocacy of better living quality and less pollution for the general public.  
In the process of categorising interest groups, it is interesting to notice 
that the undercurrent of the academic debate revolving around categorisation is 
whether interest groups are a positive or negative force of reform in China. The 
answer is essential for discussing how to incorporate them into the political 
system. To be specific, interest groups, in general, are seen as natural 
development which might bring positive outcomes to the reform, whereas 
vested interest groups (jideliyijituan 既得利益集团) are detrimental to both 
reform and the very survival of the Party-State. 
Deng Yuwen thus perceives vested interest groups as a small proportion 
of people in the privileged classes who possess and control public power and 
resources131. The goal for this kind of interest group is to maintain vested 
interests regarding money and power. There are three criteria to decide which 
invested interest groups are. The first criterion is that they manage to “plunder” 
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or take the majority of benefits due to Reform and Opening Policy. The second 
standard is that further political reform will damage the group’s vested interest, 
which explains their lack of interest in political reform. The third benchmark is 
the capability of these groups to steer reform in their preferred direction: 
namely, more economic reform and less political reform. 
 Built upon these three criteria, Deng outlines seven vested interest 
groups in China and exemplifies the economic landscape of interest groups. The 
first group refers to powerful government agencies and departments in which 
the power to control and allocate resources gives rise to peculiar departmental 
and individual interests, resulting in rent-seeking and corruption. The second 
group is local government and cadres which the central government finds 
difficult to constrain, as their parochial interests differ from the national. 
Usually, local interests are in the form of the personal gains of local governors 
by corruption and commodifying their power through projects related to 
urbanisation, attracting investment, land transaction and real estate.  
The next type of vested interest group is Central State-Owned 
Enterprises (yangqi央企) and their senior management. SOEs usually control 
the critical and strategic industries of China, such as energy. Unlike 
Brodsgaard’s argument about central government’s capabilities to control SOEs, 
SOEs have taken advantage of political, economic, and financial privileges to 
maximise their profits and draw up policy supporting their narrow interests, 
instead of the public good. Deng uses the example of PetroChina Company and 
Sinopec to demonstrate how SOEs have formed a unique and even hereditary 
system as the employment decision is dictated by nepotism, namely, whether 
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the candidate’s family works in this sector plays a predominant role in the 
recruitment decision.  
The fourth vested interest group is transnational capital and its Chinese 
agents, or “foreign compradors” (yang maiban 洋买办).  These foreign 
compradors are composed of political elites who use top-level connections to 
act as agents for transnational corporations, epitomising the marriage between 
power and capital. Deng singles out real estate developers as the fifth group, 
because the real estate industry becomes a pillar industry in the majority of 
local jurisdictions. It reallocates national income, and has become a hotbed of 
rent-seeking and corruption. The sixth group is made up of private 
entrepreneurs whose success story is inevitably intertwined with power 
collusion. The last group is composed of those experts and scholars affiliated 
with the above mentioned six groups, who use their knowledge resources and 
expertise, to provide a service to other interest groups. Deng contends that the 
above listed vested interest groups are in direct opposition to the public’s 
interest, and are the primary obstacle to socio-political reform. ‘Vested interest 
groups’ is thus a pejorative term, whereas ‘interest group’ is a neutral term, as 
long as the members in interest groups defend their interests within the legal 
framework.  
The emergence of an interest group as a “healthy” development which 
generates possibilities of socio-political reform is echoed by renowned 
economist and a former diplomat Zhang Yuyan. He contends that emerging new 
interest groups may bring policy change to deepen market reform, although 
their behaviours are geared towards defending and maximising their narrow 
interests. His reason is that new interest groups may bring competition and 
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reinvogerate the market economy. In other words, an open market is an 
unintended benefit brought about by emerging interests groups, as their 
endeavours to maximise their interests have a spill-over effect to the 
macroeconomic structure. The condition Zhang sets to make this prediction is 
that countries in economic transition, as the interests reshuffle, will shatter the 
old and traditional interest groups in the planned economy and inject new 
energy into the market economy132.  
In line with Zhang’s sympathy with interest groups, Liu distinguishes 
interest groups from vested interest groups as the former result from collective 
interest, and can be an element facilitating the reform and sustaining of the 
political system, whereas vested interest groups are highly exclusive and 
narrow their interests to such an extreme that no one but they, and their family 
members can benefit from their interests maximisation133. These conceptual 
differences between vested interest groups and interest groups are important, 
because they are related to how we define what is to be included as interest 
groups and the assumption of the role of interest groups vis-à-vis the public 
good.  
The conceptualisation of interest groups is informed by the existing 
literature, in which Chinese scholars explore how to modify the non-Chinese 
concept to the political context in China. According to Chen Shuisheng, Wang 
Huning is one of the few scholars who used the concept of the interest group134. 
The most influential scholar in China as a close advisor to leaders from Jiang 
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Zemin’s era to Xi Jinping and originally famous for his political theory of Neo-
authoritarianism, Wang wrote in 1987 that interest groups are those with 
special interests, who attempted to maximise their special interest via their 
activities. He thus implicitly conflates interest groups and vested interest 
groups. Wang Puqu takes the analysis further by specifying the strategy of 
exerting pressure as a defining feature of the way interest groups influence the 
government135. Mao Shoulong further pinpoints the objectives of interest 
groups as influencing policy making136.  
Instead of narrowing down policy making to the desired output of 
interest groups, I prefer not to set limits and conditions to the scope of their 
political activities. It means that no matter whether groups aim to make 
favourable policy or bring policy change, as long as groups whose members 
sharing common interest and objectives collectively express their interests and 
attempt to maximise them, they are counted as interest groups. The ability to 
influence policy is one barometer indicating the effectiveness of interest groups, 
but should not be an obstacle for us to understand how and why interest groups 
function, not only in China but also in China’s international cooperation, even if 
they do not influence the policy outcome. This is based on the assumption that 
policy changes gradually. It is of vital importance in tracing the evolution of 
interest groups, instead of assuming they have a single goal when shaping 
policy. This broad definition of interest groups sets the boundary of inclusion 
and the following categorisation of interest group specifies the criterion of how 
one interest group differs from another.  
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Chinese academics divide interest groups based on broad criteria such as 
class and social strata and interests deriving from the Reform and Open 
Policy137, and detailed benchmarks such as objectives, organisational degree, 
and functions. For instance, Yang Jisheng summarises five classes based upon 
income, power, and reputation: upper, mid-upper, middle, mid-lower, and 
lower classes138. The assumption behind this categorisation is that the interest 
of each class is given and fixed. Li Qiang has captured the fluidity of interests 
especially as the Reform Policy, and classifies society along the spectrum of 
benefit versus harm, due to this new economic initiative139. But a more nuanced 
classification is provided by Wang Shiyi in the light of interest reconfiguration 
since 1978. These include: basic class including the state apparatus 
management, workers, farmers, and professionals; emerging class including 
management and technical personnel of private enterprises, foreign venture 
firms, freelancers, and agencies; reviving class including self-employed (getihu
个体户) and private entrepreneurs; and the marginalised class including laid-off 
workers and retired staff140.  
Based on the objectives of organisations, interest groups are divided into 
economic, socio-political, public, and government interest groups141.  Xia also 
sees differences from the perspectives of organisational degree, and classifies 
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interest groups as informal, non-associational, institutional, and associational. A 
crisper categorisation offered by Yang Guangbin and Li Yuejun who 
differentiate groups based on the functional aspect: institutionalised, enterprised, 
associational, and unorganised interest groups142.  
Bearing these views in mind, I will use social strata and class 
categorisation as the beginning of my analysis in my next chapter regarding the 
domestic context within which interest groups emerge. I will borrow Chen 
Shuisheng’s categorisation which is informed by the above Chinese research. 
Based on the objectives and organisational features, Chen Shuisheng identifies 
four types of interest group: enterprise-interest groups (such as real estate, 
telecommunication, and energy), association-interest groups (such as industry 
association and commerce chambers), institutional interest groups 
(bureaucracies), and public interest groups (such as environmental 
organisation)143. This categorisation is particularly useful when studying the 
subject of international environmental cooperation, because it allows us to 
examine all relevant actors without losing focus, and more interestingly, 
conflicts within these four groups help us explain how domestic conflict is 
linked to international cooperation.  
By using Chinese definitions of interest and a categorisation of interest 
groups to delineate the unit of analysis, two observations emerge to challenge 
the assumption of rationalist institutionalism: the lack of space to incorporate 
the ideational dimension, which will be shown to be empirically salient, and 
overconfidence that institutions are useful in aggregating domestic preferences. 
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Although the ideational aspect is missing in rationalist institutionalism, it is 
salient in the definition of “interest”, and is needed to justify the existence of 
interest groups in a political context where interest groups are “morally and 
culturally vulnerable”.  Moreover, the ability of institutions to aggregate 
preferences is discounted, because of the prevalence of informal channels 
through which diverse interests are mediated and reconciled.  
Two questions thus arise from this section: 1) how are interest groups 
formed through the interaction between ideas and interests; and 2) what 
aggregates domestic preferences, if not institutions. Having said this, I do not 
seek to jettison the rationalistic approach.  Rather, the next sections are aimed 
at advancing the framework and better adapting it to the context in China.  
 
 
2.2.2 The Ideational Dimension in Foreign Relations 
A practical concern of interest groups poses a neglected question to the 
Chinese research community which understands and welcomes their 
emergence: how to deal with the negative attitude of the national leaders 
towards them? Jing Yuejin observes that in CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang’s 
working report in 1988, he acknowledged the inevitability of interest groups to 
emerge due to conflicts of interests. In contrast, when interest groups 
reappeared in Jiang Zemin’s speech in 2001, it was iterated in a negative light, 
used interchangeably with the notion of vested interest group144. This raises the 
question of how, under an authoritarian regime whose political culture 
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discriminates against the idea of the interest group, is it possible to justify an 
interest group’s efforts to maximise its interests without being seen as causing 
harm to the Party-State. 
The distrust of national leaders of interest groups foregrounds the 
importance of the ideational aspect, insofar as it speaks to the beliefs of political 
elites. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue that “common beliefs, instead of 
common interests, function as a glue to hold coalitions together” 145 in their 
frequently cited Advocacy Coalition Approach derived from their analysis of the 
environmental policy at Lake Tahoe. They visualise the structure of belief 
systems in the mind of the ruling elites; normative and ontological tenets at the 
heart of the system; policy stance and strategies as the second-tier; and 
instrumental and information-related beliefs at the periphery. Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith also ask a more fundamental question than Milner, which is what 
kind of information is deemed essential: that is to say, what conditions 
information selection. Their approach represents a radical departure from 
treating the institution as the unit of analysis and replaces it with policy 
subsystems as a vehicle to aggregate preferences, which directly contradicts the 
assumptions of rationalist institutionalism. 
In the same year, Goldstein and Keohane published their edited book 
Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change to explore 
ideas in foreign policy. They identified three pathways for ideas to influence 
foreign policies: road maps, focal points, and institutionalisation. Ideas as a road 
map refers to the business of conducting policies in an ideologically correct way 
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because the chosen idea limits choices 146. The focal point is the function of 
ideas to “define cooperative solutions or act as coalitional glue to facilitate the 
cohesion of particular groups”147. When ideas are institutionalised, their lives 
are prolonged, and they can have an impact, although no one genuinely believes 
in them. Hence, instead of arguing whether national leaders believe in certain 
ideas, the question is whether idea gets the job done. This view of the role of 
ideas in foreign policy is supplemented by chapters with concrete case studies. 
For instance, Garrett and Weingast conclude that ideas provide motivation, 
reasons for collective action, and needs mechanisms to translate ideas to 
actions in real life148, stressing that “ideas are not self-implementing” and it is 
“their utility in helping actors achieve their desired ends under prevailing 
constraints”149. The prevailing restriction, in the case of interest groups in China, 
is the national leaders’ suspicion. Hence, the role of academia and intellectuals 
is critical regarding framing the political relevance and salience of certain 
interest groups to ease the anxiety of the ruling elites.  
Goldstein and Keohane and their colleagues, in the process of theorising 
the ideational dimension in foreign policy, argue that it is “changes in the 
underlying conditions, rather than changes in ideas themselves, [that] can alter 
the impact of ideas on policy”150. This sets conditions and distances ideas from 
policy change. Ruggie thus criticises Goldstein and Keohane’s efforts as “neo-
utilitarian” by which he means that there is an intellectual convergence in the 
                                                          
146 Judith Goldstein and Robert O Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and 
Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p.12. 
147 Ibid, p.18. 
148 Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R Weingast, “Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the 
European Community’s Internal Market,” in Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.203-204. 
149 Ibid, p.178. 
150 Goldstein and Keohane 1993, p.25. 
79 
 
1980s between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism around the premises 
that “ideational factors are rendered in strictly instrumental terms, useful or not 
to self-regarding individuals in the pursuit of typically material interests”151. 
Ruggie points out that what Goldstein and Keohane achieve is limited to “how 
individuals go about their business”, instead of the social constructivist concern 
of “what happens before the neo-utilitarian model kicks in”152.  
The following discussion examines the “neo-utilitarian” approach in the 
1980s and 90s to gauge their explanatory power and limitations. It does so by 
looking at concepts that have used for understanding ideational factors and 
interest group politics in late-industrialising societies, namely the concept of a 
composite ideology used by Woodruff Smith and the logrolling model proposed 
by Jack Snyder.  
2.2.2.1 Composite Ideology 
According to Geertz, ideology may be comprehended concerning 
functions153 , structures154, and a cultural system155. The structural aspect of an 
ideology means that the philosophical roots of ideology are a blueprint of the 
political architect, displayed in Marxism and Liberalism for instance. The 
sociological layer of the ideology has neo-utilitarian underpinnings, as the 
ideology is depicted as “a mask and a weapon” to pursue the individual interest, 
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and “a symptom and a remedy”, which means a “symbolic outlet for emotional 
disturbances generated by social disequilibrium”156. 
Woodruff Smith, influenced by Geertz, treats ideology as “a set of ideas 
employed to facilitate the accomplishment of political action and to justify 
particular social orders-past, present, or future-by associating such actions and 
orders with a notion of the general good”157. He thus prefers to examine 
ideology through the lens of function, and reveals the potential of ideology to be 
used as “a disguise for the particular interests of social classes and groups of 
political participants or as a means of transforming narrow interest into a 
general, objective-seeming worldview”158.  
The characteristics of ideology in the modern political system, according 
to Smith, are that it is composite or aggregate, which is why he uses the term 
composite ideology159. Composite ideology constitutes a diversity of ideas, 
because it not only addresses the social transformation from the past to the 
future, but also attends to contradicting interests. Constituents in the composite 
ideology are independent of each other before being included. The logical 
connections between each element are loose and artificially contingent on 
“similarities in image and impression, non-rigorous analogies, the employment 
of symbols, and similarities in descriptive language”160. The weak logical 
structure is strengthened by a perpetual repetition of two discrete statements 
until they sound as though they belong to each other. Furthermore, each 
component of the composite ideology justifies other elements, and is meanwhile 
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justified by them. That is to say, a composite ideology is not falsifiable and 
therefore detached from reality. The illogicality and inaccuracy in the composite 
ideology must be hidden. When there is a problem with the ideology, a 
scapegoat is necessary to shoulder the unfavourable consequences. The absence 
of a sound logic, meanwhile, is compensated for by “emotional images and ill-
defined vocabulary”161. 
A composite ideology, despite and ironically precisely because of its 
logical frailty, is intended for action, and capable of being used for popular 
mobilisation. Smith views the relationship between ideology and action as a 
two-way communication, in which ideology justifies actions and actions can 
reinforce and consolidate the ideology. The reason why ideology has the 
potential to mobilise the public is that it contains unsophisticated and 
accessible ideas. A composite ideology construes a sharply defined reality with 
a crystal clear identification of the problem and the diagnosis of the society. 
Sinologists such as Lucian Pye contend that the purpose of ideology in China is 
to “make reality safe”. When reality is full of confrontation and disorder, it can 
be perceived as peaceful and harmonious162. 
Nationalism is the epitome of such a composite ideology. Since the 1990s, 
it has been used as “a spiritual instrument” to guide “the reform and to control 
enormous changes resulting from the reform policy”163. The manipulation of 
nationalism is not only for internal control, but also engenders foreign policy 
implications. Jessica Chen Weiss convincingly demonstrates that nationalism 
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and anti-foreign protests are used by the ruling elites to signal their “domestic 
vulnerability”, resulting in the perception of instability which pushes other 
countries to make concessions164. She uses this logic to explain the practice of 
tolerance and repression of the People’s Republic towards nationalist protest. 
The composite ideology of nationalism comes at a cost. Hughes observes a 
geopolitik turn of nationalistic narrative, developed from the ethnic dimension 
of nationalism which reduces citizens to members of “a politicised ethnic 
groups defined by common culture and descent, shared historical experiences 
and usually a common language”165. The geopolitik nationalism is used to 
undermine a pragmatic version of nationalism, which calls for a peaceful 
environment for the sake of economic development, and the liberal nationalism 
which calls for expanding individual rights and openness to the outside world, 
exposing the aggressive side of the “double-edged sword”, a metaphor used to 
describe nationalism and its unintended politicised consequences.  
The example of nationalism is used to demonstrate the purpose of a 
composite ideology, which is to reach a consensus among conflicting parties 
without addressing real problems. It disguises reality and construes an illusion 
that is supported by myths. The weakness in a composite ideology does not 
prevent it from being successful in reaching a consensus. When an ideology 
achieves its purpose, it can “take on a life of its own over time” 166 and the 
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longevity of a composite ideology further relies on socialisation and education 
in a society.  
2.2.2.2 Logrolling 
To better understand the process by which a consensus is reached, Jack 
Snyder’s logrolling model sheds light on the question of how different groups 
put aside their various interests, form coalitions, reach consensus, and thus 
influence foreign policy. Snyder borrows the term of logrolling from American 
politics literature, primarily meaning “give and take”, “compromise”, “trading”, 
and “the adjustment of interests”167. Snyder reconceptualises it as a process by 
which the parochial interest is justified and repackaged as the general interest, 
enabling this narrow-minded interest to “hijack national policy”168. He analyses 
the case of Japan and Germany from the late nineteenth century till the Second 
World War, the United States since 1945, and the Soviet Union since the 1930s, 
and Britain. His model explains how a narrow and irrational imperialist interest 
group can dominate the agenda and propaganda, not because of the 
persuasiveness of their appeal, but because of their capacity to form a coalition 
via logrolling and to re-formulate their special interests as an ostensible benefit 
for all the people.  
The process of logrolling not only rationalises the pursuit of parochial 
interests, but also transfers the costs to the greater public and persuades the 
public to accept this cost.  Coalition managers are important in this process. 
There are two strategies. The first is the straight logroll, a situation in which 
“each major group in the ruling coalition gets what it wants on the issue it cares 
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about most”169, with a typical example of the Wilhelmian coalition between 
industrialists, farmers, army and navy. The second is called the creative straddle. 
This is when all interest groups are too weak to form a stable coalition, so 
coalition managers use ideology bundled with myths to change the preference 
of individual groups to make logrolls feasible. Policy entrepreneurs devise “a 
creative synthesis” which is claimed to be beneficial for every group. A classic 
example is Hitler’s technique of persuading the whole of Germany to pursue 
“foreign adventures”170. In reality, the straight roll also needs an ideology to 
sustain the coalition by exaggerating the benefit of logrolling. 
The effectiveness of logrolling is contingent on domestic structure. 
Snyder categorises political systems into cartelised, unitary and democratic 
systems while acknowledging that there is no pure form, and that all polities are 
hybrid. The cartelised system and cartelised groups are dominant in the 
logrolling process for three reasons. First, groups in a cartelised system have 
compact or concentrated interests. Each member benefits from a significant 
share and hence has a strong incentive to strive for a common goal. Secondly, a 
concentration of resources leads to a concentration of knowledge. A monopoly 
of information and a manipulation of propaganda hinges on local expertise as 
well as organisational and material basis. The third explanation is that a close 
tie to the state apparatus grants interest groups with political advantages. 
Interest groups thus cooperate with national leaders to create political myths. 
In the case of empires, such myths allow interest groups to make a profit out of 
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war, whereas national leaders can benefit from “nationalism, social solidarity, 
and social mobilisation that go along with it”171.  
2.2.2.3. Idea-interest nexus  
The biggest contribution of Snyder is that he uses coalition politics in the 
“systemic, bureaucratic, or individual-level” manner and a modified rational 
choice theory to link domestic sources to foreign policy and the international 
behaviour of states172. This helps to explain under what conditions interest 
groups are politically active. Whereas Snyder uses domestic structures as a 
variable, explaining under which condition it is more efficient for interest 
groups to form a powerful coalition, I will use the domestic structure as a 
context within which the needs of interest groups emerge and their survival and 
thriving is possible, in the next chapter. 
Although Snyder offers a clear and strong analytical edge to explain 
expansionist foreign policy,  it is necessary to pinpoint the flaws in his argument 
to further our understanding regarding the role of ideology. One self-
contradiction in Snyder’s book is his view on the importance of ideas. On the 
one hand, ideas empower and rationalise interests. On the other hand, Snyder 
dilutes the significance of ideas by emphasising the mechanism of logrolling, in 
which groups get their interests maximised. Ideas are treated as a medium 
between interest and action and a “by-product” of the logrolling process173. This 
shortcoming of Snyder’s analysis primarily results from his scope and primary 
concern, which is to explain expansive foreign policy. It is almost inevitable that 
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the role of ideational factors is downplayed in the logrolling process as the 
assumption threading through the whole book is that interest influences foreign 
policy. Yet one contribution which he, perhaps unconsciously, introduces is to 
augment the role of ideas through the need for domestic groups to justify their 
interests. The fact that ideas justify interests allows ideas and interests to share 
the stage as explanatory elements. 
 
 
2.2.3 Social Constructivism  
The applicability of Snyder and Smith’s work to environmental policy 
may be subject to modification, due to their choice of case and the differing 
degree of interdependence they attribute to the individual state and the outside 
world. In the age of globalisation, environmental cooperation revolves around 
the domestic-international nexus174. The international interaction generates 
identities and (re)defines interests that go with them. When criticising the neo-
utilitarian approach, Ruggie emphasises that constructivists instead contend 
that “identities and interests of actors are socially constructed”, and 
furthermore, “they must share the stage with a whole host of other ideational 
factors that emanate from the human capacity and will”175. He points out that 
neo-utilitarianism cannot answer two critical questions: “how the constituent 
actors-in international relations, territorial states-came to acquire their current 
identity and the interests that are assumed to go along with it” and how to 
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comprehend the “generic identities and interests of specific states qua states”176. 
In this light, social constructivism and its emphasis on identity have a particular 
relevance in our understanding how Chinese political actors define their 
interests when the country is integrated with the outside world and how 
identity aggregates interests.  
In bringing identity, culture and norms to Chinese foreign policy, 
Johnston argues that China has demonstrated a consistent realpolitik strategic 
culture in the Maoist period177. One particularly useful concept from his article 
is that of “ranked preferences”. Instead of seeing options as a menu of choices 
with equal weight, ranked preferences reflect the cultural element and strategic 
weighing of each choice. The action of weighing belongs partly to the process of 
aggregating preferences, and involves the search for the identity of a state and 
its position within the international system.  
Qin Yaqing articulates the importance of identity in Chinese foreign 
policy by saying “the heart of Chinese foreign policy thus is not a security 
dilemma between great powers, but an identity dilemma within China as people 
ask ‘who is China’ and ‘what kind of world does it want”178. Underlying China’s 
search for identity is the Essence (ti 体)/Function (yong用) dichotomy, flagged 
up by Hughes reflecting the mentality among Chinese political actors to use the 
foreign substance to serve the Chinese essence to balance political orthodoxy 
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with functional learning from abroad179. As China as a state is increasingly 
integrated with the international system as observed by Johnston, domestic 
debates about China’s identity matter and the micro-process of socialisation 
merits attention180. David Shambaugh offers a comprehensive overview of the 
domestic debate regarding China’s identity, which not only weighs up 
preferences, but also provides a platform to aggregate different preferences181. 
Shambaugh treats domestic perceptions of China’s international identity 
as a variable to explain China’s global impact, and captures seven schools 
harbouring distinctive opinions about China’s relations with the outside world 
and different views of the international order, and different priorities and 
interests for China. I will build on Shambaugh’s useful categorisation, and add a 
particular layer of environmental issues to present the domestic debate on 
China’s environmental foreign relations and demonstrate the intimate 
relationship between domestic interest and China’s national image in the case 
of environmental foreign relations. My method of gauging the views of different 
schools of thought on environmental issues is based on the main argument and 
logic of each, as supported by their representative statements and opinions on 
China’s stance in international environmental cooperation. 
2.2.3.1 Identities and Preferences 
Shambaugh’s categorisation is based on the degree of trust in the 
international order. Situated on one pole of the spectrum is nativism regarding 
                                                          
179 Christopher Hughes, “The Enduring Function of the Substance/Essence (Ti/Yong) Dichotomy 
in Chinese Nationalism,” in China Orders the World: Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy, 
Callahan, William and Elena Barabantseva (eds.) (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press, 2011), pp.118–42. 
180 Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States :China in International Institutions, 1980-2000 (Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
181 Shambaugh, 2013. 
 
89 
 
the West as evil, and on the other end is globalists or liberal institutionalist, 
advocating further cooperation as well as taking responsibilities, with the five 
schools in the middle, respectively: realism, the major power school, Asia first, 
the Global South, and the globalists.    
The perception of nativists of the international community is principally 
guided by distrust and conspiracy theory, which sees international multilateral 
involvement as a trap to contain China’s development. They are against 
globalisation which is thought of as a new form of imperialism and they criticise 
the Reform and Opening Policy for corrupting China’s culture with foreign 
influence. Consequently, the defining characteristics of this school are that it is 
conservative and xenophobic. Reflecting the logic on environmental diplomacy, 
which will be discussed in Chapter 5, is the deep-rooted doubt of environmental 
protection as a genuine international norm and the belief that environmental 
protection is another tool of the “West” to control, contain, and weaken China.  
One representative nativist, as identified by Shambaugh, is Wang 
Xiaodong, one of the authors of Unhappy China182. Wang published an article to 
assess China’s environmental diplomacy on Green Leaf (lüye绿叶), the monthly 
journal dedicated to environmental issues and affiliated with the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection. He asserted that a fundamental problem is China’s 
ideological difference with other countries, not environmental pollution in 
China. Environmental issues, following Wang’s logic, are the veneer of the long-
fought ideological battle and environmental diplomacy is “nothing but 
competing for natural resources”. To prevent external forces from using 
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environmental protection to exploit China, the Chinese government needs to 
win over the Chinese public and the elites who fail to realise that China is 
making an excessive concession and wielding its economic clout to get a better 
deal in environmental negotiations. Not only does Wang refute environmental 
protection as an international norm, but he divorces China’s environmental 
performance from the country’s international image and insists that every 
country is judged by its power, which could be augmented by collaboration with 
other developing countries183.  
Wang’s comments on environmental protection epitomises the left-wing 
nativist interpretation of international environmental protection and he is far 
from being alone. In 2010, Gou Hongyang published his book Low Carbon Plot 
and pictured global climate negotiations as a smokeless war complicated by 
diverse international, national, and subnational interests and impregnated with 
conflicts. Gou warned that a carbon tax and tariff would lock developing 
countries into a permanently disadvantageous position in the international 
economic order184. Gou’s book and Wang’s article echo and summarise the 
nativists’ doubt in environmental protection. In sum, they argue that China as 
an ideologically different country should define its interests in opposition to the 
Western rhetoric, due to conflicting interests. By portraying China and its 
relation to the world in the nativist light, environmental protection becomes a 
non-issue and is irrelevant to domestic preferences. 
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The realist school, also referred to by Shambaugh as pragmatic 
nationalists, is pessimistic about the international system, if not as suspicious as 
nativists. They share a narrow understanding of the national interest and 
dismiss transnational issues based on the “China first” tenet. It is not surprising 
that environmental protection does not weigh much in this literature. In similar 
vein to nativists, environmental issues are either deployed as an opportunity to 
cooperate with the United States, in other words, as an ice-breaker issue to 
resume dialogue, as realist scholar Sheng Dingli suggests185, or they are seen as 
tools to contain China, as mentioned by Zhang Ruizhuang. Environmental 
protection is never at the heart of this school, due to the “soft nature” of the 
issue, vis-à-vis economic clout and military build-up186.  
The major power, Asia first, and the Global South schools address a 
common question of which partner is a priority for China, and is most directly 
linked to its national interests. Each school has a different answer. On the 
surface, these three schools select who to partner with in terms of international 
environmental cooperation. Although these three schools disagree on the 
priority of China’s foreign policy, all of them are of direct relevance to 
environmental issues. The major power school sees cooperation with 
superpowers, such as the United States, Russia and the European Union, as the 
“key of the keys”, largely due to the science and technology from the States, 
energy resources and military equipment from Russia, and the EU’s generous 
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offer of trade, investment and technology transfer to China187.  The major power 
school is endorsed by a rich literature on the environmental cooperation 
between China and the US on climate change188, China and Russia on energy189 , 
China and the European Union190 . 
The Asia first school, instead, reckons that proximity does matter, and 
according to Zhu Feng, “every power must protect its own yard”191. Guided by 
neighbourhood diplomacy (zhoubian waijiao周边外交) ， China takes a more 
proactive approach to its peripheries with a mixture of bilateral and regional 
cooperation. Instead of interpreting the Asia first school through the lens of the 
core-periphery hierarchy, it is more accurate to depict regional cooperation as 
dynamic interdependence and characterised by a high degree of issue linkage. 
This is particularly the case when China and its neighbouring countries face 
common problems. As Dent rightfully points out, the energy security concerns 
shared by East Asian countries is leading to an increasing convergence between 
their energy and environmental diplomacies192. This allows the Asia First school 
to have a broader appeal.  
The Global South school plays the card of China, having been colonised 
and a victim of imperialism and portrays China as a revisionist power, rather 
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than a status quo power. China should not only insist on its identity as a 
developing country but also, in solidarity with other Southern countries, call for 
the restructuring of the currently partial international order to “redistribute 
financial resources, institutional influence, and power from North to South”193 . 
The relevance of this school for China’s participation in global environmental 
governance is particularly evident in China’s insistence that it is a developing 
country and its continuing efforts to request international funding and 
technology transfers from the industrialised countries as a way to compensate 
the Southern countries.  
The selective multilateralists, the sixth school, refers to “an 
internationalist vision of realists”. They differ from liberal internationalists 
because they see global involvement per se as a tactic for China to benefit. 
Influenced by the realists, they are alarmed at the institutional trap set by the 
West in multilateral institutions; meanwhile, they depict China as a responsible 
power, not a “self-interested free rider” 194 . The selective multilateralist 
approach reflects the “do some things” approach without being deceived into 
shouldering more responsibilities. Environmental cooperation is thus a fine line 
for the Chinese government to walk due to the co-existence of limited trust in 
the multilateral institution and the desire to act as a responsible power. The 
representative thinker mentioned by Shambaugh, Chang Gong, did not specify 
his stance on environmental foreign relations. Yet this thought can be used to 
weave the liberal norm of environmental protection into the realist fabric. 
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On the other end of the spectrum are the globalists or liberal 
institutionalists. Premised on the interdependence among countries in the 
context of globalisation, they ask for an even greater responsibility for China in 
global governance and are far less critical of multilateral institutions such as the 
United Nations than are selective multilaterailists. In sharp contrast to the 
realists, transnational issues such as environmental protection are high on the 
agenda of globalists. The representative voice of the globalists, Jin Canrong, 
observes that as more expectation is given to China it leads to more 
responsibilities which the ruling elites are not yet ready to take on. High 
expectations are also present in China’s involvement in environmental 
governance, particularly on climate change issues. How to meet the 
expectations and translate transnational problems into China’s soft power and 
eventually leadership is a key concern of globalists. I am not suggesting that the 
globalists regard environmental protection as a norm or principle. They also see 
it through the lens of strategic importance. Jin Canrong, for example, analyses 
Obama’s environmental policy as a strategy to create a “bubble of renewable 
energy” and generate a new economic locomotive, and Obama’s emphasis on 
renewable energy research and investment is a smart choice because it is a 
trend of the future195. In other words, environmental diplomacy is a concept of 
increasing strategic value in foreign policy and international relations.  
Having examined the domestic discussion regarding China’s 
international identity and linking this to its corresponding role in global 
environmental governance, we find that the common ground which is agreed on 
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by all schools is the need for a strategic, interest-based perspective on 
environmental issues, rather than seeing environmental issues as a norm. That 
is to say, what nativists and globalists disagree with is the degree to which China 
participates in international environmental cooperation, instead of whether 
environmental protection per se is a means or an end.  
 
 
2.3 Analytical framework: constructivist utilitarianism  
The last section of this chapter introduces the approach of constructivist 
utilitarianism as an attempt to assemble the interaction between interests, 
ideas, institutions and identities, aiming to shed light on more than just the 
empirical aspects of China’s international environmental cooperation.  
This chapter began with an overview of the rational institutionalist 
school of IR as a means of challenging the realist assumption of the state as a 
unitary actor, and the discussion has emphasised the importance of domestic 
preferences and how institutions, interests, and information are used to explain 
international cooperation. In the process of applying rational institutionalism to 
the context of China, the weakness of Milner’s assumption that the institution is 
the aggregating mechanism of various domestic preferences has been shown. I 
thus echo what Helen Milner acknowledges, in her defence of rational 
institutionalism, namely that institutions are political means to realise one’s 
preferences, and I see institutions as a platform, not a mechanism196.  
This points to the need to resort to the constructivist school when 
looking at China, which emphasises the mutual construction of interest and 
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identity as Chinese actors see the lack of “discursive power” and the ideological 
difference between China and the West as an obstacle to fulfilling China’s 
“national interest”. In other words, the normative dimension and the question 
of China’s identity in the world constitute and interweave with its national 
interest. Norms are important as they “frame the parameters of policy debate 
on given issues and concurrently introduce constraints to decision making as 
well, under certain circumstances, changes in actor preferences”197. 
This identity is expressed through strategic concepts which then 
converge into a composite ideology. Strategic concepts are featured by “simple 
dichotomies” to justify foreign policies ex post facto 198. Strategic concepts in 
this research are “environmental diplomacy” (Chapter 5) and the “Chinese 
experience” (Chapter 6). Composite ideology is a conglomerate of strategic 
concepts and its aim is to achieve consensus among different interest groups. 
The composite ideology here is “ecological civilisation” which will be elaborated 
in Chapter 7. 
I thus argue that what aggregates domestic preferences is more than 
institutions, but also the identity politics and norms which condition 
preferences. The interaction between domestic interests and external factors 
thus becomes strategic.  To better comprehend the subject of China’s 
international cooperation, I combine John Ruggie’s critique of neo-utilitarianism 
and promotion of social constructivism, published in the same issue with 
Milner’s development of rational institutionalism. By engaging with the 
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literature on the role of ideas in foreign policy and social constructivism, I seek 
to give ideas academic weight in the assessment of how domestic groups 
influence environmental cooperation.  
I thus propose a framework of constructivist utilitarianism to marry the 
salience of domestic preferences advocated in rational institutionalism to the 
assumption that interests and identity are mutually constructed.  I argue that 
ideas and interests must share the stage because ideas justify interests and the 
process of legitimation makes ideas not only a veneer of interest but also their 
building blocks. Identity, in addition to institutions, is a platform to aggregate 
domestic preferences because it weighs different foreign relation preferences. 
In saying this, I am not suggesting that institutions are irrelevant, nor do I 
abandon the observation that ideas are used instrumentally to serve one’s 
interests. Instead, I attempt to nuance our understanding of how domestic 
preferences are aggregated to inform foreign relations, in forms of cooperation, 
non-cooperation, or even conflict. This is a particularly useful tool for us to 
understand the apparent contradictions in a state’s international engagement, 
between its statements and actions, and between earlier and later stances. One 
point of clarification is that I argue that in China, foreign policy decision-making 
is not fragmented, but that what is fragmented is the broader sphere of foreign 
relations conducted by a plurality of actors and through which a diversity of 
messages and national images are sent out from China to the international 
audience.  
The following chapter 3 explains the methodology deployed in this thesis. 
Chapter 4 will survey the interests, ideas, and identities in China’s 
environmental governance and delineate the three case studies under scrutiny: 
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environmental treaty implementation, sharing the Chinese experience, and 
making an alternative norm. In this way it will be possible to unpack the 
motives, pattern, and performance of China in international environmental 
cooperation.  
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
 
 
3.1 Research objectives and questions 
To operationalise my theoretical framework, I selected three dimensions 
in which the central research question comes under closer scrutiny: treaty 
implementation, sharing Chinese experience, and setting an alternative norm. 
These three dimensions have been intentionally chosen to reflect the changing 
attitudes of Chinese political players towards learning from abroad, generating 
experiences based on learning and adaptation, and eventually, providing an 
alternative norm to establish China’s leadership position.  
These three dimensions inspire three inter-related sub-questions which 
seek to shed light on the efforts to understand why and how domestic interest 
groups matter in China’s environmental foreign relations. 1) Why are some 
international environmental treaties better implemented than others; 2) how 
interest groups define, interpret, and deploy the Chinese experience to facilitate 
their pursuit of overseas interests; 3) how interest groups make the alternative 
norm malleable to their specific interests.  
The first question will bring implementation back to our understanding 
of foreign relations, which affords us a means of understanding the drivers of 
successful implementation and the impact of the degree of implementation on 
China’s role in future cooperation. The second question explores a frequently 
mentioned, if understudied buzzword, the “Chinese experience”, and goes 
beyond how Chinese players learn from the international community, namely, 
what China as a state has to teach others with its own learning experience. The 
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final question speaks to the concern that China is providing a set of alternative 
values to challenge the liberal world order, and adopts a pragmatic approach to 
using the recently proposed “ecological civilisation” to shed light on the 
intention of domestic groups to promote it to the outside community and, 
moreover, its limitation.  
 
 
3.2 An overview of methods used: quantitative and qualitative 
I use a combination of quantitative methods to present a broad picture 
and a qualitative approach to provide in-depth analysis. I use archival research 
for Chapter 3 with the intention to provide an overview of China’s 
environmental foreign relations and how it is presented to the public, including 
domestic groups. Content analysis functions as a useful quantitative tool to 
survey various databases used in empirical chapters 5 and 7. Questions which 
are raised from the use of quantitative methods are further inquired into by the 
use of semi-structured interviews conducted in strict anonymity, as requested. 
The findings from empirical chapters derive from comparative case studies 
which allow me to tease out explanatory factors based on different outcomes 
and to map out patterns of domestic groups’ influence on foreign relations. 
Lastly, participant observation plays a small, complementary part in my 
analysis in Chapter 7. How each method is used and their limitations will be 
explained in further detail in the following section.  
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3.3 Archival research 
I use archival research primarily for Chapter 4 to provide a broad 
context to China’s environmental foreign relations. The method of digging into 
archives is not sufficiently used by political scientists due to their preference for 
“theoretical innovation” over “discovery of new information”, and the obsession 
with the present, not the past, as observed by Diamant. Yet this method will 
help us to “look at old issues in new ways”199, and to “draw attention to aspects 
of the state and society that are easily brushed under the carpet in sources that 
pay more attention to elites”200 . It is precisely because of the new insights we 
discover through archival research that we are better able to “ground and fill 
out abstract ideas in messy reality and local interpretations”201.  
In this light, I conducted archival research from May to July 2015 in the 
National Library of China located in Beijing. I chose the China Environment News 
(zhongguo huanjingbao 中国环境报) from 1984 to present as the corpus of text. 
This is because this newspaper is the only nationwide, official media outlet to 
introduce and interpret environmental policies in the past three decades, and to 
reflect domestic debates, discussion, and analyses regarding China’s 
environmental foreign relations. It reports on domestic environmental 
legislation, challenges, important international events, the most recent 
technological developments and information, and so on. It has become a 
platform for international cooperation not only in terms of Chinese journalists 
gathering information from other countries but also as a window on the outside 
                                                          
199 Neil Diamant, “Why Archives?,” in Contemporary Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods, and 
Field Strategies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.38. 
200 Ibid, p.36. 
201 Ibid, p.35. 
102 
 
world to know the progress made in the Chinese government’s environmental 
governance. The range of audience is, however, limited because it is a Chinese 
language newspaper, and consequently it is not taken seriously enough in the 
English-language academic research.   
The newspaper is stored in the format of microform, which requires a 
Microfilm Reader. The database is open to the public and an almost complete 
collection of all the papers, with one section in 1987 and one in 1989 missing, 
which the librarians cannot offer an explanation for. It is time-consuming to 
print all the relevant pages and the library regulates a quota of daily photocopy 
pages. Therefore, I categorise the articles while reading them and focus my 
attention on articles related to environmental relations with keywords such as 
“international cooperation”, “bilateral cooperation”, “diplomacy”, “trans-
border”, “foreign capital”, and such like. I have indexed relevant article titles 
and key messages, and therefore, when I need to read a particular article again, 
it is faster for me to locate it.  
The advantage of the archival analysis of China Environment News (CEN) 
is that the content provides a general trend towards understanding China’s 
environmental relations from 1984 onwards. In addition, actors involved in 
foreign relations emerge with their concerns, preferences, and demands. It is 
also a publicly available document to which both Chinese and foreign 
researchers have equal access. The disadvantage of surveying the newspaper is 
that its breadth weakens in-depth analysis. In addition, the nature of this press 
as an official media outlet is inclined to propagate political orthodoxy and to 
educate the general public with the upshot that environmental protection is 
painted with a rosy imagination. Despite this, such material is still useful to 
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identify the trend of environmental foreign relations. However, we also need a 
tool to examine the deeper implications of this pattern, which leads to the 
method of content analysis.  
 
 
3.4 Content Analysis 
Content analysis is “a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences by systematically identifying specified characteristics of the 
message”202. By coding and analysing data, this method was aimed to explore 
covert meanings in selected texts. This quantitative method allows one to 
observe trends, patterns, and developments and address “what” and “how” 
questions, based on a priori research design.  
I deploy this method primarily in two of the empirical chapters (Chapter 
5 and 7) to identify, respectively, implementation patterns (Chapter 5) and the 
pattern of academic efforts to theorise ecological civilisation (Chapter 7). In 
Chapter 5, I categorise implementation as procedural and substantive, and use 
content analysis to code the efforts of different domestic groups to implement 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), with the aim to understand the 
implementation pattern of CBD in China. The database is the first four of China’s 
National Reports on the Implementation of CBD submitted by the National 
Environment Protection Agency to the CBD secretariat from 1997 to 2008. The 
nature and purpose of these reports are to “describe the work China has done in 
conservation and sustainable utilization of biodiversity since it ratified CBD, in 
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particular, the progress in implementing…CBD” 203. The most recent national 
report, the fifth, is excluded from the body, as it was submitted in 2014, after 
the introduction of the Aichi target and does not fall within the time framework 
of Chapter 5 comparison. All national reports are available to download from 
the official website of CBD under the category of “National Reports and 
NBSAPs”. The length of each report ranges from 110 to 232 pages. I logged over 
200 entries regarding implementation efforts and coded them into procedural 
and substantive efforts. Content analysis helped me establish the finding that 
CBD implementation in China is mostly procedural. More details will be 
provided in Chapter 5.  
The purpose of using content analysis in Chapter 7 was to answer the 
question of how academics in China theorise the very new concept of ecological 
civilisation and to gauge its connection with political dogma. I conducted 
keyword search in the database of “China Academic Journals Full-text Database” 
(CNKI) and obtained over 5000 articles which attempted to theorise ecological 
civilisation through the perspectives of Marxism, culture, and economics. As 
shown in Chapter 7, Marxism occupied a predominant position in the Chinese 
scholars’ theorisation efforts.  
One major limitation of content analysis is that it cannot address “why” 
questions or suggest any causal relations. To compensate for this shortcoming, 
this research also employs interviews and comparative case studies to explore 
issues which are addressed neither by content analysis nor archival research.  
                                                          
203 National Environment Protection Agency, “China’s National Report on Implementation of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity” (Beijing, December 1997), “Forward”. 
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3.5 Interview 
Semi-structured interviews were used to further understand the “why” 
question and obtain primary information for Chapters 6 and 7. I conducted 2 
pilot interviews in August 2013 in Beijing, one with an NGO officer and another 
with an official working in the Ministry of Environmental Protection. The 
purpose of a pilot interview was to gauge the political sensitivity of the selected 
topic and the feasibility to obtain primary data regarding the role of interest 
groups in China’s environmental foreign relations.  
The majority of interviews were administered from April 2015 to May 
2016 in London, Beijing, and Vientiane. As most of the interviewees requested 
strict anonymity, I could only present them in the broad category of NGO officer, 
party officials, government officials, International NGO officer, consultants, and 
scholars, shown in the table 4-1. An exception to the principle of anonymity was 
the interviewees mentioned in Chapter 6, in which the organisation of Global 
Environmental Institute is examined. I interviewed 6 current officers, 1 former 
officers, one prominent Chinese scholar who requests for anonymity, and the 
executive director Mrs Jin Jiaman, as all of them had been directly and indirectly 
related to GEI’s operation in Laos. Overall, I conducted 35 interviews, via Skype, 
telephone, Wechat, and face-to-face. The following table summarises the date 
and length of interview, with the interviewee’s identity indicated by their 
position and affiliation.  
Table 3-1 List of Interviews 
Date Interviewee 
Place 
Form and Duration 
2013/8/12 GEI officer 5 Face-to-face 
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& 
2015/6/12 
60 minutes 
2013/8/13 Ministry of Environmental Protection official 1 
Beijing 
Face-to-face 
50 minutes 
2013/8/13 GEI officer 1 
Beijing 
Face-to-face  
46 minutes 
2015/4/14 IENGO 1 
London 
Face-to-face 
56minutes 
2015/4/30 IENGO 2 
London 
Face-to-face 
36minutes 
2015/5/7 IENGO3 
London 
Face-to-face 
45 minutes 
2015/6/3 ENGO officer 1 
Beijing 
Wechat 
communication 
2015/6/3 Private entrepreneur  
Beijing 
Wechat 
communication  
2015/6/11 GEI officer 2 
Beijing 
Face-to-face 
50 minutes 
2015/6/12 GEI officer 3& 4 Face-to-face 
1hour 13 minutes 
2015/6/17 GEI officer 6 
Beijing 
Face-to-face 
43 minutes 
2015/6/17 ENGO officer 2 
Beijing 
Wechat 
communication 
2015/7/2 Ministry of Commerce official 1 
Beijing 
Telephone  
19minutes 
2015/7/7 IENGO 4 
Beijing 
Face-to-face 
30 minutes 
2015/7/13 Consultant 1 
Beijing 
Face-to-face 
1 hour 10 minutes 
2015/7/21 Consultant 2 
Beijing 
Face-to-face 
1 hour 
2015/7/23 GEI executive director  
Beijing 
Face-to-face 
50 minutes 
2015/7/23 IENGO 5 
Beijing 
Face-to-face 
1 hour 
2015/7/23 IENGO 6 
Beijing 
Face-to-face 
50 minutes 
2015/7/27 Ministry of Commerce official 2 Face-to-face 
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Beijing 40 minutes 
2015/7/29 State Forestry Administration official 1 
Beijing 
Email conversation 
2015/8/3 Scholar 1 
Sydney 
Skype  
30 minutes 
2015/8/7 State Forestry Administration official 2 Telephone  
28 minutes 
2015/11/26 Former GEI officer 1 
London 
Skype 
41 minutes 
2016/3/13 National Development and Reform Commission officer 
1 
Beijing 
Face-to-face 
41 minutes 
2016/3/21 Party official 1 
Beijing 
Face-to-face 
54 minutes 
2016/3/26 Scholar 2 
Vientiane 
Face-to-face 
1 hour 17 minutes 
2016/3/27 Chinese Embassy in Laos officer 1&2 
Vientiane  
Telephone 
4 minutes 
2016/3/30 Former Vice Minister of National Land Management 
Agency (Lao) 
Vientiane 
Telephone  
5 minutes 
2016/3/30 Ministry of Investment and Planning Official 1 (Lao) 
Vientiane  
Face-to-face 
45 minutes 
2016/4/5 Chinese academic from Peking University 
Beijing 
Wechat 
communication 
2016/4/14 Party diplomat  
Beijing 
Face-to-face 
2 hours 27 minutes 
2016/4/28 Ministry of Environmental Protection official 2 
Beijing  
Face-to-face 
1 hour 24 minutes 
 
These interviews allowed me to gather valuable insights and obtain 
primary data. My interviewees were eager to share both information and 
practical interviewing tactics with me. For instance, one of my interviewees 
spent two hours discussing how China might fix its international image on the 
global stage through environmental leadership. Before each of my interviews, I 
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conducted a background search of the interviewee and sent them the list of 
questions which were tailored to their position and expertise. The advantage of 
analysing a popular buzzword such as “ecological civilisation” was that 
interviewees regarded it as less sensitive, and hence were willing to talk about 
it. Some of my interviewees even encouraged me to be an ambassador for the 
concept of ecological civilisation and to “persuade” foreigners to accept the 
Chinese norm.  For sensitive topics such as “interest groups”, I adopted a 
conversational interview style, as suggested by Lily Tsai, as this “gives 
respondents power and control” and generates a “sense of equality” which was 
“critical to the willingness of the interviewees to volunteer truthful information 
on political[ly] sensitive topics”204. 
All interviews were conducted in either English or Chinese. During my 
field trip to Vientiane, I used English to interview, as I did not speak Lao.  It 
would have been ideal to hire a Lao interpreter to interview residents near the 
project site, as is explained in Chapter 6. However, the dam site was guarded by 
the Lao army and a series of attacks targeted against Chinese tourists shortly 
before my field research rendered the site visit particularly dangerous. Given 
the fact that my focus in the thesis was how Chinese domestic groups influence 
foreign relations I decided there was no need to risk my personal safety.  
Whereas the majority of interviewees were very cooperative and 
generous in sharing their insights, there were nevertheless several limitations 
which need to be flagged up. The first was the difficulty of getting an interview 
opportunity with representatives from the SOEs.  In Chapter 6, on the role of 
                                                          
204 Lily Tsai, “Quantitative Research and Issues of Political Sensitivity in Rural China,” in 
Contemporary Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods, and Field Strategies (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.264. 
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SOEs, Sinohydro, comes under scrutiny. I assumed that it would be easy for me 
to secure an interview with SOEs, as the project discussed was deemed to be a 
success and a model template for implementing Corporate Social Responsibility. 
During the interview with one GEI officer, the name of the Sinohydro officer 
who was in charge of the dam project was mentioned. However, this officer 
declined my request to obtain the contact of the mentioned Sinohydro 
representative. Instead, I talked to another international environmental 
organisation (IENGO) who had had contacts with that SOE in the past. The 
IENGO officer shared the view that an interview with SOE staff would be tricky, 
particularly so during the anti-corruption campaign launched by President Xi 
Jinping. However, a useful tip that officer shared with me was to use the email 
address template in that SOE for contact. I followed this advice and sent three 
emails to the Sinohydro officer, and received no reply.  As I was unable to talk to 
the Sinohydro representative in any format, I had to resort to internal 
newsletters, reports, and stories of individuals (one about the CEO of the Nam 
Ngum 5 Company, and the other about an ordinary worker’s wedding) to obtain 
stories from the side of Sinohydro. I also attempted to contact the Laotian 
consultancy that wrote the environmental and social action plan for Sinohydro, 
but the consultancy did not respond to my email and telephone calls.  
Another limitation, surprisingly, was related to my identity as an 
overseas Chinese student. One interviewee told me that nowadays government 
officials are more suspicious of overseas Chinese students like me because we 
are considered as spies working for foreign governments.  Like foreign 
researchers, I thus had to be affiliated to a local university in order to win the 
trust of government officials. Hence, I applied for an exchange partnership 
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bursary from LSE and gained the opportunity to study at Peking University 
from March to May in 2016. It thus turned out to be qualitatively easier for me 
to secure interviews, particularly with government officials. Through personal 
network and affiliation with Peking University, I managed to interview officials 
from the Ministry of Commerce, the State Forestry Administration, the National 
Reform and Development Commission, the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection, the Central Party School, and the International Department of the 
Communist Party Central Committee, with two telephone interviews and one 
interview based on an email conversation.  
 
 
3.6 Participant observation 
The unforeseen difficulties in securing interviews drove me to reach 
other means to capture the whole story. Participant observation was premised 
on the assumption of naturalism, namely, “[T]he nearer we get to the conditions 
in which [the people we are studying] actually do attribute meanings to objects 
and events, the more accurate our description of those meanings are likely to 
be”205. For instance, in the section of the intellectual versus bureaucrats’ debate 
in Chapter 7, I adopted participant observation to understand the debate, the 
logic, and the mentality of scholars and government officials when faced with a 
new political slogan to interpret. This was done by participating in internal 
workshops while I was in Beijing. The content was not directly quoted, but the 
discussion itself inspired the structure and the main argument that leftist 
                                                          
205 Howard S Becker, “The Epistemology of Qualitative Research,” in Ethnography and Human 
Development: Context and Meaning in Social Inquiry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 
p.58. 
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intellectuals had to resort to in party organisations to promote their socialist 
agenda.   
 
 
3.7 Comparative Case Studies 
A case study as a method is described by Gerring as “the intensive study 
of a single case where the purpose of that study is-at least in part-to shed light 
on a larger class of cases” 206. Features of a case study include small-N, thick 
description, utilisation of particular types of evidence, intertwined cases and 
contexts, and the usage of triangulation. Although a case study allows us to 
investigate the attributes of a single phenomenon or event, it incorporates both 
quantitative and qualitative techniques to gather and analyse evidence207. In 
order to locate the causal mechanism, it is almost inevitable for researchers to 
see case studies as a comparative lens. In fact, the comparative method is most 
suited to the many variables and a small number of cases. The purpose of using 
comparison is, by controlling other variables, to identify sufficient and 
necessary conditions, and ideally identify the scope of conditions which trigger 
causal mechanisms. Along Mill’s method of difference, comparison allows us to 
identify crucial differences which explains different outcomes and gets closer to 
the causal mechanism208. Based on our observation derived from comparison, it 
is possible for us to achieve “concept formation”209 and the fact that the 
                                                          
206 John Gerring, Case Study Research Principles and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), p.20. 
207 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (SAGE Publications, 2013), p.33. 
208 Gerring 2006. 
209 David Collier, “The Comparative Method,” in Political Science: The State of the Discipline II 
(Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1993), p.105. 
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formation is based on specific cases on the ground, a “conceptual stretch”, 
describing the inability of a concept to suit new cases when applied to a wider 
range of cases, is minimised210. As comparative case study investigates small-N 
cases, the action of defining cases makes generalisation possible211. 
The empirical chapters of this thesis (5-7) employ comparative case 
studies to investigate the causal mechanism in which domestic groups influence 
environmental foreign relations in terms of international treaty implementation, 
sharing Chinese experience, and setting alternative ecological norms. In line 
with Mill’s method of difference, namely to identify crucial differences so as to 
explain different outcomes, Chapter 5 examines the Montreal Protocol and 
Convention on Biological Diversity, two international treaties sharing 
similarities and yet with varying degrees of implementation. This is used to 
explore the conditions under which treaties are better implemented, and under 
which circumstances interests, ideas and identity are key independent variables.  
Chapter 6 process-traces a Chinese environmental NGO’s operation in Laos and 
answers the question of why this organisation initiated project A but ended up 
by operating project B; both are related to the Chinese experience, but the 
nature of these projects differs. This chapter is a within-case analysis to reveal 
the interplay between the idea of Chinese experience and the interest of various 
groups.  
The last empirical chapter focuses on the diffusion of the norm of 
ecological civilisation by scrutinising three pairs of political players: the 
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bureaucrats, leftists and local governors from impoverished jurisdictions in 
China. Unlike Chapter 5, Chapter 7 follows Mill’s method of similarity. The 
question asked is why, in spite of their different positions, they all converge on 
promoting ecological civilisation to the international audience. An examination 
of these three sets of actors not only affords us an understanding of the 
rationale behind their active promotion of ecological civilisation but also 
reveals a shared concern.  
The empirical chapters span a period from 1985 to 2015, three decades 
of development of environmental foreign relations. An overview of these three 
cases not only allows me to compare cases across time and space, but also 
across properties and ultimately to make generalisations more possible. 
Regarding the limitation of generalisation, it bears a mention that the case study 
selected in Chapter 6 is a micro-level analysis of how one single Chinese 
environmental organisation plays a part in sharing the Chinese experience. The 
dilemmas and difficulties faced may not cause inconvenience to powerful 
bureaucracies such as Ministry of Commerce. However, what is generalizable 
from the efforts of GEI is how the concept of Chinese experience is tied to 
material interests in foreign relations, which is exactly the purpose of 
conducting the comparative case study.  
 
 
3.8 Scope of the research and limitation 
Use of the abovementioned mixed methods – archival research, content 
analysis, semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and comparative 
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case studies – allows me to better address the what, how, and why questions. 
Moreover, this research tries to set the agenda for future academic work 
examining interest groups’ role in China’s foreign relations. Due to the four-year 
time constraint, the scope of this research is necessarily limited to how 
domestic groups help shape China’s environmental foreign relations. It is not a 
bilateral relationship analysis as the selected dimensions (treaty 
implementation, sharing Chinese experience, and norm-setting) place 
predominant focus on the Chinese players. The external factors are not in the 
spotlight because previous research has demonstrated, on many fronts, how 
systemic factors influence cooperation. The new contribution this research aims 
to make is to examine China from inside out, and to explore possible 
breakthroughs in our understanding of not only Chinese foreign policy, but also 
its foreign relations in general.  
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Chapter 4 Contextualising institutions, ideas, and identity in 
Chinese environmental foreign relations 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter first discusses the three stages through which China’s 
environmental foreign relations have evolved, based on the archival research of 
the China Environmental News. Secondly, it demonstrates the institutions 
designed for the management of environmental foreign relations. The following 
section looks at how environment-related interests are framed, namely, the 
ideational dimension underpinning paradigms of China’s behaviour in 
environmental cooperation. The last section explores the role of identity politics 
in China’s international environmental cooperation, with a particular focus on 
the complex relationship between environmental protection and nationalism.    
 
 
4.2 Three stages of China’s environmental foreign relations 
The formative stage of China’s environmental foreign relations started in 
1984 and culminated in 2000, with preparation for entering the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and the launching of the “Going Global Strategy”. This was 
a phase that embraced environmental protection as a national strategy and 
involved learning from bilateral, regional and multilateral environmental 
cooperation. It was also a period when the term “environmental diplomacy” 
was widely used to refer to environmental foreign relations, so that it 
116 
 
frequently appears on CEN. The key message in this stage is that international 
environmental cooperation is inevitable, and that China can benefit from 
foreign technology and assistance. During this phase, two peaks of 
environmental diplomacy may be identified: 1992 and 1998.  
Liu Xiaojun and Chen Ting summarise environmental diplomacy in the 
first stage as “hot and effective”212, giving the example of intensified exchanges 
and visits between officials from the State Environmental Protection 
Administration and foreign experts, the signing of international environmental 
accords, participation in regional and bilateral cooperation, and the 
establishment of CCICED. The then directors of SEPA, Qu Geping and Xie 
Zhenhua, actively participated in the discussion of environmental diplomacy. 
The institutional collaboration between SEPA and MOFA is reflected in the 
writings of environmental diplomacy by officials from both institutions: Wang 
Guangya (vice minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Wang Zhijia (Chinese 
representative in UNEP), Pan Jiahua (a senior officer in UNDP’s Beijing office), 
and Liu Huaqiu (director of Central Foreign Affairs Small Leading Group).  
Whereas the first stage witnessed China’s integration with global 
environmental governance, the second stage, after 2000, was one of spotting 
problems and challenges and was impregnated with suspicion towards the 
normative foundations of environmental cooperation. While entry into the WTO 
signified further integration with the world economic order and more 
competition from foreign firms inside China, the Going Global Strategy 
encouraged Chinese companies to explore international markets. This meant 
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境外交热而有效 [Environmental Diplomacy in Our Country Is Hot and Effective],” 中国环境报
[China Environment News], January 14, 1993. 
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that the question of how to coordinate foreign trade and environmental 
protection dominated the discussion on CEN. The “green barrier” (lüse bilei绿
色壁垒) became the centre of discussion. It refers to restrictions on trade 
brought about by environmental regulations and embeds environmental issues 
in foreign trade.  Environmental diplomacy was perceived as a means to fend off 
“environmental colonialism” in which developed countries used environmental 
protection to set non-tariff trade barriers and export their foreign waste to 
China213. 
This linkage brought officials in charge of foreign trade into the field of 
environmental foreign relations. The former Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation (MFTEC), now Ministry of Commerce, represented 
national economic interests in environmental foreign relations. In 2002, an 
international seminar on the economic and ecological opportunities and 
challenges posed by China’s entry into the WTO was thus co-hosted by SEPA 
and MFTEC to explore ways to integrate foreign trade and environmental 
protection in accordance with WTO regulations214.  
The debate over trade and the environment had the effect of sharpening 
the conflict of interests between developed and developing countries, and 
creating solidarity among the states of what came to be known as the ‘Global 
South’. For instance, in 2004 the UNDP cooperated with MOFCOM on South-
South Cooperation and allocated US$1.6 million to a three-year project. The 
then Vice Minister of Commerce, Wei Jianguo, pointed out that South-South 
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Cooperation was the cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy, which implied that 
MOFCOM has a critically important role to play in the broader scope of foreign 
relations215. The emergence of South-South Cooperation was also important for 
Chinese companies that were “going out” and felt that “markets of developed 
countries are already occupied with highly competitive multinationals, and we 
(Chinese companies) can only pick up those undesirable projects in developing 
countries”216.  
The fact that MOFCOM guided and influenced the scope and direction of 
Chinese outward FDI made it an important player in environmental foreign 
relations. The global financial crisis of 2008 was a watershed in this respect 
because China’s outbound investment witnessed its biggest ever increase, 
jumping from $26.5 to $55.9 billion217. In 2013, China was ranked as one of the 
top three investors in the world, hitting a flow of $100 billion. Chinese investors 
left their footprints in 184 countries. By 2013, 15,300 domestic investors had 
set up 25, 400 enterprises abroad that involved almost two million staff 218. The 
speed and scale of China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) indicate 
that domestic interest groups in China have a direct bearing on the 
international market. Furthermore, they can be seen to start to play a role in 
China’s foreign-policy making. In other words, the actions of Chinese companies 
began to have implications well beyond the borders of the PRC. 
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The legacy of this second stage is that the field environmental foreign 
relations is dominated by the economic power of nation-states. In other words, 
environmental issues are an instrument of which economically powerful states 
contain the development of poorer countries. Questions of national image and 
discursive power have thus become relevant and crucial for facilitating the 
development of environmental diplomacy. 
This can be seen in in the third stage, from 2010 onwards, 
environmental foreign relations have been increasingly linked to China’s 
national image and discursive power 219. Environmental issues are used to 
remedy the damage on the national image in the aftermath of the Tiananmen 
Incident of June 1989 and help China rejoin the international community. 
However, the elevated importance of national image in environmental issues 
has changed the way in which Chinese political actors define the challenges of 
China’s participation in global environmental governance. Instead of regarding 
severe domestic pollution as the key rationale for international environmental 
cooperation, the stress on national image tends to establish the logic that a 
better image induces more discursive power for China to defend the national 
interest. The implication, therefore, is that showing the international community 
how devoted the Chinese government is to fix global environmental crisis is 
seen as important if not more than action-based implementation. In other 
words, the key concern for China is more about “being liked” than “being green”. 
Consequently, the contrast between the green image China displays and the 
domestic environmental problems, with smog as the most recent example, may 
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prove that without on-the-ground evidence of improved environmental quality 
within China, the “green image” is more contested than convincing.     
The above three stages illustrate how the trend of China’s environmental 
foreign relations has been shaped by learning from the outside world, adjusting 
so as to ensure the protection of its economic interests, and ultimately taking a 
leading role on behalf of other developing countries. The following section 
presents the institutional set-up and strategic concepts of environmental 
foreign relations that this has generated. Each part indicates the formation of a 
different paradigm for China’s role in international environmental cooperation: 
namely from environmental diplomacy through “Chinese experience” and to 
Chinese culture.   
 
 
4.3 Institutions: scattered and weak 
I depict the three phases by looking at the actions and statements of the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection, the MOFA and MOFCOM as they 
dominate the discussion on environmental foreign relations on CEN. It does not 
mean that they have a monopoly on international environmental cooperation. 
Other ministries have corresponding international partners and delegate their 
departments for international cooperation to attend to environmental issues in 
their specific fields. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 
for example, is another important government agency and the hub of climate 
change policies. Suffice it to say that environmental foreign relations are 
scattered in various government departments with different preferences. My 
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empirical chapters will compensate for the narrow focus of CEN and illustrate 
the bureaucratic involvement and competition based on specific issues.  
The duties and responsibilities of environmental governance have in fact 
been shared across a diversity of government institutions since the 1980s. 
“Division of labour” is the underlying logic of the absence of a leading institution, 
despite the establishment of SEPA in 1998. For instance, CEN reprinted a speech 
by Li Peng in which he allocated natural environmental management to 
agriculture, fisheries, forestry, water conservation, mining, and oceanic 
departments; industrial pollution to industry and transportation departments, 
and suggested that economic departments should not treat environmental 
protection as an “extra burden”220. In fact, the 1980s had already witnessed a 
wave of existing institutions “jumping on the bandwagon” of environmental 
protection issues. The cross-departmental cooperation is manifest in an 
increased sense of urgency and responsibility for the Ministry of Chemistry and 
Industry in 1984221, research and development activities on environmental 
protection in the short-lived Ministry of Arms Industry in 1984222, and the 
efforts of the People’s Liberation Army223, Ministry of Aerospace Industry224, 
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and the Navy on environmental protection225, supported by the Ministry of 
Finance226.  This approach to environmental protection also came from the 
Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and Environmental Protection, the 
State Commission for Planning, the State Science Commission, State Economic 
Commission, Ministry of Finance, and the Chinese Construction Bank227. The 
State Council Environmental Protection Commission, created in 1984, was thus 
composed of 25 people from 24 different ministries.   
The institutional setup created in the 1980s has not changed over the 
past three decades, leading academic research to dwell on the weakness of 
institutional capabilities for protecting the environment. Jahiel identifies the 
main duties of the different kinds of government agencies expected to attend to 
environmental issues.  The National People’s Congress Committee on Natural 
Resources and Environmental Protection is intended to draft and amend 
environmental laws; the State Environmental Protection Administration 
participates in environmental policy formulation, assists in drafting legislation, 
supervises environmental management, works on environmental education, 
and coordinates international environmental exchanges. Its subordinate 
bureaux and offices are responsible for enforcing environmental laws and 
policies, setting standards for local pollution, investigating on-the-ground 
environmental accidents, and mediating environmental disputes. Commissions 
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on environmental protection are usually inter-ministerial and composed of 
senior officials from the environmental department and other related 
stakeholder departments, such as planning and economic. There are 
environmental offices in industrial ministries and their tasks are to oversee 
industry-specific pollutants and wastes and to formulate “industry-specific 
waste treatment regulations and procedures.” 228  The environmental protection 
industry that emerged in the late 1980s is also composed of companies that 
produce and sell environmental protection equipment to industries and 
governments. Research programmes and monitor stations have also been set up 
to raise public environmental awareness and collect data and information for 
the reference of environmental agencies.  
Despite environmental protection penetrating various institutions, 
however, they are either too weak to fight for environmental interests or too 
constrained when they are non-governmental actors. Even though the 
environmental institution agencies were upgraded to ministerial level in 1998, 
Jahiel shows that two obstacles still haunt environmental governance: the 
inadequate authority of environmental agencies and poor coordination among 
institutions. For instance, Hildebrandt points out that to overcome institutional 
barriers, one has to resort to personal charisma and individual networks to 
enable environmental appeals to taken into consideration229.  
The conduct of environmental foreign relations appears to be limited to 
a few key ministries and is issue-based. Regarding negotiation, the final say, 
theoretically, resides with the MOFA, the State Development Planning 
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Commission, and the Ministry of Science and Technology230. However, as the 
following empirical chapters demonstrate, this is not always the case. 
Leadership in foreign environmental relations is not always monopolised by 
MOFA, for example. Chen observes that the weakness of MOFA. Whereas MOFA 
is in charge of negotiations, the NDRC is responsible for policy formulation, the 
Ministry of Science and Technology deals with technology and concrete projects, 
and the there is also joint participation by the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection, State Forestry Administration, State Meteorological Administration, 
Ministry of Water Resources, and MOFCOM231. Indeed, the playing field of 
environmental foreign relations is crowded with either no leader or one with 
limited power. As chapter 5 demonstrates, no less than 16 ministries are 
involved in implementing the Montreal Protocol, and 18 are related to 
implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity. This fragmentation of 
agencies is also manifest in climate change implementation, with the climate 
change research programme in 1989 encompassing 40 projects, 20 ministries, 
and 500 experts232.  
This fragmentation leads to competition among bureaucracies over 
international resources. Yu Hongyuan thus uses the example of the Global 
Environmental Facility’s role in China’s climate change policy to demonstrate 
parochial ministerial interest. He lists 11 ministries and their divergent 
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interests and preferences233. For instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is 
concerned with international norms and laws and aims to reach consensus 
between UNFCCC and domestic bureaucracies. The Ministry of Science and 
Technology controls the transfer of funds and technology and hopes that more 
GEF funding can be distributed for the development of science and technology. 
The Ministry of Agriculture strives for more funding for research on the 
agricultural development strategy, and SEPA wants more resources into 
environmental science and legislation. The division of labour among ministries 
suggested by Li Peng thus evolves into a competition for international resources 
and the pursuit of narrow bureaucratic interests. Yu’s case study of climate 
change policy is thus a microcosm that reflects the plurality and weakness of 
the institutions of China’s environmental foreign relations. As explained in the 
theoretical discussion in Chapter 2, institutions are too weak to aggregate 
domestic preferences and divide preferences instead.  
 
 
4.4 Ideational Paradigms of China’s role in Global Environmental 
Governance 
 
 
4.4.1 Revival of Socialism 
Carter and Mol observe that “with the perception of China as a 
superpower-in-the-making, attention is shifting from the role of foreign 
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assistance on domestic environmental reform to China’s outward role in global 
environmental politics”234.  Their words mean that, in addition to defending 
national interests in environmental cooperation, the Chinese government is 
expected to contribute its share, commensurate with its capabilities. 
Socialism is important in China’s environmental foreign relations not 
because the political system resembles one of a socialist entity, but because it is 
“a symbol of patriotic loyalty” by the Chinese leaders under the Reform and 
Opening Policy about the introduction of “technological and market orthodoxies 
of globalisation”235. At the heart of the discussion of Socialism, therefore, is not 
whether the Chinese political system is genuinely socialist. Instead, political 
actors explore how socialism can be used to differentiate China from other 
capitalist countries. Furthermore, how can the paradigm of socialism with 
Chinese characteristics suggest the political advantage of the Chinese regime.  
Xia Guang, the director of Policy Research Centre for Environment and 
Economy in the Ministry of Environmental Protection, highlights  the he 
political advantage of socialism is thus noteworthy when it comes to 
environmental protection 236 .  The linkage between Socialism and 
environmental issues traces back to the introduction of Eco-socialism to China 
in the 1980s and its development in the 1990s. With more academic work being 
available in China, the twenty-first century has so far witnessed a remarkable 
interest in doing research on the topic in both universities and the Party237. 
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Literature in the eco-socialism discourse tends to focus on the role of science 
and technology and the political system in environmental governance. Eco-
socialism thus discards technological determinism and gives science and 
technology a political purpose. This can be seen in the work of socialist scholars 
outside China, such as Ted Benton who asserts that the “environmental crisis 
was to be seen not as the result of industry or population but as a consequence 
of the specifically capitalist form of organisation of economic life”238. Therefore, 
science and technology, according to the ends they serve, may be categorised as 
having either a capitalist form or a socialist form239. The ecological crisis does 
not result from technology per se.  
In a similar vein, it is said to be untrue that science and technology can 
automatically solve the problem of environmental deterioration. Instead, it is 
held that it is the capitalist application of science and technology, which is based 
on the exploitation of both nature and labour, which accounts for the ecological 
crisis. Chinese scholars favour this idea because Eco-socialism orchestrates a 
harmonious symphony with the notes of a China’s rocketing market economy, a 
strong yearning for scientific and technological advancement and an urgent 
need to protect the environment240. Science and technology in the process of 
industrialisation can thus be used to maintain the legitimacy derived from the 
economic achievements of the Communist Party. However, according to the 
former vice minister of Environmental Protection, Pan Yue, science and 
technology imported from abroad can never be completely relied upon, because 
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it does not necessarily fit China’s situation - especially its low GDP per capita. 
Therefore, the Communists claim to be able to socialise science and technology 
and utilise it to serve a socialist purpose.  
In fact, Pan regards environmental protection as the best policy area in 
which to experiment with socialist democracy and the rule of law, as 
environmental issues are not the most politically sensitive and have an impact 
on diverse interest groups and stakeholders241. It is worth noting here that Pan 
Yue’s mentioning of democracy appears to contravene the academic critique of 
democracy as not a sufficient or necessary condition of better environmental 
governance. Such a view is expressed by Pan Nini, a researcher at Chongqing 
University and columnist of the right-wing nationalism news outlet Guancha 观
察, who declares that democracy cannot solve environmental problems and that 
waves of environmental protests are driven by conflicts of interests, instead of 
moral judgments242.  
This distrust of Western models and the emphasis on socialism points to 
the significance of appealing to the “Chinese experience” when reconciling 
different interests along the development-environment nexus. The emphasis on 
such experience frequently appears on CEN. Qu Geping states in 1990, for 
example, that the Chinese experience includes the use of small hydropower, 
desert control, small watershed management, biological control, and briquette 
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technology243. In a conversation with the renowned executive director of UNEP, 
Dr Mostafa Kamal Tolba, Qu says that China’s vast territory and its rich flora 
and fauna could allow UNEP to “experiment” in environmental governance in 
ways that would allow different actors in China to generate new experience244. 
Such experience is important because it provides a medium that allows the 
Chinese government to draw the international community’s attention. When 
Chinese media representatives participated in an Asia-Pacific NGO and Media 
Environmental Promotion seminar in Bangkok, they thus wrote that China’s 
unique environmental protection experience contributes to the well-being of 
the mankind, which is something that foreigners do not due to the language 
barrier245.  
The Chinese experience is not only used for the Chinese government to 
promote its efforts in environmental protection to the international community, 
but also as a medium for the outside world to engage with China. For instance, 
former UNEP director Dr Tolba lauded the legislation and strict enforcement of 
environmental laws in 1992, and asserted that the Chinese experience was 
unique246 . Claiming the uniqueness of the Chinese experience has two 
implications: first, the experience of the developed countries cannot be directly 
applied to China; and second, one cannot impose the Chinese experience to 
other developing countries. As a result, the paradox is that the Chinese 
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experience is not defined by its capability of being generalised, but by its nature 
of not being replicable due to the emphasis on special national conditions.  
 
 
4.4.2 Yearning for modernisation 
The desire to modernise China so that it becomes a wealthy and powerful 
nation has long motivated its integration with the outside world. Environmental 
cooperation is no exception to this. Chinese people have experienced the 
modernisation project since the mid-nineteenth century and it was further intensified 
with the foundation of the People’s Republic. The first Premier, Zhou Enlai, iterated 
the goals of Four Modernisations in 1963, targeting agriculture, industry, 
national defence, and science and technology. Concrete policies began to be 
implemented after Deng Xiaoping assumed power and launched Reform and 
Opening in 1978. The scope of the Four Modernisation expanded in the 1990s 
to incorporate most dimensions of the economy, society, politics and culture247. 
The environment was first included in the official definition of modernisation in 
the late 2000s. A watershed document was the China Modernisation Report 
2007, which indicated “an urgent and timely effort to insert ecological 
rationality into the modernisation discourse, policy-making, and practice in 
China”248. 
The theory of ecological modernisation (EM) has developed into five 
streams in Europe, as categorised by Murphy249, which are different from the 
Chinese interpretation. The first is represented by Joseph Huber, the founding 
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father of the EM school, who proposes that the advancement of science and 
technology can solve environmental problems and that “the dirty and ugly 
industrial caterpillar will transform into an ecological butterfly”250.  The second 
branch, while acknowledging the strong influence of science, emphasises the 
macroeconomic structure, arguing for a restructuring of national economies 
from resource-intensive to knowledge-intensive industries251. Shifting attention 
from economy to institutions, the third school of thoughts foregrounds the issue 
of equity, capacity building, and citizen empowerment252. The last two strands 
argue respectively that ecological civilisation is a political strategy and a 
discursive construct, and challenge the assumption of the previous three, 
namely that economic prosperity and environmental improvement can be 
simultaneously achieved if the right policies are made and implemented. 
According to these perspectives, EM is a political strategy to question the 
usefulness of using modernisation to solve environmental problems. The most 
obvious function of this term is to highlight the importance of the government 
in minimising the conflict between environmental protection and economic 
development, thereby integrating environmental elements into the overall 
policy framework253. The last school deconstructs EM even further by arguing 
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that it should be based on “credible and attractive storylines” in which “the 
regulation of the environment appears as a positive-sum game; pollution is a 
matter of inefficiency, nature is a balance that should be respected, anticipation 
is better than cure”254. 
Noting the various approaches to ecological civilisation, Zhang et al. 
observe that China’s 2007 Modernisation Report is heavy on the economic-
technological dimension, with no recognition of political modernisation in 
environmental governance. EM with Chinese characteristics is thus described 
by Zhang et al as the “technological-economic dimension of sustainable 
development, without entering too much into relations with equity, equality, 
citizen empowerment and the like”255. The way in which EM is used, therefore, 
reflects the technical and managerial approach to finding solutions to 
environmental problems. This has implications for foreign relations because the 
high salience of science and technology for the Chinese government’s 
modernisation project justifies its requests for technology transfer and for 
taking action after scientific research proves this to be necessary. To borrow the 
words of Economy, the Chinese government can take advantage of science and 
technology from developed countries without being liberal256.   
The other important difference from the European streams of thinking 
that Zhang et al. identify is the issue of decentralisation in ecological 
modernisation. While decentralisation is favoured as an effective way to achieve 
equity in the European literature of ecological modernisation, it is seen as an 
obstacle to environmental protection in China because it does not match the 
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political landscape. Professor Hong Dayong of Renmin University thus argues 
that a decentralised political system will provide fewer incentives for local 
governors to prioritise environmental management, as they will be driven to 
pursue parochial economic interest and to represent vested interest groups257. 
The distrust of local officials and the confidence that national leaders have a 
better idea of how to serve the public good thus renders a decentralised system 
less desirable.  
Hong’s argument is indicative of the necessity of a stronger role for the 
state in the process of ecological modernisation.  The emphasis on the state 
dovetails with Dent’s theory of new developmentalism, which synthesises 
ecological modernisation with the theory of state capacity258. The common 
ground between EM and state capacity is the emphasis on state effectiveness 
during the process of transformative economic development. This linkage is of 
particular significance as it explains the political motivation for the central 
government to deploy the theme of ecological civilisation. Since the economic 
reform, the national government has been losing its grip on the speed and 
nature of modernisation on local jurisdictions259. The incorporation of the 
ecological element into modernisation provides needed momentum for the 
central government to chart a new path to sustainable development and 
maintain the leading role in economic transformation.  
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The Chinese adaptation of the European concept of EM is preoccupied 
with technological advancement and the consolidation of state power. It should 
not mislead us into believing that modernisation is the only solution to 
environmental problems. Modernity is but one side of the coin, and the other 
side is tradition and culture. This constitutes the third paradigm used in 
environmental governance, and increasingly so in environmental foreign 
relations.  
 
 
4.4.3 Resorting to Chinese culture   
Political actors in China are not satisfied to follow the Western theory 
and Western models and try to define their own, not merely to refine those of 
foreigners. The recently-emerged idea of “ecological civilisation”, which will be 
explained in further detail in Chapter 7, is one of the many efforts by which 
Chinese political groups try to incorporate cultural elements in environmental 
governance and foreign relations. This reference to traditional culture and 
philosophy is an effort to search for the roots for environmental awareness 
domestically, and to showcase sources of discursive power which the Chinese 
find desirable. Shapiro has teased out Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism as 
philosophical inputs into Chinese environmental awareness. Confucianism, 
according to Shapiro, is anthropocentric and takes a utilitarian and pragmatic 
approach in order that the exploitation of nature is normalised260. Buddhism, on 
the other hand, is more bio-centric, advocating reverence for life and 
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vegetarianism. Daoism further equates human beings with nature and 
corresponds to a deep ecological movement. The strategy of highlighting the 
resonance between environmental protection and the Chinese view of nature 
can be not only used to mobilise domestic support to protect the environment 
as Shapiro demonstrates, it could also be a tool to fulfil diplomatic objectives.  
Robert Weller scrutinises the interaction between old and new concepts 
so as to understand how countries respond to the globalisation of 
environmental awareness. He observes that China and Taiwan were “the heirs 
of the unstinting dedication to modernity that characterised the dominant 
stream of Chinese intellectuals from the early twentieth century on” and adopt a 
pro-development discourse which reduces nature to a “resource to be mined” 
and an “obstacle to be conquered”261. He further judges that an older Chinese 
environmental discourse has not yet posed a challenge to current global 
discourses. Even if alternative and creative native green discourses emerge, 
they will not be aimed to compete against current global discourses.  
Although Weller convincingly points out the limitation of Chinese 
environmental discourse to replace Western concepts, however, China’s leaders 
do in fact aspire to portray the country as a power with a normative 
contribution to make. Hughes suggests a critical evaluation of how “tradition” 
and “culture” are constructed in the political project which highlights the 
Chinese way262. Indeed, as illustrated in the three stages of environmental 
foreign relations, they have increasingly shifted attention towards the national 
image and discursive power (huayuquan话语权). This is thus becoming is a key 
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obstacle to furthering foreign relations as the importance of cultural and 
traditional elements in the Chinese environmental concept gets more 
prominent.  
The exercise of discursive power can be seen, according to Breslin, as a 
measure to “sinicise” an imported concept, and a sinicised interpretation will 
tend to focus more on the most important and imminent challenges China 
faces263. Having the ability to define what are the most pressing issues, instead 
of being told by foreign countries and multilateral organisations thus grows out 
of the second phase of environmental foreign relations, in which environmental 
issues are seen as an instrument used by developed countries to exploit 
resources and dominate the global trade. In other words, “environmental 
protection” is said to reveal the hypocrisy of the super powers. What China has 
learnt from this is that economic strength can be used to exert soft power over 
others. This disillusionment with the normative underpinning of 
environmentalism from the West yields two reactions: dissatisfaction with the 
current environmental discourse; and a conscious and explicit usage of Chinese 
versions of environmental norms to defend national interests, instead of for 
solving environmental problems. In the process, environmental diplomacy can 
be used explicitly by the Chinese government to occupy the moral high ground 
in the international community, and hence enhance the national image and 
status of China264.   
The above analysis demonstrates that the ideational dimension used in 
environmental foreign relations is more of a diplomatic project for the Chinese 
                                                          
263 Shaun Breslin, “Debating Human Security in China: Towards Discursive Power?,” Journal of 
Contemporary Asia 45, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): p.259. 
 
264 Chen 2010.  
137 
 
government to demonstrate its political superiority, acquire international 
scientific and technological advance, and improve its national image than part 
of a committed effort to fix global environmental problems. The following 
examination of the disjointed relationship between environmental protection 
and nationalism provides further evidence that domestic preferences are 
aggregated and ranked not against a universal environmental identity, but 
against a national economic one.     
 
 
4.5 Environmental nationalism as a possibility? 
 
 
4.5.1 Theoretical connection 
All three strategic concepts discussed above touch upon the linkage 
between environmental protection and nationalism. This is because they 
prioritise defence of the national interest, claim the political superiority of 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics”, and resort to tradition and Chinese 
culture to construct an alternative set of norms. That there can be a connection 
between the environment and nationalism should not be surprising, as it is 
natural for the individual to “love his birthplace or the place of his childhood 
sojourn, its surroundings, its climate, the contours of hills and valleys of rivers 
and trees” as “we are all subject to the immense power of habitude”265.  
A systematic theorisation of the connection between nationalism and 
ecological value is seen in Avner De-Shalit’s analysis of how nationalism 
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accommodates and hinders ecological value promotion. The reasons why 
nationalism benefits environmental protection are three-fold. First, the 
solidarity and responsibility advocated by nationalism transform the calculating 
individual into a citizen who wants to take care of what is perceived to be the 
common good. The second reason is that nationalism arouses the duty of the 
public towards the past. De-Shalit uses the example of heritage preservation as 
a physical vehicle for national myth and history to assert that our consciousness 
of the past nurtures the discourse of environmental protection. Thirdly (and 
related to the second reason) is the sense of responsibility towards future 
generations advocated by nationalism266.  
All these reasons focus on the individual level. When it comes to the 
collective level, though, De-Shalit sees conflicts between nationalism and 
ecological values. The first tension is between the national interest in 
nationalist rhetoric on the one hand and the global and local interest in 
environmentalism on the other, typified by the slogan “think globally-act 
locally”. The second issue revolves around the question of national borders. 
Whereas nationalists regard borders as a holy demarcation between Us and the 
Other, environmental activists try to break the hurdles set by national 
boundaries because the problems they are concerned with are most of the time 
transboundary.  
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4.5.2 Environmentalism and patriotism on CEN 
In Chinese environmental discourse, the connection between 
environmental protection and nationalism is complicated. Domestically, 
nationalism is used to raise environmental awareness among the public. 
However, in terms of foreign relations, nationalistic rhetoric is deployed to 
prioritise economic interest over environmental protection based on the 
assumption that the West uses environmental issues to undermine developing 
countries. This is particularly evident in the first two stages of China’s 
environmental foreign relations as shown on CEN.  
Wang Wenxing, a renowned environmental chemist, recalled China’s 
first overseas trip which sought to solve environmental problems. Eleven 
delegates travelled to Britain in 1973 to learn about pollution control. The 
delegates had to revise their report many times to avoid being seen as 
xenophiles (chongyang meiwai 崇洋媚外)267. The mentality of the delegates 
reflects the “foreign” side of environmental protection and how loyalty 
constrains the way experts report to the national leaders. A more explicit 
negative linkage between nationalism and environmental protection is 
articulated by Li Keguo, who is an environmental activist and educator. He 
warns against the possibility of “environmental imperialism”- by which he 
means countries using environmental protection to set non-tariff trade barriers, 
plunder resources, transfer polluted industries, and export waste. Instead of 
dismissing environmental protection, Li proposes a solution to deal with 
potential environmental imperialism through the active conduct of 
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environmental diplomacy, an enforced environmental education, and the 
strengthening of technology268. Cui Fengshan, a military commentator, further 
links environmental issues with military strategy and argues that regional 
environmental problems may lead to violent conflicts and the environmental 
threat becomes another excuse, apart from human rights, to interfere with 
Chinese domestic affairs269. 
The relation between environmental protection and nationalism is, 
however, interpreted differently when the purpose is to educate the public. This 
can be seen in an article entitled “Environmental protection in the national 
anthem” published in 2000 by Guo Geng, an active environmental activist 
devoted to animal conservation. He claims that environmental protection is 
patriotism (huanbao jiushi aiguo 环保就是爱国) and the common enemy of all 
patriots is the “economic and cultural invasion” in the form of technological 
determinism, materialism, and consumerism. He attempts to “wake up” the 
patriots through the national anthem and advocates that environmental 
protection is an indispensable element of patriotism270. The connection 
between patriotism and environmental protection does, therefore, have some 
appeal among environmental activists. In one article exploring how non-
governmental environmental organisations can exert their talent, the authors 
                                                          
268 Li 2001, p.3. 
269 Fengshan 凤山 Cui 崔, “‘Queli Huanjing Junshi Zhanlue Xin linian’确立环境军事战略新理念
[Confirm the New Concept of Environment-Military Strategy],” 中国环境报[China Environment 
News], January 18, 2002. 
 
270 Geng 耕 Guo 郭, “‘Guogesheng Zhong de huanbao’国歌声中的环保[Environmental Protection 
in the National Anthem],” 中国环境报[China Environment News], March 22, 2000. 
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conclude that patriotism is the precondition and pragmatism is the 
foundation271. 
These two cited articles echo a strong element of learning about and 
caring for the natural features of the motherland in civic education. In recent 
years, environmental protection has been incorporated in the College Entrance 
Exam (gaokao) 高考 in Chinese provinces272 in various subjects: Reader (yuwen) 
语文, geography, and politics. The rhetoric currently advocated by the CCP 
which highlights environmental protection-nationalism nexus and depicts an 
aesthetic appreciation of Chinese landscape is “beautiful China” (meili zhongguo 
美丽中国). Meili zhongguo, originally the Chinese translation for a BBC-CCTV 
jointly produced documentary Wild China, is now used as a name of a tourism 
iPhone App273 dedicated to sightseeing in Chinese cities. Moreover, it is a name 
of a Hong Kong listed company which specialises in environmental protection 
investment, construction, and operation274. This indicates the penetration of 
environment-nationalism to the business world.  
Juxtaposing these two interpretations of the environment-nationalism 
nexus points to a very unique and somehow schizophrenic trait of how 
environmental protection is perceived within the nationalistic rhetoric. On the 
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one hand, environmental protection is linked to the flora and fauna of the 
motherland and reflects the love of one’s nation. On the other hand, the fact that 
environmental protection is an imported concept generates conspiracy-based 
suspicion which limits China’s environmental commitments in the global 
environmental governance. This contradiction can be seen as a gap between the 
positive environment-nationalism nexus on the individual level and the 
negative connection on the state level, echoing de-Shalit’s theorisation.  
To highlight the special linkage between environmental protection and 
nationalism and comprehend the cautious attitudes towards environmental 
issues in China, the following brief section presents some classical analysis from 
other countries regarding the environment-nationalism connection and the 
caveats of this nexus.   
 
 
4.5.3 Lessons from USSR and Latvia 
Established links between environmental protection and nationalism can 
be found from insightful case studies of the former Soviet Union and Latvia, 
among others. Ziegler provides evidence that environmental participation in the 
former Soviet Union contains a stark populist element and are interwoven with 
nationalistic movements, in which civic elements were highlighted. Moscow’s 
economic, agricultural and energy policies engender severe ramification on 
account of environmental pollution and health problems275. In the Baltic states, 
environmental issues have been pushed by separatism into a rallying point for 
                                                          
275 Charles Ziegler, “Political Participation, Nationalism, and Environmental Politics in the USSR,” 
in The Soviet Environment: Problems, Policies and Politics, Steward, John (ed.) (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.24–39. 
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nationalism. Generally, “ecological issues have served as focal points for 
voluntary political participation” 276 and environmental appeals dovetail the 
request for the rule of law, civil rights, and accountability of the government. 
The USSR’s environmental movements were not only about civic awakening but 
also related to an emotional reaction to Moscow’s mismanagement and the 
adverse impact on the aesthetic, symbolic, and culturally-significant homeland 
and landscape. The example of Lake Baikal- “a unique, even spiritual symbol for 
Russians and Buryats - being polluted by effluent from cellulose plants and 
Moscow’s mismanagement, typifies the political power of the environmental 
protection-nationalism nexus277.  
 This is not to suggest that love of the national landscape will 
automatically mobilise public support to protect the environment and remind 
the public of their national identities. Antony D Smith argues that it is landscape 
attached to an ethnic element and shared memory that is able to instigate 
emotion among the population278. Katrina Schwartz illustrates the importance 
of the ethnic constituent, and its connection with civic participation with the 
fascinating case of the National Awakening Movement in Latvia. The key 
dynamic in her work is the internationalist (outward) and peasantist (inward) 
perception of the “nature and nation nexus”279. She defines the ethnoscape as “a 
cultivated landscape of labour that mutually constitutes and is constituted by 
                                                          
276 Ibid, p.37. 
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Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.149–62. 
279 Katrina Schwartz, Nature and National Identity After Communism (Pittsburgh: University of 
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the national character and serves as a reservoir of national history and 
ethnographic uniqueness”280.  
The lessons in the USSR and Latvia demonstrate not only how intimate 
the relationship between nationalistic sentiment and environmental awareness 
is but also how dangerous environmental degradation could be to the political 
legitimacy of an autocratic regime. Perhaps one reason why the Chinese 
national leaders do not couple environmental protection and nationalism, even 
though it may make environmental education and governance easier, is that 
they are concerned and anxious about the potential for environmental 
nationalism to challenge their own legitimacy to rule.  
 
  
                                                          
280 Ibid. She observes that during the first national awakening movement in Latvia from 1800 to 
the 1850s, there were two forms of Latvian nationalism, inward-looking and outward-looking 
(Ibid, 8). Inspired by Johann Gottfried Herder and his romanticist thinking, national 
entrepreneurs sought authenticity from the countryside because farmers were too isolated to 
be corrupted by cosmopolitan cities. In the 19th century, nation-builders went down to the 
provinces to garner and research folk songs, poems, peasants’ customs and vernacular usage. 
Ardent passion and strenuous efforts were made to fend off the hegemonic German, Austrian or 
Turkish culture and defend an authentic Latvianness. The outward perspective, a flipside 
interpretation, depicts Latvia as a cosmopolitan middleman, bridging the East and the West. 
After 1918, the bourgeois ruling elites shifted the internationalist discourse towards the idea of 
Latvia as a “nation of farmers” (Ibid). The purpose was to shield Latvian identity from the 
influence of Soviet Bolshevism. Radical land reform was launched by the leaders to connect the 
national character closely to peasant values. Closeness to nature became the critical Latvianness 
and the “nation of farmers” were revived in the dominant discourse with a nostalgic 
atmosphere against the backdrop of annexation by the Soviet Union. A shift from aesthetic 
attachment to the primordial landscape towards environmental participation was detected in 
the third national awakening movement. Soviet rule was characterised as imposing ruthless 
industrialisation at the expense of the Latvian ecosystem, yielding to the Latvian Great Tree 
Liberation Movement in the mid-1970s. Schwartz laments that “Soviet technocratic 
utilitarianism had crowded out the primordial Latvian sensitivity to nature” (2007, 279). The 
tree is not only a national-ethnic symbol in Latvia, but also exemplifies the mismanagement of 
the country by Moscow. It is at this point that the ethnocultural and civic element of nationalism 
converge into an environmental nationalistic identity. 
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4.5.4 Political legitimacy in question 
Environmental issues have the potential to undermine the political 
legitimacy of the one-party regime for two reasons. First, environmental 
pollution is costly and discounts the economic achievements of the country. 
Research from the 1980s to 2000s conducted by academics, officials and the 
World Bank estimates that the cost of pollution in China occupies 3%-18% of 
GDP281. The cost is not only in financial terms, because environmental pollution 
is also a matter of life and death. Air pollution alone contributes to about 1.2 
million premature death in China each year282. The most recent OECD report 
“the economic consequences of air pollution” compares projected GDP losses 
among countries and concludes that air pollution will hit China hardest at a cost 
of around 2.5% of GDP, due to extra health costs, lower productivity and 
reduced farm output. This is even worse than, Russia, with less than 2% of GDP 
loss283. Such costs can only weaken the legitimacy of the ruling elite, which is 
largely premised on economic performance284. In fact, a recent opinion poll 
conducted in thirty-four Chinese cities on urban citizens’ attitudes towards 
environmental protection reveals that seventy-seven percent of respondents 
believe that environmental protection is more important than economic 
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282 Eleanor Albert and Beina Xu, “China’s Environmental Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
2016, http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-environmental-crisis/p12608. 
283 OECD, “The Economic Consequences of Outdoor Air Pollution,” 2016, 
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development, with only eleven percent arguing the opposite285. Furthermore, 
environmental problems cause social instability. The number of complaint 
letters on environmental disputes has increased eight times in the decade from 
1996 to 2005. Environmental protests have steadily increased by an annual rate 
of twenty-nine percent 286.  
The second reason why environmental issues can be detrimental to 
Chinese rulers is that one of the fundamental core concepts of political 
legitimacy in  Chinese traditional political culture is the Mandate of Heaven 
(tianming 天命), together with rule by virtue, popular consent, and legality287. 
According to the theory of the Mandate of Heaven the responsibility of the 
emperor was to “ensure that society expressed its natural order which was an 
aspect of the cosmic order of humanity, heaven, and earth” 288. Preserving 
harmony with the natural order was thus crucial to governance, and managing 
agriculture established the material base of political legitimacy. This was 
sometimes specified in considerable detail, as when the Lost Book of Zhou 
prohibited hunting animals and felling trees in March because it was the time of 
the beginning of new life. The Mandate of Heaven, therefore, had the potential 
to both legitimise and de-legitimise the rulers. It not only justified authority but 
also granted the right to rebel against despotic and incapable emperors289 . 
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People would know when the ruler had lost the mandate because there would 
be natural disasters such as droughts, floods, earthquakes, and epidemics. 
The ancient source of political legitimacy is still salient at a rhetorical 
level nowadays, revolving around the legitimacy of the CCP. During the 
Tiananmen Student Protest in 1989, the protesters argued that the Communist 
Party had lost the Heavenly Mandate and hence justified their “rebellion”290. 
Falungong, a dissenting religious group in China, contended that the natural 
disaster of the flood in 1998 was an omen from Heaven, depriving the current 
regime of its mandate. Chinese orthodox scholars try to argue the opposite. Cao 
Jinqing, a famous professor of Sociology, for example, contends that the CCP has 
sustained the mandate via rapid economic growth. The challenges and 
responsibility are now to ensure sustainable development291, without upsetting 
the balance of nature and by galvanising the Chinese government into 
environmental governance. Cao’s remarks merit attention because he 
diminishes the direct connection between the environment and legitimacy by 
adding the economic dimension, thereby conditioning the relationship between 
the former two with economic achievements.  
The Communist Party and its leaders thus tread a fine line between 
environmental protection and nationalism, due to concerns about legitimacy. 
The perspective of locating environmental protection to political legitimacy also 
explains the prevalence of conspiracy theory which underpins the 
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environmental foreign relations in China as nationalism is a mechanism to 
defend economic interests in environmental negotiation. The following party 
line rhetoric list in the table illustrates that the projection of an environment-
related image for the Party is framed with reference to the economy. It also 
shows how it is an economic rather than environmental version of national 
identity that is used to aggregate domestic preferences when forging 
environmental foreign relations.  
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Table 4-1 Official green rhetoric in China 
 
Period 
International 
context 
Party Line Rhetoric Action 
1949-
1972 
1960s global 
modern 
environmental 
movement. 
 People will conquer nature 
(rending shengtian 人定胜天) 
 Yu Gong Yi Shan; 愚公移山 
 Great Leap 
Forward 
 Cultural 
Revolution 
1972-
1990 
1972  
United Nations 
Conference on the 
Human 
Environment 
 
 Overall and rational planning, 
reduction of harm, a reliance on 
the masses and both the protection 
of the environment and the 
enriching of the people.  
 “putting protection first and 
combining prevention with 
control”; 
 “Making the causer of pollution 
responsible for treating it” 
 “intensifying environmental 
management” 
 1972 China 
participates in 
the United 
Nations 
Conference on 
the Human 
Environment in 
Stockholm;  
 1973 First 
National 
Conference on 
Environmental 
Protection 
 1989 
Environmental 
Protection Law 
1990-
2003 
1992 Earth Summit 
in Rio and Rio 
Declaration 
1997 Kyoto 
Protocol 
2001 China entry 
in WTO  
2002 Johannesburg 
Summit and 
Johannesburg 
Declaration on 
Sustainable 
Development 
 Sustainable development; 
 The word “environment” appeared 
in the 15th National Congress 
Report in 1997 in the context of 
“huge environmental and resource 
pressures caused by population 
growth and economic 
development was listed as a major 
difficulty for the nation’s future”; 
 
 
 
 1992 China 
sends a 
delegation to the 
Earth Summit; 
 1994 adoption of 
Agenda 21; 
 Ninth Five Year 
Plan: sustainable 
development as 
a national 
development 
strategy; 
 1997 publication 
of the National 
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Sustainable 
Development 
Report; 
 Public protests 
over 
environmental 
issues increased 
29% annually 
since 1996 (Men 
Si, 2012) 
2003-
2007 
2009 the UN 
Climate Summit in 
Copenhagen  
2010 Cancun COP-
16 
 Jiang Zemin (16th Party Congress 
2003): circular economy; 
 Hu Jintao 2003: scientific view of 
development (kexuefazhan guan 
科学发展观) 
 Green GDP  
 Wen Jiabao 2005 the “two oriented 
society” resources-efficient and 
environmentally friendly 
 Power-saving and emissions-
reduction popular in an  
industrialising China 
 2005 first batch 
of circular 
economy trials in 
ten provinces 
 2008 Circular 
Economy 
Promotion Law 
 2006 
government sets 
targets for 
energy intensity 
and emissions of 
pollutant.  
2007-
present 
2012 UNCSD in Rio 
de Janeiro 
Hu Jintao 2007: ecological civilisation   
 
2012  
53 trial projects of 
ecological 
civilisation.  
Source: based on Meng Si, 2012. 
In this table, the only exception that might indicate a direct linkage 
between environmental protection and nationalism is the “ecological 
civilisation” proposed by then President Hu Jintao. Chapter 7 will be of 
importance in this regard because it will examine to what extent ecological 
civilisation represents a green identity in the ranking of domestic preferences. It 
also indicates that the nature of Chinese nationalist discourse is changing as 
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China becomes more powerful in the world, and is reflected in the way it is used 
in environmental diplomacy. 
The discussion of the identity dimension demonstrates the economic 
logic underpinning the green discourse, and observes how environmental-
related interests are constructed around Chinese nationalism. That is to say, the 
Chinese state may appear green on global environmental governance. However, 
the calculation of environmental cooperation derives from economic gains such 
as securing international funding and opening overseas markets, which will be 
elaborated in the following three empirical chapters.  
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Chapter 5 Strategic Concepts and Interest Grouping in 
Treaty Implementation: A comparison of the Montreal 
Protocol and the Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
 
5.1 Main argument 
The main strategic concept in this chapter is that of environmental 
diplomacy as a foreign policy tool used to facilitate domestic interests. The 
implementation of environmental treaties is a very important aspect within 
environmental diplomacy to demonstrate China’s intention to cooperate with 
the international community and to restructure domestic interest group 
alignment. The analysis of the successful implementation of the Montreal 
Protocol and the failed attempt to implement the Convention on Biological 
Diversity highlights the salience of sectors and ministries in terms of 
operationalising international environmental cooperation. Domestic interest 
groups have the potential to be catalysts for, or hindrances to realising China’s 
international commitments.   
 
 
5.2 Context and Structure of this chapter 
China’s engagement in global environmental governance, driven by 
international pressure, started with a form of international environmental 
cooperation in the 1970s. The landmark event which indicated the presence of 
the Chinese government in the joint efforts to tackle global environmental 
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problems was the 1972 United Nations Conference on Human Environment 
(UNCHE). Zhou Enlai, the first Premier and Foreign Minister of the People’s 
Republic, accepted the invitation from the Fourth UN Secretary-General Kurt 
Waldheim and led a delegation of over twenty representatives to attend this 
conference with an unprecedented focus on the environment. The fact that the 
Chinese government sent such a high-level delegation demonstrated the 
acceptance within the leadership that environmental problems were not only 
problems of Capitalist countries, but also Socialist regimes like China, indicating 
a gradual shift from ideological explanation of the environmental crisis towards 
a pragmatic and managerial approach. The consequence of the UNCHE, 
according to the first Director of the State Environmental Protection 
Administration Qu Geping, is that it “enlightened the officials who were out of 
touch with reality and blinded by political dogma”292.  
Yet in the broad context of the Cold War, it was difficult to disentangle 
environmental cooperation from ideological struggle. The ideological 
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union engendered an 
unintended benefit: making environmental cooperation possible and reaching 
environmental agreements more likely293. This is largely because the leadership 
in the USSR used environmental cooperation to project an image of 
cooperativeness and a platform to showcase the achievements of the 
Communist regime, suggesting the calculated enthusiasm of the Soviets in 
                                                          
292 Libo He, “‘Zhou Enlai Wei Xinzhongguo Huanbao Shiye Dianji’周恩来为新中国环保事业奠基 
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environmental protection294. In similar vein, the Chinese government used UN 
conferences as an opportunity to fight the ideological battle and meanwhile 
demonstrate its willingness to participate295. This is evident in China’s stance in 
the 1972 UNCHE negotiation, in which the representative of China highlighted 
that the main reasons for environmental pollution were “the policy of plunder, 
aggression and war carried out by Imperialist, Colonialist, and Neo-colonialist 
countries, especially by the super-Powers”, appearing in the same section which 
ended with the remark that “China was willing to participate in the common 
endeavour”296.  
The co-existence between ideology and pragmatism in foreign relations 
related to environmental protection posed two challenges to China’s exposure 
and participation in global affairs: first, it raised the need to create a conceptual 
mechanism to ensure that international cooperation serves the ideological end 
in the context of the Communism versus Capitalism binary; and second, China’s 
commitments on the global stage had to resonate with domestic performance. 
That is to say, international commitments were to be realised and fulfilled 
through domestic implementation, rather than via a blank cheque. The first 
question will be further elaborated in the second section, which introduces 
“environmental diplomacy” as the conceptual mechanism to reconcile 
international cooperation with national and domestic interests. The second 
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question will be unravelled though a closer look at the perspective of 
international environmental treaty implementation.  
Implementing international treaties occupies an important part of the 
early stage of international environmental cooperation. Indeed, the Chinese 
government has actively signed, accessed, and ratified international 
environmental agreements since 1980.  According to the statistics in the 
International Environmental Agreements(IEA) Database Project, which dates 
back to three treaties signed in the republican era and includes latest entry into 
force in 2015, China has taken action on 356 multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) with 44 signatures, 85 ratification, accession and 
succession and 334 entries into force297. These actions relate China to a wide 
range of global environmental issues, including Antarctic affairs, biodiversity, 
climate change, desertification, endangered species, environmental 
modification, hazardous wastes, ozone layer protection, seaborne pollution, 
wetlands, timber and whaling298.  
Although the Chinese government’s commitment to these agreements 
makes a difference, their effect is contingent upon the extent to which IEAs are 
implemented. Oksenberg and Economy identified determinants of successful 
implementation largely through the lens of the bureaucratic politics model. 
According to this, a powerful implementing agency and the status of its head are 
likely to prompt successful implementation, whereas bureaucratic infighting 
                                                          
297 For the full list of multilateral environmental agreements (MEPs) China has taken 
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inhibits effective enforcement. Responsibility accorded to the designated 
implementing agency engenders success, whereas lack of incentive and funds 
leads to failure299. It must be noted that bureaucrats represent one type of 
stakeholder whose primary task is enforcement. The other side of the 
implementation is that of compliance, which remains to be examined. In an 
attempt to further Oksenberg and Economy’s analysis, this chapter will also 
examine the compliance stakeholders and their interaction with the 
bureaucratic forces.  
The following section selects two cases of treaty implementation: The 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (or the Montreal 
Protocol) and the Convention on Biological Diversity, the former deemed as a 
successful practice and the latter as ineffective. The Chinese government 
ratified the Montreal Protocol in 1991 and CBD in 1993. Given that “success” is 
measured on the basis of fulfilling objectives, China has achieved its goals ahead 
of time in the Montreal Protocol, whereas implementing CBD is problem-laden. 
This contradicts the Chinese government’s effort to appear more of a leader in 
the area of biodiversity. The puzzle this chapter tries to solve is why one treaty 
is more effectively implemented than another, and how treaty implementation, 
in turn, influences China’s role in international environmental governance. 
 
 
5.3 Environmental Diplomacy as a strategic concept 
The term “environmental diplomacy” was proposed subsequent to the de 
facto practice of this concept. Although China’s participation in the 1972 UNCHE 
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is recognised as the beginning of international environmental cooperation, 
environmental diplomacy was first articulated in October 1989 at the Sixteenth 
Meeting of the State Commission Environmental Protection (SCEP) by its then 
Director and State Councillor Song Jian300. The purpose of environmental 
diplomacy is to effectively defend the national interests in the midst of 
intensified multilateral, bilateral, and regional environmental cooperation. The 
fate of a new term is, to a large degree, correlated to the status of the articulator. 
Song Jian played a critical role in the promotion of environmental diplomacy as 
the guiding strategy of China’s environmental foreign relations. A Soviet-trained 
military scientist and specialist in cybernetics and a protégé of Qian Xuesen, 
who was Mao Zedong’s trusted science advisor, Song rose to an influential post 
in China’s Ministry of National Defence in 1960301 and had been the Chairman of 
the State Science and Technology Commission from 1984 to 1993. His authority 
in policy making derives from a mixture of his position as SCEP’s director, his 
scientific background, and his awareness of the irreconcilable conflict between 
developing and developed countries shaped by his experiences in national 
defence. Song’s suggestion regarding environmental diplomacy led to the 
inclusion of Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the SCEP and the institutional set-up 
of environmental experts in the Department of Treaty and Law and the 
Department of International Organisations and Conferences.   
Environmental diplomacy functions first and foremost as a path to a 
unified principle of the Chinese government in international environmental 
cooperation. In fact, SCEP passed and released “The Principle Stance of China 
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regarding Global Environmental Problems” in 1990 at the Eighteenth Meeting 
of the SCEP. Eight principles were listed as fundamental: 1) “manage the 
relationship between environmental protection and economic development; 2) 
clarify that the main responsibility of international environmental problem is 
on the shoulders of the developed countries; 3) defend sovereignty over natural 
resources and the non-interference principle with highlighted emphasis on 
opposition to interference in domestic affairs with the excuse of environmental 
protection; 4) acknowledge the necessity of the participation of developing 
countries; 5) fully consider the special conditions and needs of developing 
countries; 6) stress that environmental protection shall not be the precondition 
of foreign aid and not be the excuse for new trade barriers; 7)emphasise the 
duties of developed countries to provide additional funding and technology 
transfer on preferential and non-commercial conditions; 8) indicate the 
necessity to reinforce international environmental legislation” 302 .The 
establishment of these principles placed international environmental 
cooperation at  the highest level of the diplomatic agenda in the 1990s303. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ participation in SCEP was to ensure that the Chinese 
environmental negotiation did not infringe national sovereignty, did not grant 
Taiwan international status, minimised China’s financial obligations, and 
guaranteed the maximisation of technology transfer304.  The unified principles 
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provide a strategic framework within which different domestic political actors 
interact with the outside world on environmental cooperation.  
Furthermore, environmental diplomacy is useful to break the ice, and is 
intimately linked to the timing of its introduction305. In the wake of the June 4th 
1989 Tiananmen crackdown, Chinese foreign policy was challenged by 
economic sanctions and the freezing of foreign investment. The United States 
imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions, including the suspension of arms 
sales and top-level official visits to China. The Bush Administration liaised with 
the Group of Seven (G7) countries to impose economic sanctions as a response 
to the regime’s repression and violation of human rights306. In addition, 
international financial institutions like the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank halted loans to China, thereby contributing to a 22% 
decrease in direct foreign investment to China in the first half of 1990 and a 40% 
decrease in foreign lending in the single year of 1989307. The international 
community’s reaction to the Tiananmen crackdown stirred domestic debate in 
Chinese foreign policy, and led to the prominence of what Harding calls “tough 
internationalists”. The view of tough internationalists, typified by the then 
Premier Li Peng, were moving along the spectrum between “flexibility of 
reformers” and “intransigence of hard-liners” and the defining character of this 
school was faith in “China’s ability to pursue international relationships on 
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favourable terms”308. Underpinning the tough internationalist approach was the 
interdependence between China and the “West”:  China needs access to foreign 
capital, technology and markets to realise modernisation. Meanwhile, the “West” 
will benefit from the partnership with China in trade and investment.  
In the context of a tough internationalist setting, environmental 
diplomacy was a strategic concept deployed to practice a tough internationalist 
approach. Epitomising the strategic dimension of environmental diplomacy was 
the relationship with Japan in the aftermath of Tiananmen. As a member of the 
G7, Japan suspended Official Development Assistance (ODA), a five-year 
package of loans worth US$ 5.4 billion  albeit reluctantly and under 
international peer pressure 309 .  The ruling party in Japan, the Liberal 
Democratic Party, oscillated between pressure from the Bush Administration to 
continue freezing foreign aid to China310 and the demands of domestic business 
groups for lifting the economic sanctions exerted on China311. Meanwhile, tough 
internationalists in China proposed the solution to the international economic 
sanctions: overtures to Japan to break the Western solidarity against China312.  
Tokyo’s engagement policy towards China dovetails with Beijing’s strategy to 
play the “Japan card”. In fact, Japan was the first G7 country to lift its freeze on 
the third yen loan package as early as August 1989. Coincidentally, both 
countries started to support environmental diplomacy in 1989. The Japanese 
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Diplomatic Bluebook 1990313 covering activities from August 1989 to July 1990 
underscored the increasing environmental consideration in Japan’s Bilateral 
ODA. Furthermore, the first ODA charter listed “environmental consideration” 
as one of the basic guidelines and philosophies of Japan’s ODA314. By 1998, 
Japan has the largest bilateral aid programme to China with a considerable 
number of project containing environmental component315. 
Although there were no causal relations between environmental 
diplomacy and the lift of economic sanction and pressure from the US played a 
greater role in Japan’s decision, suffice it to say that environmental diplomacy 
had become an integral part of the international political economy and was 
intimately linked to concerns of trade and investment. As a consequence, the 
Chinese government’s emphasis on funding, technology transfer and 
investment was not peculiar. Instead, it is a constant declaration and reminder 
that environmental diplomacy embeds the international liberal norm of 
environmental cooperation in the realist context within which rational 
calculation of national interest dominates.  Indeed, the Japanese government’s 
environmental aid to China results from concerns about trans-border pollution 
from China to its territory, and there is little doubt that Japan can benefit from a 
less polluted China316.  
The above mentioned delicate relations between Japan and China, when 
juxtaposed with the tension with the United States, point to the fact that 
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environmental diplomacy is a political project of tough internationalists. 
Evidence supporting this claim includes the enthusiasm in the environmental 
diplomacy of Li Peng, who, according to Harding, epitomised the tough 
internationalist in China’s international relations317.  Perhaps the best example 
of Li Peng’s salience in environmental diplomacy is his speech in the 1992 
UNCED, known as the Rio Summit, which dramatically boosted the development 
of environmental diplomacy. He declared the stances and principles of 
environmental diplomacy, and compressed the abovementioned Eight 
Principles passed by SCEP into five points: 1) coordination between 
environmental protection and economic development; 2) bigger environmental 
protection responsibilities on the shoulder of developed countries; 3) national 
sovereignty as the cornerstone of cooperation; 4) peace and stability; and 5) the 
consideration of realistic national interests and the long-term interest of the 
world, by which he meant that the international community should understand 
and support the environmental problems plaguing developing countries and 
cater to their reasonable requests318.  The flagship institution of environmental 
diplomacy, mentioned in Li Peng’s speech as a testimony to the willingness and 
determination of the Chinese government, is the China Council for International 
Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) established in 1992 in 
cooperation with the Canadian government. Composed of ministerial or vice-
ministerial rank experts and international experts, CCICED is uncommon, as it is 
encouraged to criticise government policies regarding the environment and 
                                                          
317 Harding 1990, p.9. 
318 State Council, “‘Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan gongbao”中华人民共和国国务院
公报[Gazette of the State Council],” June 12, 1992, 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/shuju/1992/gwyb199215.pdf. 
163 
 
development319. “Li Peng fully supported the idea of CCICED from the beginning 
as he understood the importance of extensively listening to the opinions of 
domestic and foreign experts” , recalled by Qu Geping, the first Director of the 
State Environmental Protection Bureau on the forefront of environmental 
diplomacy320. 
Making high-profile speeches and signing international environmental 
accords demonstrates China’s willingness to cooperate; however, it is the 
degree of treaty implementation and compliance that plays a vital role in the 
Chinese government’s leverage to secure international funding and technology 
transfer, and in the long term increases the credibility and bargaining power of 
the Chinese delegation in international environmental negotiations. In many 
ways, a successful implementation of international accords dovetails the two 
cornerstones of tough internationalist beliefs: China’s chances to benefit from 
interaction with the outside world and its ability to make the interaction in its 
favour. Paradoxically, the effectiveness of treaty implementation is not dictated 
by the top national leaders, although accession to it is largely the case321  In fact, 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, which will be explained in further detail 
in the next section, was signed by Li Peng himself in the Rio Summit but was 
poorly implemented. In comparison, the Montreal Protocol was widely 
regarded as a successful case in China’s treaty implementation practice, and 
even ignites hope in the Chinese leadership position, not only in phasing out 
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ozone depletion substances but also in the related issue area of climate 
change322.      
 An even more intriguing question emerges from the interaction between 
the strategic concept of environmental diplomacy and treaty implementation, 
which will be elaborated in more detail in the following section. The negotiation 
of the Montreal Protocol began in 1987, two years before environmental 
diplomacy was proposed, whereas the decision to familiarise China with 
biodiversity conservation through CBD was after the concept was introduced. 
Before China adopted CBD, the State Council summoned a Coordinating Group 
on Establishing the Biodiversity Convention which included thirteen ministries 
and agencies with SEPA as a leading agency323.  An intuitive expectation is that a 
treaty signed in the height of environmental diplomacy and by the then Premier 
is more likely to be implemented than one signed earlier. Yet the outcome is 
counterintuitive, and the presence of environmental diplomacy is not 
necessarily an omen for the implementation of an effective international 
environmental agreement. Therefore, a more challenging question that this 
chapter aims to address is why environmental diplomacy fails to push for an 
effective treaty implementation, shedding light on the broad question of how 
different actors and players play a role in China’s foreign environmental 
relations.   
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5.4 A tale of Two Treaties: Montreal Protocol and Convention on 
Biological Diversity 
Both the Montreal Protocol and the Convention on Biological Diversity 
were ratified in the early 1990s, a period regarded by Zhang Haibin, leading 
expert in the study of environmental diplomacy, as the peak of environmental 
diplomacy324.  I borrow Stalley’s approach to scrutinising two dimensions of 
implementation: enforcement and compliance, the former indicating how 
stringent the government is, and the latter looking at the performance of 
various involved groups and actors325. The aspect of compliance is further 
divided into substantive compliance, evaluated based on the achievement of the 
objectives of treaties and procedural compliance which provides a “legal and 
institutional framework for satisfying substantive requirement”, including 
establishment of institutions and report of data and information326. Instead of 
nuancing compliance as substantive versus procedural, I modify the word 
differentiation to implementation, to distinguish patterns of action in these two 
compared cases. Stalley and Zhao categorise the process of implementation 
based on a different basis: Stalley adopts the perspective of actors (government 
versus industry) whereas Zhao employs a more abstract means versus end 
dichotomy. Their different methods lead to the two-by-two matrix, shown 
below, which is to structure the evaluation of the degree of implementation of 
the Montreal Protocol and CBD.  The benefit of this matrix is that it not only 
unravels the dimension on which a treaty is more effectively implemented, but 
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engenders the implication of the treaty implementation on the concept of 
environmental diplomacy.   
Table 5-1 Matrix of Implementation 
 Enforcement agency 
(e.g. government) 
Compliance agency  
(e.g. industry, firms) 
Procedural    
Substantive    
Implementing both the Protocol and the Convention is characterised by a 
strong determination of enforcement, with a leading agency and cross-
ministerial coordination. The following Venn diagram displays various 
government agencies involved in the enforcement, and highlights seven 
institutions working on both treaties in the middle of this diagram. The leading 
agency of both treaty implementation is the State Environmental Protection 
Administration, now Ministry of Environmental Protection since 2008.  The 
overlapping agencies indicate the commonality of the nature of these two 
treaties: both as a matter of foreign policy, finance, development and planning, 
science and technology, agriculture, public security, and customs.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1 Implementing Agencies of the Montreal Protocol and CBD 
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Source: compiled by the author based on information on the official website of “Ozone Action in China” 
(http://www.ozone.org.cn/gywm/200712/t20071227_15668.html) and “Coordination working group for 
China’s implementation of CBD” (http://sts.mep.gov.cn/swdyx_1/guanli/200607/t20060725_91254.htm) 
http://www.7c.gov.cn/color/DisplayPages/download/pdf/06chin.pdf 
The Venn diagram also demonstrates how these two treaties address 
divergent issues. The enforcement agencies designed for the Montreal Protocol 
are dominated by industry-related departments, including petroleum and 
chemical, light industry, tobacco, and aviation, whereas although the industry of 
traditional Chinese medicine is relevant, the focus of CBD implementation 
seems to lie in media, communication and education, with three mouthpiece 
news outlets involved. Conversely, the differences and complexities of 
implementing these treaties are acknowledged and elaborated later. A 
comparison of these two cases of different outcomes regarding implementation 
focuses on the interaction among involved actors and groups and affords us the 
opportunity to identify overlooked explanatory factors. In other words, the 
process within which various actors interact and coordinate to meet the 
objective, and the match between enforcement and compliance stakeholders, 
renders them comparable.  
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The objective of the Montreal Treaty in general is to control and set a 
timetable for countries to phase out ozone-depleting substances (ODS), and 
chemicals that destroy the ozone layer. Controlled substances include 
cholorofluorocarbon (CFCs), halons, other fully halogenated CFCs, carbon 
tetrachloride, methyl chloroform, hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), 
Hydrobromofluorocarbons, methyl bromide, and bromochloromethane. China 
as an Article 5 country, defined in the treaty as a developing country whose 
annual calculated level of consumption of ODS is less than 0.3 kilograms per 
capita on the date of the entry into force of the Protocol327. This means it is 
granted more time, together with funding and technology, to fulfil the objectives. 
The ultimate purpose of the Convention of Biological Diversity is threefold, as 
enshrined in Article 1: “the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable 
use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
out of the utilization of genetic resources”328. Similar with the Montreal Treaty, 
CBD entitles developing countries funding, technology transfer, training, and 
allows each member state to develop national strategies and plans in line with 
their national conditions and capabilities329. In this light, I use the objectives 
identified in the national plan for both treaties. 
China’s Country Programme for the Phaseout of Ozone Depleting 
Substances under the Montreal Protocol (Country Programme) was issued in 
1993 and revised five years later, as part of meeting the requirements set by the 
Multilateral Fund, established in 1991 to offer financial and technical assistance 
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to Article 5 countries. The 1993 Country Programme set the deadline of 
reducing ODS consumption and production to no more than the 1991 level to 
1996, three years earlier than the targets the Protocol set for Article 5 countries. 
China did not meet its own ambitious target, because the production level 
exceeds the 1991 level by 94 percent and the consumption is 65% greater330. 
The leading agency to implement the Montreal Protocol, SEPA, thus conducted a 
review of ODS reduction efforts and existing data and revised the approaches 
and the objectives. The Protocol required Article 5 countries to freeze CFCs and 
halon consumption and production at average 1995-1997 level by 1999 and 
2002. The revised Country Programme identified the ODS production, 
consumption, production phaseout and consumption phaseout plans for 1999, 
2005, 2007, and 2010331. Furthermore, the Country Programme set objectives 
for those sectors involved, including foam, industrial and commercial 
refrigeration, electronic appliances, halon, aerosol spray, automobile air-
conditioning, and tobacco.  After 1997, the ODS reduction efforts were 
recognised as a great success. China not only achieved more but also reached its 
objectives ahead of time. The amount of reduction of the consumption and 
production levels of CFCs and methyl bromide is 15% to 25% greater than that 
set in the objective.  The consumption and production levels of halon and CTC 
were cut down below the average 1995-1997 levels, four years and three years, 
respectively, before the timeline of the Protocol332.  Chinese efforts to phase out 
ODS were recognised by the World Bank and the Ozone Secretariat. The former 
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awarded its annual Green Award to Xie Zhenhua, the Environmental Minister, 
for his leadership in 2003 and the latter recognised China as an “outstanding 
National Ozone Unit”333. 
The national plan to implement CBD, China Biodiversity Conservation 
Action Plan (the “Action Plan” hereafter) was issued and promoted by the State 
Council in 1994, a procedural implementation of Article 6 of the CBD334. The 
Action Plan proposed seven objectives through operating 26 actions and 18 
priority projects. The seven objectives were 1) to strengthen fundamental 
studies on biodiversity and 2) to improve the network of national nature 
reserves and other protected areas; 3) to protect wild species significant to 
biodiversity; 4) to protect the genetic resources of crops and domesticated 
animals; 5) to establish In-situ conservation outside nature reserves; 6)to 
establish national network of biodiversity information and monitoring; 7)to 
coordinate biodiversity conservation with sustainable development335.  
The objectives themselves strongly emphasise the procedural dimension 
of implementation, the most noticeable achievements being at the procedural 
level and focused on the dimension of enforcement. Cai Lei, a key biodiversity 
expert and official of Biodiversity Office under SEPA in the field of CBD 
implementation summarised China’s achievements as the establishment of a 
cross-ministerial coordination mechanism, strengthening of the legal 
framework, establishment of biodiversity schedules, and improvement of the 
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management of nature reserves336. More than a dozen pieces of biodiversity 
legislation were promulgated within the decade of implementing the Action 
Plan. Up until 2006, more than two thousand Nature Reserves have been 
established, with 1593 designated regions for natural ecosystem protection 
(forest, grassland, desert, wetland, and marine ecosystems), 669 protected 
areas for wildlife, and 133 for natural remains. A trend towards an increasing 
number and percentage of Nature Reserves, respectively represented by the 
purple and blue line in Figure 4.2, is presented by Xue Dayuan who has 
participated in the drafting, negotiation, and implementation of the CBD and 
Chief Scientist for Biodiversity at the Nanjing Institute of Environmental 
Sciences.  
Figure 5-2 Number and Percentage of Nature Reserves in China from 1956-
2008 
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Source: http://aseanbiodiversity.org/caec/downloadables/presentations/the-
practice-to-develop.pdf 
However, establishing a great number of Nature Reserves does not 
automatically address the issue of biodiversity loss. In sharp contrast to the 
abovementioned achievements, China faces enormous challenges in 
biodiversity conservation. Scientists from the Chinese Academy of Agricultural 
Science observe in their research project “The Current Situation and Protection 
of China’s Biological Genetic Resources” that the decrease of biological species 
is at an alarming rate and equivalent to the listing of endangered species on a 
daily basis337. The “main culprit” to blame is, surprisingly, researchers who 
carried out scientific projects with their foreign counterparts abroad, speculates 
Xue Dayuan.  Whereas genetic biological resources offer only one vantage point 
of the poor implementation of CBD, the record of wildlife is another example. 
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According to the “Living Planet Report China 2015” by WWF, the population of 
China’s terrestrial vertebrates dropped by almost 50% in the three decades 
from 1970 to 2010338, and the period 1955 to 2010 saw an 83.8% shrinkage in 
the population of primate species. These two statistics, among others, are 
evidence to support WWF’s claim that China is “one of the countries with the 
world’s richest biodiversity, yet it is also one of the countries that has 
experienced the greatest biodiversity loss”339. The co-existence of intensive 
government-led procedural implementation and incapability of preserving 
biodiversity, the first and foremost objective of CBD, raises the question of how 
effective enforcement is in substantive terms, and leads to a revision of the 
1994 Action Plan.  
In 2010, the Ministry of Environmental Protection released the China 
National Biodiversity Conservation Strategy and Action Plan (2011-2030) (or 
NBCSAP) to address new challenges, identify updated overall objectives, 
strategic tasks and priorities for the next two decades340. The launch of NBCSAP 
acknowledged the fact that the original Action Plan did not fully represent the 
third objective of CBD: the equitable sharing of its benefits341. The way NBCSAP 
addresses problems and challenges facing biodiversity conservation in China 
provides the reason for the paradox between a strong enforcement and a 
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disappointing substantive achievement. Primary problems include absence of 
monitoring and warning system on biodiversity, inadequate investment in 
biodiversity both in terms of scientific input, capacity building and funding, and 
overexploitation of biological resources342. Furthermore, Xue Dayuan points out 
the limitation of the current rate of implementation, I refer to this pattern as 
enforcement-style and procedure-dominated, due to the absence of local 
authorities, sector-based participation, and poor compliance343. 
In short, the Montreal Protocol represents a pattern of implementation 
from both the enforcement and compliance dimensions and achieves both 
procedural and substantive goals, whereas CBD is characterised by impressive 
procedural achievement together with a disappointing substantive performance, 
marked by strong enforcement and weak compliance. For the purposes of 
comparison, the cut-off point is the year of 2010 to evaluate the Action Plan for 
CBD and the Country Programme for the Montreal Protocol. It is both a deadline 
for the ozone-depletion substance phase out plan and a year in which the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection officially recognised the importance of 
sectors in the NBCSAP, in which new goals have been set. In addition, the 
Chinese government began to change its approach, as indicated in the fourth 
National Report on the Implementation of the CBD in 2008, towards sector-
based344. This was to address severe biodiversity losses, replicating the 
approaches deployed in the Montreal Protocol implementation. The next 
section will explain the actors involved in each cell of the matrix for both 
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treaties, and explore how interest groups’ politics function as an explanation of 
why certain international treaties are more effectively implemented than others.  
 
 
5.5 Unravelling implementation patterns 
The following analysis presents the implementation patterns of the 
Montreal Protocol and CBD along the two-dimensional categorisation, one 
based on agent and the other on the means versus end binary. This addresses 
the question of how different actors and players facilitate or hinder the 
procedural and substantive dimensions of international treaty implementation. 
Data used for analysis are from secondary sources, due to the rich existing 
literature on individual treaty implementation, such as Zhao Jimin’s work on the 
Montreal Protocol and Xue Dayuan’s publications in Chinese on the 
implementation of CBD. The gap filled in this research is a much overlooked 
comparative perspective of these two representative cases. Amongst others, 
national reports to the Ozone Secretariat and the Secretariat of CBD will be used 
to map out relevant actors and groups. The official websites “Ozone Action in 
China” and “Biodiversity Clearing-House Mechanism of China345”, respectively 
for the Montreal Protocol and CBD, together with the journal Biodiversity 
Science, which are fully accessible to the public, offer a significant  amount of 
data in terms of scientific debate, sectorial concerns, and practical issues which 
are overlooked in the official reports. The following part is divided into two sub-
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sections: procedural and substantive enforcement stakeholders, and procedural 
and substantive compliance stakeholders. The enforcement agent refers, albeit 
not exclusively, to government institutions, and the compliance agent is 
composed of various non-government actors such as industries, media, and the 
general public. In each sub-section, the Montreal Protocol and the CBD will be 
discussed together for the purposes of comparison and contrast. The difference 
between a procedural and substantive stakeholder is determined by how 
directly they are related to the end of the treaties, as opposed to the means, or 
to use a blunter expression, pro forma, activities. It is, however, possible for one 
single agency to carry both procedural and substantive responsibilities. For 
instance, the Ministry of Environmental Protection manages both substantive 
and procedural implementation tasks. The substantive task includes stipulation 
of the ODS catalogue and investigation of the data of production, import, export 
and consumption submitted by industries, and the procedural responsibilities 
are reporting to the Multilateral Fund (MLF)346.  
 
 
5.5.1 Enforcement: procedural versus substantive 
The Montreal Protocol enforcers are listed on the official website “Ozone 
Action in China”. All seventeen government institutions address substantive 
issues, and three are in charge of procedural implementation, and three 
agencies: State Environmental Administration, Ministry of Finance, General 
                                                          
346 “‘Xiangguan Bumen zhize’相关部门职责[Responsibilities and Duties of Relevant 
Departments],” 中国保护臭氧层行动[Ozone Action in China], December 27, 2007, 
http://www.ozone.org.cn/gywm/200712/t20071227_15667.html. 
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Administration of Customs are both procedural and substantive enforcers. 
Substantive enforcers work on concrete areas directly addressing the Protocol 
implementation. For instance, the Ministry of Agriculture attended to the 
phasing out of methyl bromide, while the Ministry of Public Security took care 
of the usage and management of halon and researched for a substitute. 
Enforcement of the Protocol is therefore characterised by a heavy emphasis on 
the substantive dimension and a clear division of labour among enforcing 
agents. A full list of enforcement stakeholders for the Montreal Protocol is 
summarised in the following table.  
 
 
 
Table 5-2 Enforcing Agents in the Montreal Protocol 
 Agent  Duties 
Procedural   Ministry of 
Environmental 
Protection 
Report project progress to the 
Secretariat and the Multilateral Fund; 
Investigate, compile and supervise the 
data submitted by firms, industries, 
and Customs;  
Ministry of Finance Manage Multilateral Fund  
General Customs 
Administration 
Classify the harmonised system code 
to regulate controlled ODS products 
flow; 
Collect data 
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Substantive  Ministry of 
Environmental 
Protection  
Oversee the implementation of the 
Protocol and Country Programme;  
Formulate the list of controlled ODS; 
Formulate details of international 
cooperation; 
 
 Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Manage Ozone-related foreign affairs 
and legal issues 
 Ministry of Finance Formulate taxation policies 
 Ministry of Agriculture Manage the use of methyl bromide  
Formulate phaseout plan of methyl 
bromide 
 State Development and 
Planning Commission 
Plan and Control ODS production, 
import, export, and consumption; 
Formulate taxation policies 
 State Economic and 
Trade Commission  
Plan and Control ODS production, 
import, export, and consumption; 
Formulate taxation policies; 
Phaseout aerosols for medical use;  
 
 
 Ministry of Science and 
Technology 
Plan, Organise, Implement and 
Manage ODS substitute technology and 
demonstration projects for new 
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products  
 Ministry of Public 
Security 
Phase out halon used in fire 
extinguisher; 
Manage halon substitute research, 
production, usage, and recycle 
 Ministry of Information 
Industry 
Phase out production and 
consumption of ODS in solvent  
 General Customs 
Administration 
Formulate  import and export policy of 
ODS-related products 
 Ministry of  Foreign 
Trade and Economic 
Cooperation 
Formulate quota system for ODS 
products;  
Issue import and export licenses in line 
with the quota system   
 State Domestic Trade 
Administration 
Manage the production and usage of 
commercial small-sized refrigeration; 
Coordinate the recycle of CFCs 
 State Machinery 
Industry Administration 
Phase out ODS in air-conditioning 
 Petroleum and 
Chemical Industries 
Administration 
Manage non-halon controlled 
substances 
 State Light Industry 
Administration 
Manage household refrigerators, air-
conditioner compressor; aerosol 
products; foam;   
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 State Tobacco 
Administration 
Manage ODS-related tobacco 
expansion production 
 China Aviation Industry 
Corporation&  
China Aeroscience and 
Technology Corporation 
Manage and phase out ODS within the 
respective company 
Source: ozone action in China 
http://www.ozone.org.cn/gywm/200712/t20071227_15667.html 
The CBD implementation, like the issue of biodiversity, is full of 
complexity and there is no list of enforcers and their duties in a straightforward 
way as that in the website of Ozone Action in China. Consequently, I obtain data 
of CBD enforcers from the first four national reports on the Implementation of 
CBD submitted to the Secretariat every three or four years from 1997 to 2008, 
fitting neatly to the selected timeframe. I logged 211 entries of the 
implementation efforts from relevant government departments and ministries. 
Each, according to their proximity to the objectives of CBD, was coded by me as 
either a procedural or substantive effort, which will be elaborated with more 
concrete examples. These enforcement efforts are presented in different 
formats of policy, namely, Circular, Decision, Programme, Strategy, 
Plan/Scheme, Regulation, Recommendation, Notice, Method, Advice, and 
List/Directory. All “regulations” are marked with substantive efforts, as their 
enactment directly benefits the conservation of biodiversity, and all 
“list/directory” are marked with procedural endeavours, as by nature their 
functions are to provide information and facilitate policy formulation.   
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However, I am not suggesting that by looking at the nature of the 
documents, one can dictate whether it is a procedural or substantive action. 
Notices are mixed with both categories. For instance, the Notice issued by the 
then State Administration of Industry and Commerce entitling above-county-
level departments to impose administrative punishment on those who pose a 
danger and threat to wild animals is a substantive move, as it casts impact on 
behaviour down to the local level with the direct purpose of protecting wild 
animals. In contrast, the Notice issued by the then National Environmental 
Protection Agency on strengthening environmental protection in the tourism 
sector does not point directly to biodiversity preservation, and confirms a lack 
of concrete measures to be taken, and hence is regarded as procedural.  
To explain why some notices or other policy types are more substantive 
than others, it is necessary to examine who released them. The following chart 
offers a snapshot of the distribution of procedural and substantive efforts 
within individual enforcing agent. As Figure 5-3 clearly demonstrates, the most 
dominant ministries are Ministry of Forestry (now State Forestry 
Administration), National Environmental Protection Agency (now Ministry of 
Environmental Protection), and Ministry of Agriculture. Altogether, the amount 
of implementation efforts of these three institutions takes up 64% of the total. 
In contrast with these three dominating enforcers, the other three which are 
included in Figure 4.1 are absent from the picture of enforcement: Xinhua News 
Agency, People’s Daily, and Guangming Daily. Rather than categorising them as 
an enforcing agent, the term compliance agent is more appropriate. They are 
largely absent in the national reports, and the only mention of them is their 
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involvement in the publicity activity “Tram-century Environmental Trip Around 
China”, a campaign with educational purposes.  
Figure 5-3 Substantive versus Procedural Enforcers CBD 
 
Figure 5-3 also shows that ministries such as Foreign Affairs, Education, 
Press, Publication, Radio, Film & TV, and Intellectual Property contribute purely 
in a procedural sense to CBD implementation. The role of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, for instance, is to formulate China Country Study for 
Biodiversity as well as review and approve a draft national report. For the 
Ministry of Education, one of its contributions is to establish a National Base for 
Science and Technology Education of Youth. On the other hand, the Ministry of 
Science and Technology and Ministry of Public Security are 100% substantive 
enforcers, even based on a small number of efforts. The Ministry of Public 
Security promulgated two circulars, one regulation and one action plan. Both of 
these circulars address the issue of illegal hunting and the sale of terrestrial 
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wild animals, one on “Adapting to the Situation to Better Prohibit Illegal 
Hunting and Sale of Terrestrial Wild Animals” and the other entitled “Urgent 
Circular on Stern Blow Policy on Actions of Illegal Hunting, Operation and Use of 
Wild Aquatic Animals” issued in 2003. The regulation is about jurisdiction in 
regards to criminal cases of terrestrial wild animals and case filing. The plan, in 
which both Ministry of Public Security and Science and Technology were 
involved in, together with other ministries, is the China Action Plan for 
Biodiversity Conservation. This functions as a roadmap for China as a country to 
fulfil the objectives listed in the Convention, and hence is regarded as a 
substantive approach to implementation.  
The functions of ministries of Forestry, Agriculture and Environmental 
Protection, on the other hand, are more complicated than those mentioned 
above. The former two strike a balance between substantive and procedural 
actions, and the latter is more skewed towards the procedural dimension. One 
explanation for the procedural pattern of MEP is its task of collecting 
information and establishing a database to inform biodiversity-related policy 
formulation. For instance, MEP established a National Committee for Assessing 
Nature Reserves in 1992, which led to the “Notice on Strengthening the 
Ecological Management of Natural Resources Exploitation Activities” in 1994, a 
further notice on “Strengthening Management of Nature Reserves” three years 
later, and finally in 2004 a “Circular on Issues Related to Strengthening the 
Management of Nature Reserves”. With the support of UNEP, the then State 
Environmental Protection Administration set up a United Beijing Centre for 
Networking of Environmental Protection. One highlight epitomising the 
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procedural task of MEP was to organise activities to celebrate the International 
Day for Biodiversity on May 22nd as enshrined in the Convention itself.   
A final point to highlight from Figure 5-3 is the level of overlapping 
responsibilities shared by ministries, which is different from the Montreal 
Protocol implementation pattern, marked as it is by a clear division of labour. 
The issues of wild animals and plant, alien species and nature reserves, for 
instance, fall under the umbrella of the ministries of Forestry, Agriculture, and 
Environmental Protection. In fact, all three carried out the “Decision of 
Commending the National Advanced Institutions and Advanced Individuals for 
the Management of Nature Reserves” as an incentive to improve the 
management of nature reserves. As far as alien species are concerned, the 
Ministry of Forestry issued a circular calling for an improvement of the 
guarding and management of harmful alien species in 2002. A follow-up 
circular was introduced by the Ministry of Agriculture in 2003 on conducting 
pilot action of eliminating poison and removing the harm caused by invasive 
alien species and consequently launched a national campaign on Eliminating 
Invasive Alien Species in 100 Counties of Ten Provinces that same year. The 
Ministry of Environmental Protection also marked out its territory by releasing 
a circular on Strengthening the Prevention and Control of Invasive Alien Species 
of China.  
Table 5-2 and Figure 5-3 together present the implementation patterns, 
from the aspect of enforcement along the spectrum of procedural versus 
substantive, of the Montreal Protocol and CBD: the former featured by a 
substantive focus and the latter dominated by procedural efforts. There are 
several possible explanations for the differences in enforcement pattern. The 
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first lies in the way that objectives were formulated in the Country Programme 
for the Montreal Protocol and the Action Plan of CBD, specifying how the 
international conventions will be localised and their national priorities in line 
with national conditions. Among the seven objectives listed in the Action Plan of 
CBD, three are entirely oriented towards obtaining information, the very first 
objective being to improve studies on biodiversity, matched with two actions of 
assessments of the economic value of biodiversity and establishment of a 
biological geographical zoning system. The other objective is intimately 
associated with procedural endeavour, and addresses the issue of wild species 
protection, and calls for seven concrete procedural actions from an assessment 
of the situation of wildlife to the launch of research to support the 
implementation. In comparison, the Country Programme is more 
straightforward, and in line with the expectation of the Protocol on Article 5 
countries and lists a specific number of ODS to be either phased out or frozen, 
the timeline of reaching these targets and the main technologies of substitutes 
for each of the nine industries involved in ODS production and consumption.  
The motivation of the Chinese government to be crystal clear about how 
the Protocol’s target will be met derives from the desire to obtain funding from 
the MLF, which is the second difference between Montreal Protocol and CBD; 
that is to say, the availability of an international funding body designed to 
implement a given international treaty. The creation of the MLF in 1991 is 
regarded as an environmental diplomatic achievement of the Chinese 
government to represent the interests of developing countries and a triumph in 
negotiations, as the delegates from China and India were able to persuade the 
World Bank to set up a multilateral fund for Article 5 countries, based on the 
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principle of additionality347.  Under the auspices of the MLF, the Chinese 
government has obtained US$80 million to conduct ODS phaseout activities in 
eighteen sectors, leading to a total phaseout of 100,000 tonnes of ODS 
production and 110,000 tonnes of ODS consumption348. On the contrary, no 
special fund was set up to implement the single Convention of Biodiversity 
Conservation and the financial mechanism stirred bigger controversy in the 
CBD negotiation than the creation of the MLF. Article 21 of the CBD reconciles 
the demand from the developing countries for funding and technology transfer 
with the concerns from industrialised countries like the United Kingdom, about 
the ramifications of the financial mechanism. As a result, in 1991, the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF) was set up as a pilot programme and the 
Convention’s interim financial mechanism which disburses developing 
countries as to defray the costs of implementation efforts349.   
Whereas the two reasons: objectives and international funding, explain 
the differences of implementation patterns of these two treaties, they do not 
adequately account for the specific pattern of each, namely, procedural versus 
substantive. The enforcement versus compliance dimension offers a better 
explanation: the pairing of enforcement and compliance agents explains why 
one treaty is more substantively implemented than the other. As shown in 
Figure 5-3, an intuitive observation is that when the enforcers perform 
                                                          
347 Larry Stammer, “Chinese Delegates to Seek Beijing’s Approval for Pact to Protect Ozone,” Los 
Angeles Times, June 29, 1990, sec. A8, http://articles.latimes.com/1990-06-29/news/mn-
656_1_ozone-layer and Oksenberg and Economy 1998. 
348 Environmental Convention Implementation Technical Center, “Vienna Convention and 
Montreal Protocol,” Foreign Economic Cooperation Office, MEP, accessed February 26, 2016, 
http://www.mepfeco.org.cn/ywly/gjly/wyn_mtle/. 
 
349 Kal Raustiala, “Domestic Institutions and International Regulatory Cooperation: Comparative 
Responses to the Convention on Biological Diversity,” World Politics 49, no. 4 (1997): pp.482–
509. 
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procedurally, the implementation pattern tends to be procedural. However, a 
subtler message from the very same figure is why despite the fact that 
substantive efforts occupy one third of the overall CBD enforcement efforts, the 
overall pattern is procedural? To address this question, the other side of the 
story, which is the compliance side, must be unravelled.  
 
 
5.5.2 Compliance: procedural versus substantive 
The key difference between the compliance side of these two treaties is 
the so-called sector approach. This allocates funding from international 
organisations to designated sectors, instead of to individual projects, or a 
project-by-project approach. The sector-approach is used in the compliance of 
the Montreal Protocol from 1997 and functions like a silver bullet leading to 
China’s accelerating substantive achievements in reducing the production and 
consumption of ODS350.  Based on the cost-effectiveness principle, researchers 
from Peking University devised a mechanism for combining policy measures 
and economic incentives, and cut the red tape for the MLF Executive Committee 
by allowing it to approve a phaseout plan for an entire sector. This considers 
the total cost, with the purpose of both attracting MLF funding and mobilising 
relevant sectors in a country as big as China. The research team was led by Tang 
Xiaoyan, chief environmental scientist, who put the issue of ozone depletion on 
the political agenda. She attracted the attention of the State Science and 
Technology Commission, and played an indispensable role in the decision to 
accede, negotiate, and implement the Protocol. The advantage of a sector 
                                                          
350 Zhao 2005,p.66. 
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approach in comparison to project-by-project one is a lowered cost of 
implementation for the funding body. Estimation from the World Bank suggests 
that the sector approach saved almost a third of the overall cost of the 
phaseout351. 
Fourteen sectors have been identified as complying agents, with each 
sector guided by a sector-specific phaseout plan: halon, CFC production, foam, 
mobile air conditioning, tobacco, carbon tetrachloride (CTC) production, 
household refrigeration, industrial and commercial refrigeration, aerosol sprays, 
methyl bromide, solvent, TCA production, and refrigeration maintenance. In 
order to ensure that  international funding is used effectively, sectors are 
matched with either government institutions or a combination of government 
agencies and specific associations to monitor the progress of phaseout: to name 
but three examples, the halon sector is paired with Ministry of Public Security; 
the working group to monitor CFCs production is composed of officials from the 
State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPB) and the former State Petroleum 
and Chemical Industry Administration; and sectors involving the participation 
of associations are sector monitored by SEPB and the China Plastics Processing 
Industry Association, and household refrigeration enforced by the special 
working group composed of experts from SEPB and China Household 
Electronical Appliances Association. In addition to sectors, the implementation 
pinpointed the involved enterprises. The size of the foam sector is the largest, 
with over three hundred enterprises participating in the phase out of CFCs, 
                                                          
351 Yan 燕 Bo 薄, “‘Huanjing zhishi yu duobian waijiao’环境知识与多边环境外交[Environmental 
knowledge and multilateral environmental diplomacy],” Fudan guoji guanxi pinglun 复旦国际关
系评论[Fudan International Studies Review], 2006, p.283. 
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whereas the smallest sector is that of methyl bromide production, with three 
enterprises.    
The first sector to experiment with the “sector approach” was that of 
halon, a substance widely used in the firefighting industry, commonly in two 
forms: halon 1211 used in hand-held extinguishers, and halon 1301 found in 
built-in systems. By 1997, over ninety enterprises produced halon extinguishers 
and extinguishing systems. Under the project-by-project approach, the 
firefighting industry obtained USD 4.677 million from the MLF, yet the overall 
sectoral phaseout lagged, largely due to the large number and mixed type of 
enterprises. Consequently, as early as 1995 the overall sectoral phaseout 
strategy was deliberated on and formulated. The whole halon sector was 
granted USD 62 million from the MLF in November 1997, a benchmark not only 
for China, but also for the world, as the first ODS sectoral phaseout plan. Within 
less than two years, the halon sector achieved a net reduction of 6,000 tonnes of 
halon 1211, and met the Protocol’s goal of freezing the production and 
consumption of halon352. Furthermore, the sector-approach is a cost-effective 
measure to reduce halons as it saved, for the MLF, between a quarter to a third 
of the cost of implementing halon projects, compared to the project-by-project 
approach353.  Because of the success of the halon sector, seven other sectors 
emulated this approach to effectively meet the substantive objective of the 
Protocol.  
Compared to the sector-approach compliance pattern, CBD compliance is 
characterised by the loose involvement of a plurality of actors, which I teased 
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out from the four national reports. In the first national report (1997), five 
sectors were pinpointed as being relevant to biodiversity conservation: 
agricultural, pharmaceutical, forestry, breeding of wild animals, and tourism354. 
The second national report (2001) was submitted in the form of a questionnaire, 
and although it was claimed that biodiversity was distributed to major sectors, 
only two sectors appeared in the report: biotechnology and the agricultural 
industry355.  More encouragement of private sectors’ participation in the CBD 
implementation is found in the third national report (2005) which highlighted 
one major challenge of complying with CBD as insufficient “mainstreaming” and 
“integration” of biodiversity issues into other sectors, and expanded the reach 
of CBD. The urban construction industry is associated with biodiversity 
conservation through the Tenth Five Year Plan, which established an 
expectation of the urban per capita public green belt to eight square meters and 
an 89000 square kilometres’ occupation of national key scenic points356.  
The industry of Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) is another one that 
is directly connected to biodiversity conservation, due to the fact that its 
ingredient comes from natural wild herbal resources and even endangered 
animals, using around 1000 plant and 36 animal species, among them the tigers, 
rhinoceroses and sea horses, all categorised as endangered animals357.  Among 
                                                          
354 National Environment Protection Agency, “China’s National Report on Implementation of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity” (Beijing, December 1997). 
355 State Environmental Protection Administration of China, “China’s Second National Report on 
Implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity” (Beijing, 2001). 
356 State Environmental Protection Administration of China, “China’s Third National Report on 
Implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity” (Beijing, December 15, 2005). 
357 “Traditional Chinese Medicine and Endangered Animals - Advocacy for Animals,” accessed 
June 27, 2016, http://advocacy.britannica.com/blog/advocacy/2007/10/traditional-chinese-
medicine-and-endangered-animals/. 
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the medicinal animals and plants, 80% are wildlife358.  To tackle the negative 
impact of traditional medicine on biodiversity, a Development Outline on 
Modernization of Traditional Chinese Medicine was promulgated in 2002 with 
the task of cultivating new varieties of traditional Chinese medicine, as well as 
working on the substitutes of rare and endangered medicinal resources. Yet the 
key issues of Chinese medicine in the report are intellectual property rights, a 
concern dating  back to 1993 when China passed the patent law on traditional 
medicine usage and pharmaceutical products in response to bio-piracy, and as 
an effort endorsed by the government to “protect Chinese culture and 
knowledge”,  and meanwhile “enter into international trade agreements”359. In 
other words, traditional medicine is not only framed as a biodiversity-related 
issue, but also as an epitome of traditional knowledge. The emphasis on 
prospective knowledge also dovetails with the procedural approach to 
compliance in regards to traditional Chinese medicine, as in the third national 
report, studies of Chinese medicine standards and compilations of traditional 
medicine information used in ethnic minorities occupy a large percentage of the 
efforts. To a large extent, the negative impact of traditional medicine was 
neutralised or offset by its value as traditional knowledge. Efforts to justify 
traditional medicine go as far as to highlight the strengthened international 
cooperation between China and over fifty countries such as US, Canada, France. 
The upshot is a justification of the government’s support of the powerful 
pharmaceutical enterprises to conduct technological cooperation with foreign 
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counterparts largely because the industrial chain of planting and breeding 
medicinal biological resources was immature.    
The third national report also discusses the biotechnological industry 
strategy and has encouraged R&D cooperation between Chinese 
biotechnological firms and their foreign counterpart to facilitate technology 
transfer and upgrade.  
Before China submitted its fourth national report in 2008, the Eighth 
Conference of Parties was held in 2006 in the Brazilian city of Curitiba. In COP8, 
private-sector engagement is for the first time included in the single Decision 
VIII/17360.  The Decision stressed that the private sector has been the least 
engaged, yet has generated the biggest impacts on biodiversity, and the 
biodiversity-relevant expertise and technological resources could positively 
facilitate the compliance of the Convention, rendering public-private 
partnership a desirable option361. The fourth national report from China 
directly reflected the decision of COP8, and dedicates a whole section to the 
private sector. It sets out two priorities: confirmation and publicity of the 
commercial benefits of biodiversity, and the best practice of communication362. 
The report systematically outlines major sectors: agriculture, forestry, urban 
and rural development, marine, water resources, education, science and 
technology, poverty alleviation and development, and others including land and 
resources management, commerce, customs, traditional Chinese medicine 
management sector, and intellectual property management.  
                                                          
360 Aihua Wang, Jianyong Wu, and Jixin Liu, “Business and Biodiversity: A Review of the 
Negotiation Progress of a New Issue under the Convention on Biological Diversity,” Biodiversity 
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361 UNEP, “COP 8 Decision VIII/17 Private-Sector Engagement,” Convention on Biological 
Diversity, March 20, 2006, https://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/default.shtml?id=11031. 
362 Wang, Wu and Liu 2015. 
193 
 
Whereas this gesture is laudable, the way it perceives engaging private 
sectors does not fit directly with the public-private partnership. One experience 
of the public-private partnership is strict law enforcement, supported by the 
fact that over 98% of administration violations cases in the forestry sector from 
2001 to 2007 were investigated and prosecuted and the Customs executed 773 
persons involved in the smuggling of, altogether, 478 rare animals and products, 
59 rare plants and products. While there are “stick” policies on the one hand, 
there are also “carrot” policies such as the campaign for “national garden cities” 
led by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development363. The “carrot 
and stick” policy, however, overlooks the intrinsic desire of sectors and 
industries to maximise their commercial profits, and continuing the command-
style compliance is simply not effective.  
 
 
5.5.3 Matching compliance and enforcement 
Comparing the compliance pattern of the Protocol and the Convention as 
substantive and procedural, it is not difficult to observe that the compliance 
stakeholder involved in the Protocol achieved both procedural and substantive 
objectives, whereas those in the Convention have rarely done so. Procedurally, 
there is a lack of information about the involved industries and the resources 
they have, and even the commercial benefits associated with biodiversity are 
not present. Poor procedural compliance partly explains the equally poor 
substantive compliance, because of lack of motivation and concrete interests to 
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fulfil the goal of the Convention. In addition, the degree of pairing or 
partnership between enforcement and compliance agents, namely government 
institutions and sectors, simply augments the contrast between procedural and 
substantive efforts. The following table 5-3 demonstrates the linkage between 
enforcement and compliance agents in implementing these two treaties.  
The government-sector interaction pattern in the implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol is best summarised as a strong leadership of SEPB and a 
clear division of labour among various relevant ministries, in the format of 1:1 
or 2:1 cooperation. The only exception is the production of methyl bromide, an 
ozone-depletion substance extensively used as a pesticide and effective soil 
sterilant, and this sector is monitored by five government institutions. In 
comparison, the very idea of “sector” used in CBD is very lax, and unlike the 
detailed knowledge of sectoral information indicated in the Montreal Protocol, 
the “sectors” mentioned in the CBD national reports are self-evident.  
The relationship between enforcement and the sectors is more 
supportive than regulative. For instance, the biotechnology industry receives 
generous backing from the government: the State Economic Commission 
pinpointed biotechnology studies as a key area for support from 1996 to 2000; 
the State Science and Technology Commission outlined major technologies to be 
developed in conservation and biotechnology; the  State Patent Administration 
grants biotechnology patent protection; the Chinese Academy of Science is at 
the forefront of biotechnology research, together with the China National Centre 
for Biotechnology Development under the Ministry of Science and Technology. 
What is missing in the national report is any mention of investment in the 
biotechnology industry. For five consecutive years, from 1999, the Chinese 
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government allocated RMB2.5 billion and attracted RMB24 billion social capital 
to 287 projects with the purpose of industrialising biotechnology364.  
Furthermore, while the fourth national report highlights the importance 
of the sectoral approach, the content does not indicate how enterprises and 
industries can be encouraged to comply, but still adopts an enforcement-
focused approach. One representative example is the marine sector, and 
concrete measures to integrate biodiversity into marine strategies are   
“strengthening the establishment and management of marine protected 
areas”, “energetically protecting the environment of islands and islets”, 
“conducting marine ecological surveys”,  “actively carrying out marine 
ecological restoration”, and “strengthening examination and approval of 
use of sea areas and assessment of the environmental impacts of marine 
projects” 365.  
The sole actor in the marine sector, unsurprisingly, is the State Oceanic 
Administration, once again an enforcement agent performing more like a 
compliance agent. Fisheries are not even included in the marine sector, not to 
mention the vast number of fishermen. To a large degree, the “sectors” used in 
the Montreal Protocol refer to companies and industries, or non-state actors, 
whereas the sectors perceived in the CBD are not significantly different from 
the enforcement actors. 
  
                                                          
364 Zhang 张 and Zhang 张, “‘Woguo shengwu jishu chanye fazhan yu chanye zhengce luxiantu 
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Table 5-3 Matching Enforcement and Compliance Stakeholders: the Montreal 
Protocol and CBD 
The Montreal Protocol Convention on Biological Diversity 
Ministry of Public 
Security 
Halon Sector State Administration 
of Traditional 
Chinese Medicine & 
State Intellectual 
Property Office 
Traditional 
Chinese 
Medicine 
Industry 
SEPB & State 
Petroleum  and 
Chemical Industry 
Administration 
CFCs Sector State Forestry 
Administration 
(SFA) 
Forestry 
Sector 
SEPB& China Plastics 
Processing Industry 
Association 
Foam sector  State Tourism 
Administration 
SEPB& SFA & 
Ministry of 
Commerce & 
Finance 
Tourism Sector 
SEPB& State 
Administration of 
Machinery Industry 
Mobile Air 
Conditioning 
Sector 
State Economic 
Commission & State 
Science and 
Technology 
Commission & State 
Patent 
Administration & 
Chinese Academy of 
Science; Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
SEPB& State Tobacco 
Monopoly 
Administration 
Tobacco 
Sector 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Agricultural 
Sector 
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SEPB CTC Sector 
(production) 
Ministry of Urban 
and Rural Housing 
and Development 
Urban and 
Rural 
Development 
Sector 
SEPB & China 
Household 
Electronical 
Appliances Association 
Household 
Refrigeration 
Sector 
Other mentioned but not specified 
sectors:  
Marine Biodiversity, Water Resources, 
Education, Science and Technology, 
Poverty Alleviation and Development, 
Land and Resources Management, 
Commerce, Customs, Intellectual 
Property Management, breeding of 
wild animals 
SEPB Industrial and 
Commercial 
Refrigeration 
SEPB& State Food and 
Drugs Administration 
Aerosol Spray 
Sector 
SEPB& Ministry of 
Agriculture& State 
Tobacco Monopoly 
Administration & State 
Administration of 
Grain & General 
Administration of 
Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and 
Quarantine & General 
Administration of 
Customs & Ministry of 
Commerce 
Methyl 
Bromide 
Sector 
SEPB & Ministry of 
Information Industry 
Solvent 
Sector 
SEPB & China National 
Chemical Construction 
Corporation 
TCA 
Production 
Sector 
SEPB & Association of Refrigeration 
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Automobile 
Manufacturers 
Maintenance 
Sector 
 
It is worth noting that China is not the only country to fail to meet CBD 
objectives. In fact, none of the Parties did so. Hence the 2010 Aichi target was 
introduced, bearing in mind the biggest problem of the previous efforts: that 
biodiversity is not mainstreamed in each country’s economic-socio-political 
developments. The expectation of the Convention derives largely from the high-
profile commitments the Chinese government made back in 1992, when the 
then premier signed it. The assumption is that authoritarian regimes could 
achieve better in environmental governance because of their capability to 
concentrate resources for ambitious projects and causes (jizhong liliang ban 
dashi 集中力量办大事). However, a comparison of the implementation pattern 
of the Protocol and the Convention challenges the assumption and optimistic 
judgment, and the following analysis linking the implementation pattern back to 
the strategic concept of environmental diplomacy will demonstrate that 
domestic groups have acted as a constraint to the capability of the Chinese 
government to fulfil the objectives, and furthermore, to the very function of 
environmental diplomacy as a strategic concept. 
 
 
5.6 Environmental diplomacy and treaty implementation: the 
relationship between government and industry 
Considering enforcement versus compliance stakeholders in this way 
merely highlights the significance of both the government and (often neglected) 
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industries and sectors in fulfilling China’s international commitment. It 
addresses the first question of why one treaty is more effectively implemented 
than another by arguing that the participation of industries and sectors as 
compliance stakeholders is a key explanatory factor to explain the different 
outcomes of the compared treaties. However, to answer the second question of 
why the absence of a strategic concept is correlated with effective treaty 
implementation, whereas the presence of it is associated with partially failed 
implementation, a more fundamental needs to be asked, namely whether the 
strategic concept of environmental diplomacy matters at all.  
This challenging question requires a closer look at the interplay between 
the government and specific industries in the two agreements. In the Montreal 
Protocol case, I choose the refrigeration sector which started ODS-reduction 
activities even before the Chinese government ratified the Protocol. Suffice it to 
say that it is in the interests of the refrigeration sector to comply with the 
Protocol. As far as the CBD is concerned, the industry of Traditional Chinese 
Medicine has been selected as the primary concern because this industry is 
framed as an intellectual property rights issue, which is more related to 
commercial interests than biodiversity conservation. That is to say, the 
situation of Traditional Chinese Medicine represents a typical scenario faced by 
other sectors in CBD compliance: lack of commercial interest and motivation.   
The refrigeration sector’s interests in the Montreal Protocol derive 
primarily from market demand. Refrigerator manufacturers considered that if 
the Montreal Protocol had not been ratified, they would not have been able to 
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export their products to countries that were Parties to the Protocol366.  Access 
to the European market motivates Chinese refrigerator manufacturers to adopt 
non-CFC technology and conduct reduced-CFC technologies. Before China 
ratified the Protocol, Chinese household refrigerator exports dropped by 
58% 367 , as European consumers preferred CFC-free refrigerators with 
environmental labels. In order to compete in the European market, leading 
refrigerator manufacturers asked the National Environmental Protection 
Agency to promulgate an environmental labelling programme. The connection 
between reduced-CFC technology and profits from the experiences of exporting 
to the European market also generate domestic implication, or the so-called 
California effect: exporters from low-standard countries have to adopt higher 
and more stringent environmental standards in order to access higher standard 
markets. These exporters have the potential to pressure the government for 
stronger regulation to ensure that they remain competitive in domestic trade368.   
Directly benefiting from the cleaner technology of non-CFC are 
enterprises such as Xinfei Refrigerator Company. Xinfei, with the capital 
invested by Hong Leong Asia Limited from Singapore, started investing in and 
promoting “green non-CFC” refrigerator in China in 1996 and consequently 
boosted the sales from 0.8 to 1.2 million units, joining the ranking of top three 
refrigerator brands369. In 2002, the domestic market share of Xinfei was as high 
as 18.9%. The anxiety of losing to domestic competitors like Xinfei and 
multinational corporations entering China epitomises the attitude of the 
                                                          
366 Zhao and Ortolano, “Implementing the Montreal Protocol in China: Use of Cleaner 
Technology in Two Industrial Sectors.” 
367French 1997, p.165. Cited by Zhao and Orlando, pp.504. 
368 Stalley 2010, p.47. 
369 Chen 陈 and Zhang 张 Xin 鑫, Tongxing guanggaojie de 9ben huzhao通行广告界的 9本护照 
[Nine tips for advertising] (Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2006), pp.171-172. 
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refrigerator manufacturers and motivates, with over two thirds of them 
phraseology switching  to or in the process of change to non-CFC technologies 
by the end of 1997370.  The refrigeration sector benefited from the MLF funding 
and joint venture to update their technology and accelerate industrial upgrade. 
All the enterprises granted with MFL funding completed their tasks and phased 
out a total   of over 8500 tonnes of CFCs371.  
The refrigeration sector example thus suggests that ODS reduction was a 
major issue in the industry and hence the compliance stakeholders were 
motivated to implement the Protocol. The Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) 
sector paints a different picture, however. Although TCM was listed in the CBD 
national reports as an important sector, the issue of biodiversity was not 
regarded as critical, and was even seen as an obstacle to the export of the 
industry. Even the attitudes of the Chinese government institutions to the TCM 
industry have moved from regulative to protective. This can be seen from 
national reports regarding this sector. The first report in 1997 listed the sector 
policy of traditional medicine (1991-2000) and highlighted equal importance 
between conservation and protection, and strictly constrained any behaviour 
which damage wild herbal resources. The regulative tone is replaced by a 
supportive one in the third report as it links TCM closely with intellectual 
property rights protection. The 2002 “Development Outline on Modernization 
of Traditional Chinese Medicine” (2002-2010) confirms TCM as being an 
important strategic industry (zhongda zhanlue chanye重大战略产业)372 and 
                                                          
370 Zhao and Ortolano, p.515. 
371 “‘Xiangmu yilan’项目一览[An Overview of Projects]” (Ozone Action in China), accessed 
February 20, 2016, http://www.ozone.org.cn/hytt/jyzlhy/. 
372 “Zhongyao Xiandaihua Fazhan gangyao” 中药现代化发展纲要 [Outline of the Modernisation of 
Chinese Medicine], 2002. 
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aims to expand China’s meagre share in the international medicinal market. 
According to the TCM industry report in 2005, the value of “foreign Chinese 
medicine” (yang zhongyao 洋中药) imported to China is over US$2.6 billion and 
its market share in China was more than a quarter in the year of 2003373. As far 
as exports are concerned, China’s TCM industry performed even worse, on the 
verge of embarrassment in the eyes of some experts. According to Xue Dayuan 
and Cailei, Japanese Chinese medicine products occupied 80% of the global 
Chinese medicine market, and Koreans 10%. As “the Chinese medicine super 
power” (zhongyao daguo中药大国), China only shared around five percent of 
the market, rendering “protecting traditional knowledge” and “defending 
sovereignty”  pressing tasks374.   
The “embarrassing” situation by which China did not dominate the 
international Traditional Chinese Medicine market results largely from a lack of 
awareness of intellectual property rights (IPRs) within the industry. In the 2004 
TCM industry report, a section on IPRs was singled out. One frequently cited 
example to indicate the embarrassing situation of the TCM industry was the 
Kyushin (heart tonic pills) manufactured by Kyushin Pharmaceutical CO.Ltd. 
This Japanese company emulated the Chinese medicine Liushen wan 六神丸 
(literally translated as “pills made from six magical ingredients”) used as a 
cardiac stimulant with ingredients of musk, toad venom, borneo camphor, 
bezoar, pearl, realgar, and camphor. The irony is that the “knockoff” pills made 
                                                          
373 China Economic Information Network, “‘Zhongguo Zhongyao Hangye Fenxi baogao’中国中药
行业分析报告[Analysis and Report of Chinese Traditional Medicine Sector],” February 2006, 
http://www1.cei.gov.cn/doc/hyc8110/2006021329521.pdf, 26. 
374 Dayuan 达元 Xue 薛 and Lei 蕾 Cai 蔡, “‘Shengwu duoyangxing gongyue xin redian: 
chuantong zhishibaohu’《生物多样性公约》新热点:传统知识保护[New hot issue in CBD: 
protection of traditional knowledge],” 环境保护[Environmental protection], no. 24 (2006): p.74. 
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in Japan are sold popularly in the global market and their sales per year are 
equal to the overall annual export of Chinese Traditional Medicine from 
China375.  In sharp contrast to Japanese pharmaceutical companies’ awareness 
of intellectual property rights is the lack of it within Chinese enterprises. One in 
every four Chinese pharmaceutical enterprises has registered trademarks and 
pharmaceutical patents of foreign enterprises in China, occupying over 80% of 
overall medicinal high-technology fields.  
The issue of biodiversity conservation is much more marginalised in the 
agenda of the TCM industry, compared with the importance of clean technology 
(reduced-CFC and non-CFC technology) to the refrigeration section. Perhaps no 
one has articulated the direct opposition between biodiversity conservation and 
TCM industry louder than Zhang Gongyao, who advocated abolishment of 
Traditional Chinese Medicine in the name of Biodiversity Conservation in his 
controversial article “Farewell to Traditional Chinese Medicine and 
Remedies”376, stirring a heated discussion regarding the future of the TCM 
industry. Zhang’s argument was quickly refuted by Zhang Qi, an 
environmentalist who had studied abroad377, and those who promoted the 
abolishment of Chinese medicine were labelled by Zhang Qi as “national 
nihilists”378.  Even seven years after Zhang Gongyao’s article was published, 
                                                          
375 China Economic Information Network, “‘Zhongguo Zhongyao Hangye Fenxi baogao’中国中药
行业分析报告[Analysis and Report of Chinese Traditional Medicine Sector],” May 2004, 
http://www1.cei.gov.cn/doc/hyc8110/2004053000941.pdf, p.15. 
376 Gongyao 功耀 Zhang 张, “‘Gaobie Zhongyi zhongyao’告别中医中药[Farewell to Traditional 
Chinese Medicine and Remedies]” 2006, 
http://www.xys.org/xys/ebooks/others/science/dajia7/zhongyi37.txt. 
377 Qi 琦 Zhang 章, “‘Zhongguo Zhongyiyao Xianzhuang Yu Huohou Chengyin fenxi’中国中医药
现状与落后成因分析[The Current Situation and Reasons of Backwardness of Chinese 
Traditional Medicine],” 人民政协报[The CPPCC News], October 10, 2006, 
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/67543/4900445.html. 
378 Ibid. 
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scholars continue to harp on about the fallacies, to be precise, 120 fallacies, in 
his article, and argue that the TCM’s impact on biodiversity is trivial, and 
biodiversity should not be an excuse for its advocates379. What the continued 
quarrel suggests is that the very issue of biodiversity is frail when faced by a 
weak industry, and even more so when confronted by nationalistic appeals for 
protection.   
 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that both the government and industries play an 
important role in the international environmental treaty implementation to the 
extent that institutional limitations are offset by different patterns of 
implementation and compliance. The procedural implementation, as shown in 
the case of CBD, epitomises the weakness of institutions to incorporate and 
aggregate domestic preferences, as recognised in the constructivist 
utilitarianism framework. To nuance the assessment of the implementation of 
the Montreal Protocol and the Convention on Biological Diversity, I would 
rather replace the success versus failure dimension with one of substantive 
versus procedural success, as this more accurately captures the dimension 
within which the achievements are made and factors in the different nature of 
the two issues under discussion: ozone layer protection and biodiversity 
conservation. I argue that the Protocol is implemented both procedurally and 
                                                          
379 Feng 锋 Yan 颜 and Lijie 丽婕 Xu 徐, “‘Zhang Gongyao gaobie zhongyi zhongyao wen miuwu 
120 ze’张功耀‘告别中医中药’文谬误 120 则[120 Mistakes of ‘Farewell to Traditional Chinese 
Medicine’ article],” 北京科技大学学报[Journal of Beijing University of Science and Technology], 
no. 04 (2013): pp.54–68. 
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substantively, whereas the CBD is only implemented procedurally. To explain 
the difference in implementation patterns, I argue that the degree of 
commercial interest attached to the environmental treaty is related to the 
procedural versus substantive outcome. To be specific, treaties with direct 
commercial interests brought to sectors are more likely to be implemented both 
substantively and procedurally, while those without commercial interests or 
where this is a conflict of interests are at best implemented procedurally.  
The procedural pattern of treaty implementation echoes what Zhou et al 
called “symbolic compliance” which is “decoupled from the process of actually 
meeting targets”. This behavioural pattern of implementation derives from “the 
logic of meeting targets” which “induces coping behaviours such as selective 
implementation… and the pursuit of short-run gains at the expense of long-term 
benefits” 380. The model Zhou et al used is based on the study of intermediate-
level bureaus which “play the double role of enforcing policy mandates given by 
higher authorities and administering incentives to their subordinates in the 
policy implementation process”381. This characteristic is also shared within 
ministries which are sandwiched between the higher authority and their 
subordinate. Indeed, the findings in this chapter resonate their model of 
muddling through, “characterized by a reactive response to multiple pressures, 
constant readjustments and a focus on short-term gains”382. 
If institutions are a medium for bureaucrats to “muddle through”, this 
lead to the question of what mechanism incorporates domestic interests and 
prioritises one interest at the expense of another. The strategic usage of 
                                                          
380 Zhou et al 2013, p.125. 
381 Ibid, p.145. 
382 Ibid, p.120. 
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environmental diplomacy and the role of nationalism sheds some light on this 
enquiry. It is ironic and empirically intriguing that the Montreal Protocol 
negotiated before the introduction of environmental diplomacy is better 
implemented than the Convention signed at the height of the environmental 
diplomacy discourse. The expectation that a treaty will be better implemented 
when a strategic concept is in place is built upon a misunderstanding that 
environmental diplomacy means a bigger commitment to environmental 
protection. It is precisely this contradiction that highlights that environmental 
diplomacy is a diplomatic tool which uses environmental issues to achieve 
foreign policy goals, and more specifically, allows tough internationalists to 
pursue the dual objectives of interacting with the international community and 
making sure that international cooperation in China’s favour. At this point, the 
categorisation of procedural versus substantive implementation bears 
particular relevance because the procedural element demonstrates the 
willingness of the Chinese government to cooperate and fulfil its commitments, 
and the substantive dimension further tests the extent to which this 
demonstration is translated into actions devoted to the objectives and norms 
set in the international treaty and to power to offset pressure from domestic 
industries.   
The mechanism that incorporates and aggregates the preferences of 
domestic interest groups is the identitification of specific industries with 
nationalism. The key concern for industries involved in the treaties is to not 
only become a competitive sector but also one which serves the vaguely defined 
national strategy. What the comparative case studies suggest is that for the 
Montreal Protocol, the domestic sectors, particularly the refrigeration industry, 
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called for accession and ratification of the Protocol to ensure their export 
competitiveness in the European market, whereas the Traditional Chinese 
Medicine Industry, even though it did not create noise itself, was protected 
under the traditional knowledge frame and intellectual property rights, and 
listed as a strategic industry supported by the government. In other words, CBD 
raises more awareness of IPRs than biodiversity in the Traditional Chinese 
Medicine sector. Biodiversity being marginalised is not peculiar to the situation 
of China, and is actually identified as the main reason in the 2010 Aichi Targets 
when none of countries achieved substantive implementation. Whereas the 
opposition from interest groups from the US, e.g. biotechnology industry is 
explicit, the unwillingness to constrain TCM development due to the concerns of 
biodiversity conservation is more implicit, albeit present, through the issue 
reframing. Procedural implementation and the issue of reframing are 
ingredients for tough internationalists to ensure that a cooperative China is 
alert to the potential harm of its interests, particularly industrial interests. In a 
nutshell, the economic nationalistic identity is attributed to Chinese sectors in 
international environmental treaty implementation. The usage of 
environmental diplomacy as a strategic concept is a barometer of the ranking 
and weighing of domestic preferences.   
This chapter’s focus on treaty implementation merely reveals one aspect 
of China’s participation in international environmental governance. Chinese 
players are not satisfied with the identity of a developing country which receive 
funding and technology transfer from the developed countries. Furthermore, 
they attempt to portray the state as a leader among developing countries, 
sharing its experiences and offering financial assistance to other countries. The 
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following chapter will analyse the role that different groups play in China’s 
foreign relations when China is not merely a follower, but also a leader. More 
interestingly, how do social organisations play a part in the Chinese 
government’s efforts to lead? 
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Chapter 6 Strategic concept of the “Chinese experience”: a 
comparison of two South-South Cooperation projects 
 
 
6.1 Main argument 
The ‘Chinese experience’ is a catchphrase that is frequently used but has 
been infrequently studied in the literature of South-South Cooperation. Yet it is 
a useful tool to assess the impact of China as a rising Southern power. In this 
paper, I examine Chinese political players’ deployment of ‘Chinese experience’ 
in South-South bilateral projects, highlighting the state-society complex and the 
fragmented nature of South-South Cooperation.  I choose two case studies for 
comparison: the Lao-China Centre for Sustainable Land and Natural Resources 
Management (2008-2009) and the Nam Ngum 5 Ban Chim Village Biogas 
Technology Promotion Project (2009-2010). A comparison of these two cases’ 
is a litmus test of whether China has experience, and if yes, whose? I find that 
the Chinese social organisation is more willing to use ‘Chinese experience’ than 
government agencies. However, the former’s role is much limited in an 
institutional setup underpinned by state-centric logic. Hence, those who do not 
possess ‘Chinese experience’ are making the decisions, whereas those who 
possess it are excluded from the process, resulting in a situation of ‘Chinese 
inexperience’. The political implication of ‘Chinese inexperience’ is we are not 
so much facing an era of ever increasing South-South Cooperation, but South-
South Conflict.  
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6.2 Context and structure of this chapter 
In 2014, Professor Justin Yifu Lin, a renowned economist and former 
senior Vice President of the World Bank, published an article in the Global Times 
entitled ‘African countries are the best places to test “Chinese experience”’383. 
Lin cast doubt on the universality of the Western model, and highlighted the 
relevance of ‘Chinese experience’ of economic development to African countries. 
For instance, he instructed the Ethiopian government to establish special 
economic zones, replicating the practice of China’s Reform and Opening policy. 
Lin’s confidence in ‘Chinese experience’ is echoed in President Xi Jinping’s 
speech at the China-Africa Business Forum in Johannesburg in 2015. He stated 
that ‘It is China’s sincere hope to share “Chinese experience” with African 
countries’ in Africa’s industrialisation, and that a path ‘can only be found by 
African people’s own practice and exploration’384. The signal from both 
Professor Lin and President Xi is that ‘Chinese experience’ is increasingly salient 
in South-South Cooperation. In contrast to capital and technology, ‘Chinese 
experience’ is a soft notion and an intangible asset of this biggest developing 
country385. The emphasis on ‘Chinese experience’ indicates a shift from ‘What 
China should do’ to ‘What China has to offer’; that is from a normative 
                                                          
383 Yifu Justin 毅夫 Lin 林, “‘Feizhou Guojia Shi Jianyan Zhongguo Jingyan de Zuihao Difang’非洲
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384 Jinping 近平 Xi 习, “‘Xieshou Gongjin, Puxie Zhongfei Hezuo Xin Pianzhang’携手共进谱写中
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385 Yiping 一平 Zhou 周, “Quanqiu nannan hezuo yu zhongguo jingyan” 全球南南合作与中国经
验[Global South-South Cooperation and Chinese experience], interview by Shulin 树林 Li 李, 
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expectation to a pragmatic approach. Moreover, it is a shift from generating 
experiences domestically towards promoting them with foreign countries.  
This trend of increasing emphasis on ‘Chinese experience’ contributes to 
the existing debate among academics and journalists within the South-South 
Cooperation literature as to whether the Global South is transforming386 or 
replicating the existing world order387. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, 
academics such as Pieterse stressed the emancipatory nature of South-South 
Cooperation, and have argued for a global re-balancing process, in which the 
hegemony of the North is challenged and the old order recalibrated388.  Binding 
the Southern countries together is ‘their common experience, and rejection, of 
the neoliberal development model’389. China, as the “bellwether” among the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) is expected to play a major 
role in this re-balancing of power390.Other scholars disagree with the optimistic 
view of transformative impact of Southern countries and, instead 
contextualising the rise of Southern countries in global capitalism. William 
Robinson argues that Southern powers are not offering an alternative to global 
capitalism, but are integrating into, thereby replicating a “brutal, exploitative” 
world order391. The book BRICS: an anti-capitalist critique edited by Bond and 
                                                          
386 See Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Global Rebalancing: Crisis and the East–South Turn,” 
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Garcia employs Marxist theories such as ‘sub-imperialism’ to detract from the 
hope that BRICS are charting a path toward a more just global economic 
order392. Instead, BRICS “talk anti-imperialist but walk sub-imperialist”, ‘doing 
deputy-sheriff duty for global corporations and neoliberal ideologues, while 
controlling their own angry populaces as well as their hinterlands through a 
more formidable security apparatus’, as Bond vividly describes 393 . The 
emergence of the North-South-South triangular collaboration in the late 1990s 
instrumentalises the South-South Cooperation to legitimate and enhance 
neoliberalism394. 
This debate is built upon the assumption that the North and the South 
are opposite binaries and developing countries are either emancipated or 
imprisoned. This binary assumption is inevitable because the “South” is a 
relational concept targeted against the inequality created by the Northern 
countries395.  Suffice it to say that the term “South” is used strategically as a 
“mobilising symbol and ideological expression of the range of shared 
development challenges” facing governments of developing countries396. To 
argue whether the South is transforming or replicating the global capitalist 
order is contingent upon evidence regarding the intention of political elites397.  
However, the new reality in which the border between the South and North is 
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practically blurred, yet, discursively stressed leads to a different agenda setting 
regarding the increasingly polarised field of South-South Cooperation. The 
chasm between emancipatory expectations and Marxist anti-capitalist critique 
needs to be filled by a middle-ground.   
 
 
6.3 Chinese experience as a strategic concept 
‘Chinese experience’ as a strategic concept merits academic attention as 
it is a potential candidate for this ‘middle ground’. It challenges the basic 
premise of the binary thinking of the hegemonic North and the protesting South 
because ‘Chinese experience’ itself is derived from China’s benefiting from the 
North and the global capital on multiple fronts. In his memoir Breaking through, 
Li Lanqing, the former Vice Premier of the State Council in charge of foreign 
trade (1998-2003), stresses that foreign capital has played a vital role in China’s 
Reform and Opening-up policy398. In fact, foreign-invested enterprises starting 
in 1980 have had a great impact on China’s macro-economy, and been 
effectively made China into the manufacturing hub of Asia. In 1996, foreign-
invested enterprises accounted for 40% of China’s foreign trade399. Although 
China is intimately interwoven with foreign capital and the existing economic 
order, it is far from being a spokesperson or defender of this system as Chinese 
political leaders regard the current international system as unfair and unequal. 
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As the former President of China Hu Jintao stated in his speech at the General 
Debate of the 64th Session of the UN General Assembly, ‘Without the 
development and equal participation of developing countries, there cannot be 
common prosperity in the world, nor a more just and equitable international 
economic order’400.   
The dual identity of China as both a beneficiary and a disadvantaged  
state brings to light what Bruce Gilley terms ‘a creative Third World’, referring 
to ‘cooperative diplomatic and political strategies to advance their interests in 
the international system, strategies that in many ways borrow from and make 
use of the forms and rules put in place by the West’401. Although Gilley himself 
acknowledges that this categorisation is an oversimplification, his contribution 
is to accord pragmatism the same importance as a traditional ideological lens 
inspired by the Latin American studies in regards to the debate about the 
influence of the Global South on the world order. 
‘Chinese experience’ echoes the pragmatic approach, and furthermore 
recognises the fragmented nature of South-South Cooperation within 
developing countries, offering a new perspective to the state-centric dominated 
field. ‘Experience’ is personal, micro, down-to-project level and will ultimately 
be abstracted to a model and a policy toolkit. It is a fundamental question to 
examine whose experience and what experience matter, and to understand how 
the state as a whole makes use of ‘Chinese experience’ for the national interest. 
The role of agents is well documented and sophisticatedly analysed in the 
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existing literature including multilateral organisations such as the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development 402, regional organisations such 
as Latin America and the Caribbean403 , or prominent world leader such as Ban 
Ki-Moon’s role in South Korea’s strategy towards Africa 404. This state-centric, 
top-down approach reveals the ideational and strategic dimension of South-
South Cooperation.  
The emphasis on Chinese experience is traced back to the legacy of Mao 
Zedong thought with the essence of “to seek truth from facts”, “the mass line”, 
and “independence”405. Hughes observes that “to seek truth from facts” 
outweighed thought emancipation as a safer formula because its indication is 
that “China’s problems have to be found in Chinese experience and not in 
foreign teaching”406. ‘Chinese experience’, therefore, cannot be thought of or 
proposed. It is based on actions and concrete projects. It can only be generated, 
filtered or felt. In other words, it is President Xi who advocates ‘Chinese 
experience’, but it is different groups involved in South-South Cooperation with 
concrete skills, knowledge, and impressions that interpret what this 
catchphrase means.        Hence, it is important to view China’s South-South 
Cooperation through the lens of a state-society complex. The special collection 
of articles in the Third World Quarterly in 2013 attempts to introduce this state-
society complexity. Gray and Murphy encourage contributors to examine how 
domestic structures, actors and dynamics influence the behaviour of rising 
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powers407. Mark Beeson’s article in this special collection attempts to address 
this challenging question through a case study of China. He argues that judging 
from public opinion and surveys of Chinese businessmen, the China model, 
which is a mixture of free market and authoritarian regime, has “reasonably 
secure” foundations408. This finding is an important start to answering the 
question of how the China model is received. Yet this paper tries to go one step 
further to answer the question of how ‘Chinese experience’ is interpreted and 
used by different domestic groups. In this process, domestic political players are 
not merely passive recipients or justifiers of ‘Chinese experience’ or the ‘China 
model’, but spoke(wo)men of this notion. One difficulty in conducting this kind 
of research is rightfully pointed out by Beeson, namely that Chinese foreign 
policy is ‘notoriously opaque’ and ‘difficult to decipher’409. Therefore, a different 
approach is attempted in the present study. Rather than considering 
government institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I look at this 
question through the lens of social organisations and process-trace what they 
encounter if they are involved in South-South Cooperation.  
Before introducing the two cases, it is necessary to gain an overview of 
the institutional arrangement of South-South Cooperation which sets the stage 
for the agent’s activities. South-South Cooperation is distributed among 
different governmental institutions. As South-South Cooperation is traditionally 
bundled with foreign aid and investment, the most powerful hands-on ministry 
in this matter is the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). Foreign aid is supervised 
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by the Department of Foreign Assistance410 (DFA) and foreign investment by 
the Department of Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation (DOIEC).  
The only official platform of South-South Cooperation, “China SSC Network” is 
housed in the China International Centre for Economic and Technical Exchanges 
(CICETE), directly subordinate to MOFCOM411. The NDRC is another important 
government institution which is primarily concerned with climate change-
related South-South Cooperation412. Regarding the role of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA), this organisation sets out the principles of South-South 
Cooperation: equality, reciprocity, pragmatism, diversity, and progress. It 
emphasises that although China’s aid is limited, it is “sincere and 
unconditional”413.   
Compared to MOFCOM, other ministries possess less power to the extent 
that their roles are complementary to MOFCOM, if not ornamental. For instance, 
the MOFA is merely an advisory body to MOFCOM and coordinates with 
“relevant government departments according to the overall diplomatic 
planning”, “report” and “give suggestions to the CPC Central Committee and the 
State Council”. As far as environmental cooperation is concerned, CICETE jointly 
hosts the “Human Resource Development Cooperation Framework” revolving 
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around Foreign Aid, together with the Centre for Environmental Education and 
Communications (CEEC) under the MEP. Till 2013, CEEC has held 28 seminars 
for 659 senior officials working on environmental protection from 104 
developing countries414. Those seminar efforts function as “a carrier of external 
propaganda of cultural soft power in the field of environmental protection”, and 
indicate China as a “responsible big country”.   
The lopsided power distribution among ministries not only discounts the 
capacity of each relevant ministry but also makes it difficult to formulate a 
coherent SSC environmental strategy. The fact that SSC is monopolised by 
MOFCOM indicates the ultimate goal of SSC is the national economic interest. 
However, economic gain is only one dimension of the national interest and 
neglecting the importance of the political and diplomatic dimensions of the 
national interest will, in turn, create hurdles in the pursuit of economic interests. 
Foreign aid expert Yu Nanping suggests that foreign aid not be dominated by 
MOFCOM for two reasons.  Firstly, without a coherent strategy, SSC cannot 
serve the overall national interest. Secondly, because the strategy of SSC 
remains to be constructed, there is space for organisations outside the state 
apparatus to make their contribution415.  
Indeed, as foreign investment is married to other issues such as 
environmental protection, traditionally excluded actors in South-South 
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Cooperation are now invited to contribute their part to a friendly foreign 
relation based on a good image of China. Alden and Hughes observe that a “new 
type of strategic partnership” is proposed to invite a plurality of Chinese actors 
to consolidate person-to-person connection and stretch the influence from the 
ruling elite to grassroots416.  
I have selected two micro-level projects from 2008 to 2010, just after the 
2008 financial crisis and the beginning of the discussion of BRICS. These two 
cases present a rare opportunity to examine state-society configuration, 
because both involves to different degree the Chinese non-governmental 
organisation. These two cases are both related to sustainable development, and 
are concerned with environmental issues. The environmental element within 
these two cases speaks to Thomas Muhr’s claim that South-South cooperation is 
likely to pave the way for environmental and socially sustainable 
development417. A comparison of these two cases will shed light on the question 
of how ‘Chinese experience’ was perceived by different domestic groups before 
it became a catchphrase of the top national leader, reflecting these groups’ 
attitudes and interpretation of this current buzzword. It also provides valuable 
insights into the question of how sustainable South-South projects is, or tends 
to be.  
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6.4 The Lao-China Land Project: muted ‘Chinese experience’ 
The two selected projects help us trace how a Chinese environmental 
organisation proposes a creative South-South project, at the heart of which is 
sustainable development, which ended up with assisting a foreign investment 
project. ‘The Lao-China Centre for Sustainable Land and Natural Resources 
Management’ (2008-2009) is aimed to improve the governance capacity of the 
National Land Management Authority which is established in 2006 under the 
Lao cabinet. This project never came into fruition, but the organisation that 
initiated this project achieved a reasonable level of success in the second 
project, ‘the Nam Ngum 5 Ban Chim Biogas Technology Promotion Project’ 
(2009-2010), a Corporate Social Responsibility project. The following analysis 
will identify different levels of experience and explain under what 
circumstances ‘Chinese experience’ matters.  
The most important player in these two cases is that of the Global 
Environmental Institute. It is one of the first social organisations within China 
which explicitly identifies South-South Cooperation as one of its primary 
concerns418. Established in 2004 with support from the start-up sponsor in the 
United States, the Blue Moon Fund, it adopts a market-based and policy-
oriented approach to solve environmental problems within China, and 
furthermore, to share Chinese experience with other developing countries. The 
focus on South-South results largely from Dr Zhang Jiqiang, the director of the 
China Programme in the Blue Moon Fund, and Mrs Jin Jiaman, the executive 
director of GEI. Described as a visionary thinker by GEI staff, Dr Zhang sees 
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China as a laboratory for sustainable development, which allows GEI to 
investigate what is working within China, and then to share the experiences 
with other developing countries419. Mrs Jin Jiaman has two decades of 
experiences as an official in the Chinese government, non-governmental 
organisations and international organisation in the field of environmental 
protection. Both Dr Zhang and Mrs Jin have rich experience in working with the 
Chinese government, and are strongly committed to bringing positive change to 
the establishment, a prerequisite for their creative projects and strategic 
thinking. What distinguishes GEI from other environmental organisations is 
that GEI exports the so-called Chinese experience to other developing countries. 
In other words, whereas Chinese and foreign ENGOs operate in China, GEI goes 
further and applies what is successful in China abroad. Indeed, it is the very first 
Chinese local organisation to operate overseas. The difference between GEI and 
the government is that the former is forward thinking, and explores what the 
government has not yet but could achieve in five years’ time420. In this way, GEI 
accumulates experiences before the government does.  
The first South-South Cooperation project of the GEI was the Sri Lanka 
Biogas Commercialisation Project, launched in July 2005421. GEI opened its local 
office to implement the project in 2006. It became the very first foreign NGO 
authorised by the Sri Lankan government since Sri Lanka gained independence 
in 1947, and the very first international NGO to obtain financial support from 
the Sri Lankan government422.  GEI collaborated with the Ministry of Livestock 
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of Sri Lanka. The aim of this project was to introduce the latest made-in-China 
biogas technology to Sri Lanka and furthermore, to develop a business model in 
which livestock waste is transformed into renewable energy. The business 
model is drawn from GEI’s previous experiments and experience in rural 
Sichuan and Yunnan423. One key lesson from Sri Lanka for GEI is that it not only 
has a role to play in South-South Cooperation projects, but also that it has 
hands-on experience. Hence, GEI has initiated a second overseas project in Laos.  
The Lao-China Sustainable Land and Natural Resources Project (2008-
2009) is a government-to-government initiative, in which GEI assisted the 
National Land Management Authority (NLMA) in applying for foreign aid from 
the Ministry of Commerce in China. Based on the 2008 annual report of GEI and 
an interview with Mrs Jin Jiaman, it seems that the objective of this government-
to-government project is fourfold. The first purpose is to help the NLMA to use 
the ‘Chinese experience’ to “establish regulations on land and resources 
management” via capacity building424. Related to the first purpose, part of this 
funding request is also dedicated to conducting a survey of the land and forests 
in Laos and moreover collecting information on natural resources in the 
country. These previous two goals lead to the third one, which is to inform 
Chinese enterprises investing overseas of the environmental conditions of the 
host country and to provide guidelines for the environmental behaviour of the 
Chinese enterprises operating in Laos. The linkage of foreign aid and foreign 
investment implicit in this arrangement is manifest and will be elaborated on 
later. The last and most ambitious purpose is to “increase the innovative 
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capacities of Chinese NGOs in implementing projects on China’s foreign aid” and 
ultimately to “encourage positive change in China’s overseas aid”425.  The last 
purpose is particularly pressing because the Chinese government has neither 
strategic planning, nor the capacity to evaluate the current aid system426. 
The focus on forestry and natural resources in Laos in GEI’s proposal is 
largely driven by Chinese domestic need for timber products. In the aftermath 
of the massive floods in 1998, the then Premier Zhu Rongji introduced logging 
ban originally covering seven Chinese provinces along the Yangtze and Yellow 
Rivers and further reaching ten more provinces. Furthermore, the State 
Forestry Administration implemented Natural Forest Conservation Programme 
which has been drafted for two years and introduced in 1998 as the floods 
added urgency to the new programme427. However, with the rising demand for 
forest products in China leads to rising prices of them which boosts timber 
imports from countries with lax regulation to prohibit illegal logging and 
trading428. Consequently, deforestation has been displaced from China into 
other regions, especially, Southeast Asian countries. Laos is among the 
countries which China imports forest products from. Since the “New Economic 
Mechanism” was introduced in Laos in 1986, the forestry industry has been 
encouraged to be export-driven. The regulation on commercial logging is lax 
and “short-lived”. It is difficult to gauge from the official data how much timber 
China imports from Laos because part of the export volume is calculated as 
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Thailand’s timber exports, because of the logging ban implemented in Thailand 
in natural forests in 1989 rendered insufficient plantation for exports and the 
gap compensated by forests cut in Cambodia, Burma and Laos429. Laos seems to 
be an eager partner for Chinese companies with a less strict environmental 
regulation.  
GEI opted to apply for foreign aid to launch this proposal. It collaborated 
with Zhejiang University, the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning 
under the MPA, Information Centre of Ministry of Land and Resources, China 
Institute of International Studies (CIIS), University of International Business 
and Economics (UIBE) and government officials from Laos. The joint decision 
was to apply for a concessional loan from the Chinese government430. The fact 
that a sustainable project is married to a concessional loan merits attention 
because sustainability is a new focus of concessional loan projects. The 2011 
White Paper on China’s foreign aid stated that by 2009, 61% of the total 
concessional loans were given to infrastructure projects, 16.1% to industry and 
8.9% to energy and resource exploitation431. The Lao-China Land project 
explicitly emphasises information collection and capacity building to facilitate 
land and natural resources management. GEI’s contribution to the foreign aid 
system is to complement, not replicate or duplicate, the projects carried out by 
government agencies. Furthermore, GEI aims to bring change to the foreign aid 
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system by implementing innovative projects and “holding the hands of 
MOFCOM” on the road of sustainability432. 
The process of the Lao-China Land project is divided into two phases 
under two different names. The first phase has the title “the Lao-China 
Cooperation Centre for Sustainable Land and Natural Resources Management”. 
This is modelled upon the Sino-Japan Friendship Environmental Protection 
Centre, established in 1996 with the support of Japan’s ODA, and is aimed to 
conduct scientific research, collect and manage information and personnel 
training to improve environmental governance.  Indeed, one GEI project 
manager in the Lao-China Land project team has worked with the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, and has been personally involved in the design 
process of Sino-Japan Friendship Environmental Protection Centre. The skills 
and experiences of that individual official in the Sino-Japan Centre are 
important to the decision of GEI to establish an information centre in 
Vientiane433. In this case, ‘Chinese experience’ is drawn from a North-South 
project and is associated with the individual’s work experience.  
During the first phase, GEI and the NLMA signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on August 18th, 2008. Immediately after the ceremony, 
the NMLA and GEI submitted the proposal to the Chinese ambassador to Laos 
H.E. Pan Guangxue and the commercial attaché from MOFCOM Chen Hangao. 
According to the official procedure, the embassy screens the request from the 
recipient government (NLMA in this case), and if it sees the proposal as being 
appropriate, the embassy will pass it onto MOFA and MOFCOM in Beijing434. In 
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this case, the Chinese embassy in Laos gave this project approval as both the 
ambassador and the commercial attaché “acknowledged the importance, 
urgency and feasibility of the project and offered helpful suggestions”435. The 
details of the subsequent development are neither publicly accessible, nor 
discussed during my interviews with GEI staff. When I conducted my field trip 
in Vientiane in 2016, the officers working in the Chinese Embassy in charge of 
economics and trade told me that they were unaware of this project largely 
because those in charge of the project had been either transferred to other 
posts or retired. Moreover, there was no record in the Embassy about this 
project. I phoned the then vice minister of NLMA, Dr Akhom Tounalom and he 
did know much of this project as “my Chinese colleagues did much of the 
work”436. The message conveyed in the brief phone interview confirms the 
initiative taken on the Chinese side and officials in Lao government did not get 
much involved apart from approving the project.   
Decision-making within MOFCOM is unknown. However, the feedback 
from MOFCOM on this proposal revealed the concerns of MOFCOM, and led to 
the second phase of the Lao-China project. The key message in the feedback 
from MOFCOM was that the Lao-China project, as proposed in 2008, did not 
contain visible economic profitability, and, therefore, GEI should modify the 
proposal by including more evidence of economic benefits, instead of “merely” 
collecting information and capacity building. Neither MOFA nor the State 
Council, which has the final veto, was mentioned as MOFCOM took the lead 
when the proposal arrived in Beijing.  As a result, in the second phase of this 
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project, GEI not only changed the name of the project, but also shifted its focus. 
In order to highlight the economic element in this project, the project title was 
changed to “Sustainable Utilization and Market Oriented Management of 
National Land Resources in Lao PDR”. Furthermore, emphasis on information 
gathering was removed, as were efforts to facilitate the Laotian government to 
survey national resources and establish natural reserves. This marked the side-
lining of environmental issues in this project. To some extent, sustainable 
development became the “icing on the cake” of a profit-driven project, aiming to 
open the Laotian land market for Chinese enterprises. This is in fact the 
opposite of what GEI proposed. Whereas GEI aimed to share the land 
management governance experience with NLMA and set limits on land 
exploitation, MOFOM requested the opposite.  
This change did not stop GEI from exploring opportunities to make a 
contribution to SSC. Indeed, in the second phase, GEI played an active part in 
liaising with all the relevant players in order to apply for a concessional loan 
and managed to include itself in the official procedure of the concessional loan 
application, even though political actors like GEI were originally excluded from 
this process437. For instance, GEI established communication channels with 
MOFCOM, Export and Import Bank of China (EXIM), Chinese exporters, and the 
Laotian government, to the extent that it paved the way for cooperation among 
the players. GEI managed to modify the official procedure by merging steps in 
the procedure. In the official procedure, the beneficiary country firstly needs to 
contact China EXIM, and EXIM communicates the idea with MOFCOM. This is, 
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followed by a meeting between MOFCOM and the beneficiary country. But 
instead of the above, GEI invited officers from EXIM and MOFCOM at the same 
time, so that GEI not only participated in the discussion between EXIM and 
MOFCOM, but also had the opportunity to elaborate to both sides on the 
importance of this project. Mrs Jin quotes a comment from an officer working at 
China EXIM: ‘it is a great project. However, it is unprecedented and we have no 
experience in facilitating this kind of project’438. It is in this meeting that the 
focus of this revised project shifted towards the establishment of a “land use 
rights exchange market”439. The ability of GEI to modify the procedure is 
indicative of the flexible nature of institutions and the possibilities to bypass the 
official requirements to inform the government of this project and put it on 
MOFCOM’s agenda.   
Having had nominal support from MOFCOM and EXIM, GEI approached 
the China Construction International Corporation as the Chinese exporter 
requested in the official procedure of concessional loan application. 
Furthermore, GEI became the “foreign contractor/client”, functioning as an 
implementer of this project.  In the end, GEI submitted its revised proposal to 
NLMA. In this proposal, the project requested funding worth US$31.5 million440. 
With the effort of the NLMA and the secretary to the Prime Minister, this project 
came to be the second prioritised project in Lao’s governmental request for 
China’s foreign assistance in that year441. This is an indication that the Lao-
China Land project received substantial support from the Laotian side.  
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The outcome of the application came as a disappointment to GEI and the 
Laotian government. Although the proposal requested US$ 31.5 million US 
dollars for the Laotian government, only a mere tenth (2 million US$) was 
granted to this project for capacity building workshops442. The information 
centre, key to the promotion of sustainability, was completely shelved because 
MOFCOM did not see the economic value of gathering information and even 
more inconveniently, the information collected in the Chinese-funded centre 
was highly likely to create hurdles for the Chinese enterprises to exploit natural 
resources in Laos443.  In the end, MOFCOM decided to let the in-house unit run 
the capacity building workshops, and “invited” NLMA officials to attend. 
Effectively the money spent by MOFCOM went back into its own pocket444.   
This sustainable development project’s failure directly challenges the 
notion of ‘Chinese experience’, frequently mentioned by GEI and then ignored 
by MOFCOM. This is expected to filter out practices learnt from developed 
countries, and furthermore, to define what is appropriate for the developing 
countries in terms of balancing economic development and environmental 
governance. The question which emerges from the Lao-China land project is 
“whose experiences matter?”.  In the Lao-China Land project, the Chinese 
experience referred largely to that of GEI: its experiences in incorporating a 
market-based approach to advise policy recommendations to the government 
and to operate in the overseas setting.  As far as the government agency is 
concerned, MOFCOM is not a ministry that has experience in environmental 
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governance. Mrs Jin Jiaman reflects that the fact that collaboration with the 
State Forestry Administration may yield a different445. 
The paradox of the Chinese experience, however, was that GEI’s own 
experience reflected the inexperience of MOFCOM. As far as Lao-China was 
concerned, the Department of Foreign Aid in MOFCOM was unfamiliar with the 
innovative approach of GEI to interweave sustainability with foreign aid. The 
original idea of establishing an information centre received little sympathy from 
MOFCOM officials, and so was downsized and simplified to the supply of 
hardware (a building), instead of software (a platform to exchange information 
for environmental governance). What is clear from this is that the “Chinese 
experience” in the Lao-China Land project was contested because it did not 
serve the interests of the MOFCOM. This finding suggests the irony that the 
government-initiated catchphrase of “Chinese experience” cannot be realised by 
the Chinese government itself. To explain this irony, it is necessary to examine 
the specific interests involved in this project.  
 
 
6.4.1 Interest dimension 
The Lao-China project reveals not only the importance of explicit 
interests of players directly involved in the project, but also the relevance of 
indirect interests. Explicit and direct interests are those of MOFCOM, the NLMA 
of Laos, and GEI, whereas implicit and indirect interests refer to those of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Forestry Administration, which will be 
explained in the latter part of this section. 
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MOFCOM: The interests of MOFCOM in the Lao-China Land project are 
twofold: economic profitability and political dominance in the foreign aid 
system. The discounted element of sustainability and the stress on the 
importance of economic benefits indicates the preference of MOFCOM. In the 
perception of MOFCOM officials, foreign aid is used to open the foreign market 
which would otherwise be difficult to occupy because of the dominance of 
Western countries which have a richer experience in foreign aid446. Although 
foreign aid and foreign assistance are allocated to two different departments in 
MOFCOM, the linkage between these two is “natural” for MOFCOM officials.  
Apart from economic profitability, political dominance in the foreign aid 
system is another dimension of ministerial interest. The “innovative change” of 
GEI put the issues of sustainability, environmental governance, and information 
management to the fore. This change requests expertise from other ministries 
such as the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the State Forest 
Administration. Moreover, what GEI has demonstrated through pushing the 
Lao-China project this far is that there is a role for non-governmental 
organisations to play in the foreign aid system. The reluctance of MOFCOM to 
materialise the innovation from a proposal to a model project reflects the 
unwillingness and incapability of MOFCOM to share power with other political 
players. 
GEI: The primary interest of GEI, as a social organisation, is a mixture of 
political and social interests. Political interest is to get access to the policy 
making process and to bring policy change through implementing existing 
policy framework. Social interest refers to sustainable usage of natural 
                                                          
446 Ministry of Commerce official 2, interview by author, face-to-face, July 27, 2015. 
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resources in Laos. Both the executive manager of GEI and programme leader of 
the Blue Moon Fund are aware that it is more difficult to parachute a policy 
initiative than to modify the existing ones. As a consequence, the Lao-China 
project works within the establishment (tizhinei 体制内) by following the 
discourse of South-South Cooperation, playing within the official procedures, 
and collaborating closely with Chinese government agencies. Apart from the 
political interest, there is an economic aspect of GEI’s interest. If the Lao-China 
project is fully funded, GEI would be allocated to some funding so as to 
implement the capacity building and workshop training.  
Laotian government (GoL): The question of interests in the Laotian 
government is beyond the scope of this chapter. But it is fair to say that the Lao-
China Land project was derived from the need of Laos. This project fits in the 
National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2006-2010). Three strategies 
were identified to achieve the goal of sustainable utility of natural resources 
and protection of the environment: “the management of natural resources by 
means of increased participation and protection”, “the institutional framework 
and its capacity by means of strengthening it and raising public awareness and 
political commitment”, “the environmental management in industrial and 
construction sectors”447. These three strategies are to a varying degree reflected 
in the Lao-China projects.  
Alternative governmental partners: The next two players’ role in this 
project is implicit and indirect. But they could have become candidates to form 
a coalition with GEI. The key decision makers in the Chinese Embassy in Laos, 
233 
 
specifically the ambassador and the economic attaché, provided insights to the 
original proposal of the Lao-China project and praised the attempt made by the 
GEI. With their assistance, the proposal was submitted to MOFCOM and MOFA 
for further consideration. The role of MOFA is ambiguous as it is neither 
elaborated in the narrative of GEI nor mentioned in the interviews.   
One other ministry which was mentioned in the interview as an 
alternative government partner is the State Forestry Administration (SFA). This 
is because at the heart of the original Lao-China Land project was natural 
resources, specifically forestry. The executive director of GEI, Ms Jin Jiaman, 
reflected that one reason the Lao-China project failed was that they chose 
MOFCOM as the primary partner. She speculated that working with SFA might 
bring a different outcome because the original proposal overlapped with the 
responsibility of the SFA. In terms of foreign aid funding, the SFA could 
negotiate with MOFCOM, instead of GEI persuading MOFCOM to support a 
project which did not serve its interests. Therefore, the interest for ministries 
like SFA was political, namely sharing power with MOFCOM in the foreign aid 
system.  
 
 
6.5 The Biogas project: instrumentalising ‘Chinese experience’ 
The second project of GEI in Laos reveals the relation between GEI and 
SOE in terms of the Chinese experience: in this case, SOE’s inexperience and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
447 Committee for Planning and Investment, “National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2006-
2010）,” 2006, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/LAO_PRSP2(Oct2008).pdf. 
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GEI’s experience together lead to a coalition presented in the form of a model 
demonstration project. The Biogas project, in which GEI assisted a State-owned 
Enterprise to conduct a Corporate Social Responsibility project, is a sub-project 
under the Nam Ngum 5 Hydropower Station (the NN5). Although Chinese 
hydraulic companies have rich experience in big-scale hydropower projects, 
albeit with controversy like Three Gorges Dams and Nu River, large-scale 
hydro-electric projects are regarded as what China is experienced in448, the NN5 
was somehow new as being the first overseas dam-building project using the 
financing model of Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT). BOT is by and large “a start-
up business venture where private organisations undertake development and 
operation of a facility normally done by the government”449. It offers the 
government with the opportunity to outsource public projects to the private 
sector due to lack of public funds and the availability of private initiative and 
funding. NN5 is the first BOT project between a Chinese company and a foreign 
government, and hence is treated with great caution. The motivation for 
Chinese companies to opt for BOT as contracts of this kind are regarded as more 
profitably in the long run450. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 
2004 between the Laotian government, or the Principal, and the Sinohydro 
Corporation of China (Sinohydro), the concessionaire. This was a joint venture 
between Sinohydro and Electricite du Laos (EdL), the former holding 85% 
share and the latter 15%. Sinohydro received a concession from the National 
                                                          
448 Carter and Mol 2006, p.337. 
449 Sebastiaan Menheere and Spiro Pollalis, Case Studies on Build Operate Transfer (Edison: Delft 
University of Technology, 1996), 
http://www.gsd.harvard.edu/images/content/5/3/538865/fac-pub-pollalis-bot-part-1.pdf, p.8. 
450 Tao Hu, Min Chen, and Yanyang Wu, “Analysis of Key Players in China’s Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment Based on the Conceptual Matrix-Part II: Case Study in Southeast Asia,” 
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Bank of China (US$140 million), the investor, to finance, design, and operate 
this hydropower station, a public facility project. After 25 years, the ownership 
of this project will be transferred from Sinohydro to the Laotian government. 
The rest of the financing comes from Sinohydro Corporation (US$54 million) 
and EdL (US$6million)451. The operator is Nam Nugm 5 Power Company Ltd. 
Although the Nam Ngum 5 project started as early as 2004, it was only in 
2008 that GEI became involved in this investment project. NN5 bears a symbolic 
importance, as it is portrayed as a “model” for further overseas hydraulic 
investment in Laos. It is a small-scale project to generate ‘Chinese experience’. 
This project manager of NN5 has conducted many innovative attempts. 
Sinohydro was the first Chinese SOE to require a political risk insurance 
guarantee from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of the 
World Bank. Because of the stringent requirements of MIGA in regards to social 
and environmental evaluation, it is possible for the public to access detailed 
information about the NN5 project. Furthermore, the NN5 project was the first 
attempt to register under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)452. These 
efforts demonstrate Sinohydro’s ambition to portray a green image in overseas 
investment.    
Moreover, Sinohydro did not expect to be supervised by international 
organisations. International Rivers liaised with GEI and WWF (Beijing) to 
discuss environmental concerns with Sinohydro. The environmental concerns 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Environmental and Social Risk Management of Chinese Transnational Corporations (Yale School 
of Forestry and Environmental Studies and WWF, 2015). 
451 Vientiane Times, “Nam Ngum 5 Hydropower Project Begins,” International Rivers, April 30, 
2008, https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/nam-ngum-5-hydropower-project-
begins-2930. 
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of WWF and International Rivers are not unfounded, particularly due to the 
Chinese government’s attempts to transfer environmental pollution to 
developing countries in Africa and Southeast Asia453. GEI, as a Chinese NGO, 
enjoyed a relative advantage in the discussion with Sinohydro, particularly 
because of the perception of Sinohydro staff that international organisations 
lacked objectivity454. Although International Rivers initiated the discussion, it is 
GEI which in the end cooperated with Sinohydro in a hands-on manner. Having 
understood that Sinohydro needed hands-on experiences to fulfil its social and 
environmental responsibilities, GEI began its fieldwork and operation in Laos in 
2009. It offered assistance to Sinohydro regarding community development and 
environmental protection. GEI signed a memorandum of cooperation with the 
Laotian branch of Sinohydro, the Nam Ngum 5 Power Company Ltd (NN5PC) in 
2010. GEI and Sinohydro shared the costs and responsibilities. Whereas GEI 
recruited and paid the biogas experts, Sinohydro was in charge the costs of 
building materials and equipment. The budget of this project is $72,100, with 
30% allocated to GEI and 70% to Sinohydro455. The purpose of Biogas was to 
bring two benefits to the affected Ban Chim. First, the construction of biogas 
pool and installation of biogas lamps solves the problem of electricity in the 
village. Second, it protects the forest by replacing the use of firewood with 
livestock manure to generate energy for cooking and heating.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
452 Guofen Han, “‘Haiwai Touzi Shichang de Tuohuangzhe-Ji Gongsi Laodong Mofan Zhong 
Haixiang’海外投资市场的拓荒者-记公司劳动模范钟海祥 [The Explorer of Overseas Market-On 
Model Colleague Zhong Haixiang],” Sinohydro Corporation, July 15, 2015. 
453 Alden and Hughes 2009.  
454 GEI officer 1, interview by author, face-to-face, August 13, 2013. 
455 Linghong Kong, “Laos’ Ban Chim Village: The First Partnership Between a Chinese NGO and a 
Chinese Company Overseas,” China Development Brief, June 5, 2012, 
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This Biogas project drew on GEI’s experiences in Sri Lanka and its 
previous experiments in Yunnan and Sichuan. GEI operated in the identified 
affected village called Ban Chim. The location of Ban Chim has strategic 
importance for Sinohydro. The Luang Prabang 413 Army is stationed in Ban 
Chim to guarantee the regional security of this hydropower plant456.  The 
stationed army also created hurdles for researchers like me to get access to the 
dam site. In Ban Chim, 49 households are estimated to lose about 50 hectares of 
rice paddy fields because of the NN5. The dam inundated the arable land of 35 
families, together with grazing land457. The local consultancy firm Dongsay 
conducted a survey among affected persons and flagged up their top three 
concerns: livestock, cash crop plantation, and non-timber forest production458. 
Another interest of Ban Chim was access to electricity. Although the 
hydropower project is aimed at generating electricity for Laotian domestic use, 
the villagers in Ban Chim cannot enjoy the electricity that is produced, because 
the village is off-grid. As a consequence, another method must be contemplated 
to solve the paradox of generating electricity for the off-grid village. The way in 
which GEI helped Ban Chim was to take advantage of livestock manure and 
make it into biogas. By transferring biogas to the off-the-grid village, the 
problem of electricity would also be solved. GEI invited biogas experts from 
                                                          
456 Mei Li, “‘Laowo Nan’e 5 Fadian Gongsi Xiezhu Dangdi Jundui Xiushan junying’老挝南俄 5 发
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Management Plan (Vol. 3) : Update of Social Action Plan,” 2007, http://www-
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China to teach villagers in Ban Chim to construct and use biofuel digesters and 
distributed instruction manual in Lao and Chinese to villagers459. 
GEI’s involvement in the NN5 project was recognised by Sinohydro in its 
official website through the rhetoric of Corporate Social Responsibility, 
particularly related to social and environmental responsibilities460. CSR has 
been used as a remedy for Chinese problems in overseas investment 
destinations461. I asked the project manager of GEI, what would happen if GEI 
had not been involved in this biogas project. He said that ‘because Sinohydro 
had close to zero experience in local community settlement, and it was 
extremely understaffed, only one part-time officer in charge of CSR-related 
matter, they would not be able to be as professional like us’462.   ‘Chinese 
experience’, in this case, ties in closely with the interests of Sinohydro, and is 
purely commercial. The nature of Sinohydro as an SOE dictated that its primary 
goal was economic profit. All these efforts are orchestrated to open the foreign 
market, establish a responsible image of for Sinohydro and maintain a long-
term partnership with the government in destination countries. Indeed, the 
manager of Nam Ngum 5 Power Company Ltd, Zhong Haixiang, negotiated with 
the Government of Laos to construct a cascade of seven dam projects along the 
most important river in Lao, the Nam Ou River, to maximise the investment 
interest of Sinohydro463. Sinohydro Corporation has a ten-year construction 
                                                          
459 GEI officer 1, interview by author, face-to-face, August 13, 2013. 
460 Sunwen Luo, “‘Laowo Nane 5 Fadian Gongsi Jiji Lvxing Shehui Zeren Bing Xiezhu Quanqiu 
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period to build a $2 billion project financed by the China Development Bank. 
The cascade of dams has an annual generating capacity of around 5000 GWh464, 
ten times the size of Nam Ngum 5. This series of seven dam projects is also 
under the build-operate-transfer model, as with the much smaller-scale Nam 
Ngum 5 project. 89 villages will be displaced465.  This is because Nam Ngum 5 
hydropower station did not involve resettlement of local residents. The ‘Chinese 
experience’ is thus more Sinohydro’s experience to operate BOT-model dam 
projects in Laos than a means of establishing rapport with local communities 
and cater to local needs. The following section explains concrete interests in 
this project.  
 
 
6.5.1 Interest dimension 
Sinohydro: The nature of Sinohydro as a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) 
dictated that its primary goal was economic profit. In the specific case of 
outward foreign investment, typified in the Nam Ngum 5 Hydropower project, 
the means to achieve economic gains lies in the international competitiveness of 
Sinohydro. There were two reasons why Sinohydro also attended to 
environmental issues: international competitiveness and the requirement from 
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).  
One of the biggest differences between the domestic and international 
business environments in which SOEs like Sinohydro operate is the importance 
                                                          
464 “Laos’ Nam Ou Cascade Hydropower Project Starts Electricity Generation,” Xinhua News, 
November 30, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-11/30/c_134866619.htm. 
465 International Rivers, “Nam Ou River,” https://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/nam-
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of CSR and its direct linkage with the profit of SOEs. In order to adapt to a 
different business environment, Sinohydro has not only tried to register under 
the Clean Development Mechanism, but also cooperated with GEI to implement 
the compensation plan in the affected Ban Chim village. All those efforts are 
orchestrated to open the foreign market, establish a responsible image for 
Sinohydro and maintain a long-term partnership with the government in the 
destination countries. 
Another reason why Sinohydro paid particular attention to the social 
and environmental impact of this hydropower station is that it requested MIGA 
to provide a political risk insurance guarantee, the first time for a Chinese SOE. 
As MIGA requires “stringent environmental and social conduct” of the 
enterprises, Sinohydro was willing to expose information about the project and 
to ask a consultancy, in this case, Dongsay Company, to collect data for the 
environmental management plan (EMP) and social action plan (SAP). 
MOFCOM: The interest of MOFCOM in the NN5 project is less direct than 
that in the Lao-China Land project. The objective of MOFCOM was to encourage 
SOEs and private enterprises to invest overseas. This could be seen from a 
series of administrative and institutional reforms carried out since the 
introduction of the “Going Global policy” in the 2000s. Those reforms cut the 
red tape in the approval process and simplified the application procedure for 
Chinese companies466. The ministerial interest of MOFCOM, in the case of Nam 
Ngum 5, was therefore to facilitate Sinohydro to open the hydraulic market in 
Laos. 
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GEI: The interest of GEI is based less on financial gain and therefore 
more political than economic. Since 2007, GEI has initiated an “integrated policy 
package” to regulate the environmental and social behaviours of Chinese 
overseas enterprises.” The NN5 project is one case study from which lessons 
and experiences could be distilled in GEI’s policy package. The most direct 
interest of GEI, in this case, was policy-oriented. Indeed, GEI’s interest was 
contingent upon its capacities to mediate between the affected villages and 
Sinohydro. On the one hand, GEI aimed to improve the livelihood of the affected 
villagers and minimise the negative impact of the dam on the forest 
ecosystems467. On the other hand, it helped Sinohydro to implement its SAP and 
therefore facilitated the construction of the NN5 hydropower station. In the 
long term, a good practice of CSR in the NN5 case should pave way for 
Sinohydro’s future investments.  
GoL: The interest of the Laotian government is energy security which is 
reflected in the national strategy to become the “battery of the region”468. Nam 
Ngum 5 Hydropower Project is part of the strategy to “develop the supply of 
electricity in the rural areas of the country” adopted by the Government of 
Laos469.  By 2020, GoL aims to electrify 90% of households, including 30% 
powered by renewable energy, 10%-12% by biofuel, and the remaining by 
imported fossil fuel. The NN5 project is a strategic project because the 
electricity generated domestically will reduce the cost of importing power from 
Vietnam. In order to facilitate the construction of the NN5 hydropower station, 
                                                          
467 Kong 2012. 
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469 Sinohydro Corporation Limited, “Nam Ngum 5 Hydropower Project: Update of 
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different ministries and levels of governments were involved. Six committees 
were established to ensure sustainable compensation and community 
development: namely, environmental management, resettlement and 
compensation, forest clearing, grievance management, district work, and village 
development. Four levels of the GoL were involved: national, provincial, district, 
and village470. 
International organisations: International environmental organisations 
functioned as a pressure group and monitoring bodies. A coalition of NGOs, 
including International Rivers and WWF, was established calling on Sinohydro 
to establish “a world-class environmental policy”. As a consequence, Sinohydro 
invited Peter Bosshard, International Rivers’ Policy Director to discuss this 
matter and Sinohydro agreed to draft an environmental policy471. Sinohydro is 
advanced in terms of environmental policies, compared to other Chinese 
SOEs472. Different from GEI, International Rivers and WWF did not implement 
groundwork such as the construction of a biogas pool in the Ban Chim village.  
Instead, they pressurised Sinohydro to make an environmental and social 
commitment in the destination country.  
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6.6 “Chinese experience” and South-South Cooperation: government, NGO, 
and SOE 
The paradox of the Chinese experience, though, was that GEI’s own 
experience reflected the inexperience of Chinese government agencies. As far as 
the Lao-China was concerned, the Department of Foreign Assistance in 
MOFCOM was unfamiliar with the innovative approach of GEI to interweave 
sustainability with foreign aid. The original idea of establishing an information 
centre received little sympathy from MOFCOM officials, so was downsized and 
simplified to the supply of hardware (a building), instead of software (a 
platform to exchange information for environmental governance). What is clear 
is that from this is that the “Chinese experience” in the Lao-China Land project 
was contested because it did not serve the interests for the MOFCOM. This 
finding suggests the irony that the government-initiated catchphrase of 
“Chinese experience” cannot be realised by the Chinese government itself.  
However, the fact that GEI used this concept to launch foreign aid policy 
is indicative of domestic group’s efforts to project an image different from that 
of MOFCOM and represents Chinese social forces who are environmentally and 
socially conscious. The “Chinese experience” engenders space for domestic 
actors to initiate and implement international cooperation because the concept 
itself is fragmented. The director of International Cooperation Office in the 
Academy of Macroeconomics Research in NDRC pinpoints concrete areas as 
testimony to Chinese experience: infrastructure; poverty reduction; scale effect 
during industrialisation; and cautious attitudes towards environmental issues. 
However, the defining feature of the Chinese experience is it must factor in 
other countries’ local conditions so as to be adapted to other countries, in other 
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words, the “Chinese experience” is a suggestion that every country must “cross 
the river by feeling the stones”, a rhetoric for trial and error473.  
Behind the usage of the idea of Chinese experience is the common 
practice of the coalition between SOEs and ruling elites in the destination 
countries. Dauvergne observes that “both domestic and foreign firms continue 
to rely on networks of state and local allies to skirt regulations”474.  The 
“Chinese experience”, as something to share between foreign company and the 
local ruling elites, justifies the profit-driven operation of Chinese SOEs and 
dilutes the fact of the purely commercial activity. The Chinese experience, 
contemplated by GEI, is sustainable land management and environmental 
legislation to ensure it. GEI’s experience creates a hurdle for SOEs like 
Sinohydro because the environmental regulations will deprive the opportunity 
for Chinese companies to work secretly with the local government and profit 
from lax environmental regulation. Hence, SOEs’ Chinese experience to build 
dams overrides GEI’s “Chinese experience” to pressure the government into 
sustainable land management.   
Under the concept of “Chinese experience”, three elements are identified 
in the abovementioned analysis: information, market, and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). Both MOFCOM and GEI agreed that the collection of 
information was to serve Chinese companies investing overseas. For example, 
Ms Jin Jiaman from GEI argued one of the biggest problems for Chinese 
companies investing on foreign territory was information asymmetry. The Lao-
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China Land project involved the Chinese government in the very beginning of 
collecting information about natural resources in Laos. The benefit of this 
approach was to transmit the information to Chinese enterprises and hence 
circumvent potential environmental risks. In the Lao-China project case, the 
relevance of information to foreign aid was contested. But as we proceed to the 
NN5 Biogas project later, what is more critical is the conflict between 
information and the private interest. In other words, the information collected 
in the Lao-China Land project may create a hurdle for the SOE to pursue its 
private interest.  
The market was the common ground for GEI and MOFCOM. GEI’s 
approach was to use the market mechanism to promote environmental 
protection in developing countries. Though the very idea of market mechanisms 
is not native to China, the insistence of economic development against the 
backdrop of rising environmental awareness is shared by various political 
players in China. The question, however, is who the market is supposed to serve? 
Even though both GEI and MOFCOM agreed that foreign aid helped Chinese 
companies’ future investment by opening foreign markets, their targeted 
industries differed. The biggest benefactor of GEI’s proposal is the timber 
industry because the information collected is concerned with the distribution of 
natural resources, forestry in particular, and the planning of conservation areas 
which would enlighten the selection of locations by Chinese timber enterprises. 
MOFCOM’s major concerns were construction industries, however. As one 
officer in MOFCOM articulated clearly, the Western countries have occupied 
their territory by means of colonialism, and Chinese companies as latecomers 
must give destination countries foreign aid to open the market. Infrastructure 
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was seen as a good showcase industry and a way to exhibit the advanced 
technology and low cost of Chinese-invested projects. As a result, it is a 
convenient way to use the infrastructure industry to open the market. 
CSR is particularly relevant in Chinese overseas investment in 
developing countries because of the insufficient environmental and social 
regulations in the destination countries. In developed countries, the strict 
environmental regulations raise the threshold of Chinese investment. Once 
Chinese enterprises are allowed to invest in developed countries, they are 
protected by local laws. In contrast, it is easier for Chinese enterprises to invest 
in developing countries. However, Chinese companies are vulnerable to political, 
environmental and social risks. As a consequence, practicing CSR is a way for 
Chinese companies to minimise the risks of investing in developing countries.   
CSR is firstly deployed to link Chinese enterprises with the national 
image of the PRC. There is a consensus among Chinese officials, NGO groups, 
and Chinese enterprises’ representatives that negative reports of any specific 
Chinese overseas investment tarnish the image of China as a country. In this 
sense, Chinese enterprises are regarded as Chinese ambassadors475. Based on 
the image of Chinese enterprises as ambassadors, CSR is further employed as a 
tool to exert pressure on SOEs and also for NGOs to play a part in Chinese 
overseas investment. Operating in the international business environment, 
SOEs are monitored by international organisations and foreign political groups. 
This is different from the domestic business environment in China where the 
local government protects, not pressurises, SOEs.  
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The role of Chinese NGOs, therefore, is to facilitate SOE’s entrance into a 
foreign market and demonstrate good practice. In the NN5 case, there was only 
one part-time member of staff attending to CSR-related matters, 
incommensurate with the ambition of social and environmental management as 
listed in the EMP and SAP. GEI offered hands-on practice in the biogas project to 
implement the commitment of Sinohydro in the NN5. Since the NN5 project, the 
CSR team was established and equipped with over twenty staff.  
 
 
6.6.1 Logrolling 
Two alliances are identified in the logrolling process, one between 
Sinohydro and GEI, and the other between international organisations and GEI. 
Sinohydro employed human power and hands-on experience of GEI to establish 
a good corporate image. Sinohydro needed assistance from GEI because it 
lacked experience, manpower and capacity. Outsourcing the biogas project in 
Ban Chim village to GEI established a good and detailed example of how to fulfil 
CSR and improve the livelihood of local communities. In exchange, GEI got an 
opportunity to directly operate in the NN5 project. The experience and lessons 
drawn from this case study were included in GEI’s “integrated policy package”, 
aimed to inform the environmental policy of Chinese overseas investment. 
Indeed, the NN5 case was included in the GEI publication Going Global: the 
Environmental and Social Challenges of China’s Investment, Trade and Aid 
Abroad476.  
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Another alliance is between GEI and International Rivers. Both shared 
the belief that Chinese enterprises had responsibility for local community and 
the ecosystem in the destination country. International Rivers functioned as a 
pressure group and used the strategy of name and shame to raise Sinohydro’s 
awareness of the environmental and social consequences of their overseas 
investment.  Differently, GEI portrayed itself in the NN5 project as a service 
provider to Sinohydro. If International Rivers pressurised Sinohydro to make 
commitments, GEI’s role was to fulfil them via hands-on project management. 
GEI sent experts to teach Ban Chim villagers how to use biogas and how to build 
biogas digesters. It printed leaflets, both in Chinese and Laotian, to disseminate 
knowledge in the deprived mountainous region in northern Laos.  
The communication between GEI, the GoL and Ban Chim villagers 
remained unclear due to the language barrier as well as a lack of information. 
But broadly, the promotion of biofuel technology fitted the overall national 
energy strategy to safeguard energy security. Villagers in Ban Chim got free 
biogas digesters and learnt how to use them. According to GEI officer, the biogas 
project made life a lot easier for the Ban Chim villagers477. In the Biogas project, 
each interested party got what it wanted. The outcome was to use CSR to 
expand the business of Sinohydro in Laos. However, what is implied in GEI’s 
operations in Laos from 2008 to 2011?  
The contrast between the aborted Lao-China Land project and the 
praised Biogas project in the NN5 case raised two question: what is the role of 
GEI in foreign aid and foreign investment and whose interest is served under 
the strategic concept of the Chinese experience? The above analyses of these 
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two cases demonstrated that GEI as a Chinese NGO could play a part in assisting 
SOEs with the implementation of CSR. However, GEI’s efforts to initiate a 
government-to-government cooperation of sustainable development were 
rendered in vain by MOFCOM.  There is, therefore, a discursive hierarchy within 
the elements entailed in SSC, resulting from the relationship between foreign 
aid and foreign investment.  
Foreign aid projects are aimed to clear barriers to Chinese companies’ 
overseas investment. These barriers include Chinese companies being a late 
comer in the foreign market, the lack of international competitiveness of 
Chinese companies, and the standards set by developed countries which limit 
the scope of the economic activities of Chinese companies. In addition, 
hydropower companies like Sinohydro are “young in a commercial sense when 
compared to the centenarian oil and gas industries”478. Therefore, foreign aid 
projects are expected to be a model project demonstrating the capabilities and 
professional practice of Chinese companies as well as their low cost.  In foreign 
aid projects, the recipient countries use the standards (e.g. technology) set by 
China and have a chance to compare the cost-benefit between China and 
Western countries. By showcasing that Chinese companies are capable and not 
as expensive as Western companies, the former could sell Chinese standards 
and win the trust of the destination countries479.  
The relationship between foreign aid and foreign investment further 
sheds light on what SSC entails. Four discursive elements in SSC are identified in 
this chapter: Chinese experience, information, market, and CSR. Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                                    
477 Kong 2012. 
478 Dent 2012, p.567. 
479 Ministry of Commerce official 2, interview by author, face-to-face, July 27, 2015. 
250 
 
experience, as frequently referred to by GEI in the Lao-China project, was 
contested. MOFCOM dismissed the very notion of a Chinese experience because 
the proposed project was not conventional, or in other words, MOFCOM had 
almost no experience in implementing a project of this kind. However, GEI 
perceived itself as having experiences as it had successfully launched another 
overseas project in Sri Lanka back in 2005. The experience of GEI includes how, 
as a Chinese NGO, it could operate overseas and establish a partnership with 
foreign governments. This is a powerful leverage for GEI to convince MOFCOM 
and the GoL of its capability and relevance to foreign aid projects. In sum, the 
Chinese experience serves the interest of GEI, but not that of MOFCOM. 
However, in the Biogas project, the Chinese experience served the interests of 
Sinohydro. It lowered the costs of Sinohydro to try a new project, even though it 
had little experience in community development in the destination country. 
Once the Chinese experience is translated into concrete value, it thus becomes 
an enabling factor. In other words, the reason why the Biogas project was 
successfully implemented was because the Chinese experience was where the 
interests of Sinohydro and GEI converged.  
The discursive element of information is another disputed notion. 
Particularly when the information which benefits one project does not 
necessarily benefit the other. The Lao-China Land project was aimed at 
collecting information to serve the interests of the timber industry in China. GEI 
identified that information was the solution to the problem of illegal logging, 
and therefore, proposed to assist the Laotian government to survey the national 
land and natural resources. However, the primary concern of illegal logging was 
not the focus of MOFCOM. Furthermore, as illustrated in the NN5 project, the 
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information collected about the land and natural resources in Laos might create 
inconvenience for the hydropower industry. As International Rivers criticised, 
the EIA of the NN5 did not address the cumulative impacts of a cascade of dams 
(NN5 being one of them) on the environment. In fact, in the Validation Report 
submitted for the CDM application, the validator insisted that cumulative 
impact was not worth serious consideration480. It would be both an irony and 
embarrassment if the information collected in the Lao-China Land project 
sponsored by MOFCOM suggests that a series of Chinese-invested dams prior to 
the NN5 will aggregately generate negative impacts on the ecosystem and 
biodiversity in Laos. The safest option for MOFCOM was, as it did, to abort the 
inconvenient Lao-China Land project.   
The above two elements, Chinese experience and information, are 
riddled with controversy. In contrast, the notions of the market and CSR were 
comparatively well-received. As explained earlier, for both MOFCOM and 
Chinese companies, the very idea of foreign aid is to gain access to the foreign 
market. As far as GEI is concerned, the mission of this social organisation was to 
provide market-based solutions to solve environmental problems. In the Lao-
China land project, the revised grant proposal, as explained earlier, changed the 
focus of information to that of a “land use rights exchange market”. The market 
is where the interests of MOFCOM and GEI converge in the Lao-China Land 
project.   
The fact that there is an emerging consensus on the importance of CSR 
poses an interest alliance between SOEs and environmental organisations like 
                                                          
480 Tania Lee, “Request for the CDM Executive Board to Review the Project 9038: Nam Ngum 5,” 
CDM: Form for Submission of “A Letter to the Board” (International Rivers, February 8, 2012), 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/cdm_intlrivers_project9038.pdf. 
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GEI. On the one hand, the social and environmental responsibility emphasised 
in CSR pushes the enterprises to cooperate with environmental organisations, 
particularly when SOEs are in the early stage of establishing a CSR team and 
implementing CSR commitments. SOEs operating inside China rely on the 
Chinese government to deal with issues such as resettlement and compensation. 
Automatically, they replicate the way they conducted business domestically to 
overseas. This invites criticisms from international monitoring bodies. 
Moreover, the reliance on the government backfires if there is regime change. 
One example of this is the suspension of the Myitsone dam in Myanmar. The 
change of government renders government-business ties vulnerable and costly. 
As a consequence, SOEs must learn how to implement CSR commitments 
without overreliance on the government.  The neutrality and capability of GEI 
helped SOEs with CSR and in the long term the economic interest. In turn, GEI 
secured its political interests.  
In sum, what SSC entails in these two projects is defined by the market 
and CSR than by the Chinese experience and access to information. This serves 
the interest of MOFCOM and SOEs. As for GEI, its political interest is empowered 
in some respects and constrained in others by forging a partnership with the 
government of the destination country and Chinese SOEs.   
 
 
6.7 China (in)experience and the Economic and Political Implication 
In regards to these two cases, we see that ‘Chinese experience’ is 
predominantly economic, rather than political and is only remotely related to 
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environmental protection.  Both the Ministry of Commerce and Sinohydro 
present themselves in the identity of businessmen, and have the perception that 
economic interest is national interest. However, this not only undermines the 
very essence of South-South Cooperation and replicates the Northern practice, 
but devalues the ‘Chinese experience’ which covers more than economic 
dimension. I interviewed the national technical advisor of foreign aid in Laos, Dr 
Khennevong481, asking him what the Government of Laos wishes to learn from 
‘Chinese experience’. He said:  
One thing from my research and my work experience with the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment is that the Government of Laos wants to learn from 
China how to be a one-party state that manages the market-oriented economy. 
Whether it is successful or not is something else. What the government (of Laos) 
wants to prove to the world is that you do not need a multi-party country to 
manage its economy. The Lao government is strongly committed to managing a 
one-party state and meanwhile opening its economy. The government believes 
that Laos is a small country and it does not need a multi-party system. Look at 
China, with billions of people it can still manage.  
 
This quote leads us to unpack the question of the ‘Chinese experience’ of 
what?  For GEI, ‘Chinese experience’ seeks to use a market mechanism to solve 
environmental problems and influence policy-making in the current political 
system. This is linked with Chinese political actors’ ability to adapt what is 
learned from the Northern countries to China, seek a path suitable for China and 
other developing countries, and develop a policy package which can be applied 
to countries with similar problems with China. It is geared towards problem-
solving and policy formulation. In contrast, for the Ministry of Commerce, 
‘Chinese experience’ is a way to open foreign markets. It is more about other 
countries experiencing China’s foreign aid and consequently helping Chinese 
enterprises invest overseas. The insistence on the tied aid approach to tackling 
                                                          
481 Phanthanousone Khennavong, interview by author, face-to-face, March 30, 2016. 
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the problem of the disadvantage of Chinese companies due to lack of experience 
is illustrated by one official from the Ministry of Commerce who stated482: 
Western countries who have colonised recipient countries have developed a lot 
of experiences and have a strong presence in those countries. Host countries 
use the standards of Western countries which created hurdles for Chinese 
enterprises for purely commercial projects. Foreign aid helped Chinese 
companies to open the market by giving them something free. When the host 
countries experience cooperation with Chinese companies and realise that the 
quality is as good as that of Europe, then the market is wide open to Chinese 
investors.  
 
As far as Sinohydro is concerned, ‘Chinese experience’ justifies its further 
overseas investment and facilitates long-term partnership with local 
government, creating a stable environment to generate profit.  
All the jigsaws put together establish ‘China’s inexperience’ in South-
South Cooperation. GEI having and advocating ‘Chinese experience’ is excluded 
from making a contribution to South-South foreign aid project. The Ministry of 
Commerce, the major body supervising and approving South-South project, is 
not interested in the ‘Chinese experience’. Sinohydro takes an instrumental 
approach to this ill-defined notion to maximise its benefits. This Chinese 
inexperience, together with the big scale of influx of Chinese workers and 
Chinese funding is impregnated with political and diplomatic ramifications. At 
the beginning of 2016, three cases of Chinese citizens being attacked in Laos 
drew attention from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, because this is highly 
unusual in “politically-stable Laos”. However, the spokesperson denied that 
Chinese citizens were the target of attack483. Zhu Zhenming, an expert on 
                                                          
482 Ministry of Commerce official 2, interview by author, face-to-face, July 27, 2015. 
483 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Waijiaobu Fayanren Hua Chunying Zhuchi Lixing Jizhehui 外交
部发言人华春莹主持理性记者会[Spokersperson of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hua Chunying 
Hosts Routine Press Conference],” March 24, 2016, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1350452.shtml. 
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Southeast Asia, does not rule out the possible scenario that local residents 
become dissatisfied with Chinese rapid and upscale investments in Laos484. 
Coincidentally, one of the incidents took place in a logging camp located in the 
same county as Ban Chim.  
The reality of the ‘Chinese inexperience’ largely results from the 
domestic structure, the limited space of social organisations in the domestic 
domain cast a default limit to their ambitions and creative project overseas. 
Moreover, experiences of different political players are not abstracted to a 
model or a policy toolkit which can be emulated by other developing countries. 
Each ministry has its own experience and preference. Without coordination, the 
more projects Chinese political players conduct, the more fragmented ‘Chinese 
experience’ is.  
 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
The discussion of the ‘Chinese experience’ reveals that the sphere of 
environmental foreign relations is fragmented as the stage is shared by a 
plurality of actors which convey different national images to the international 
community. The increasingly salient notion in South-South Cooperation 
epitomises the ambition of various Chinese groups to prove the capabilities and 
intentions of Southern countries to influence the world order, and also suggests 
the potential of China to take up the leadership role. The binary between the 
                                                          
484 Ou Yang and Wang Zhang, “Zhongguo Gongmin Zai Laowo Zao Qiangji Waijiaobu:yi Tichu 
Jiaoshe Yaoqiu Yancheng Xiongshou 中国公民在老挝遭枪击外交部已提出交涉要求严惩凶手 
[Chinese Citizens Were Attacked in Laos, MOFA Urges to Severely Punish Criminals],” Global 
Times, March 25, 2016, http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2016-03/8767721.html. 
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North and South is less relevant than the dichotomy between the state and 
society as the “Chinese experience” comprises and absorbs the best practices 
from the developed world. Both projects have traces of Northern practice, the 
Lao-China Land project modelling upon the Sino-Japan Friendship 
Environmental Protection Centre and the biogas project working on the 
northern concept of corporate social responsibilities. The binary between state 
and society is particularly visible regarding the question of ‘whose experience’ 
matter in the rhetoric of ‘Chinese experience’. It seems, from the case studies 
that ministerial experience and even inexperience is more important than the 
experience of social organisations, no matter how relevant the latter is to the 
national strategy. The binary between the SOE and social organisation is less 
distinct, as the latter functions as a service provider to the former, facilitating 
the commercial interests of Chinese SOEs investing overseas.  
This finding suggests that SSC projects were dominated by economic 
concerns, despite the fact that both of the analysed projects appeared to pay 
some attention to environmental concerns which are aimed to achieve 
diplomatic objectives. The comparison of these two case studies challenges the 
very assumption that South-South Cooperation is a pre-requisite for building an 
environmentally-friendly society as SSC is not fundamentally different from the 
collaboration between the South and the North. The logic chain between South-
South cooperation and sustainability is weak and requires a more careful 
exploration of how sustainability can fix the uneven power distribution 
between developed and developing countries. Only where environmental 
protection is attached to the concrete interests of certain powerful domestic 
groups can South-South Cooperation transcend the deadlock experienced in the 
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North-South Cooperation: the pressing need of economic development and the 
equally pressing call to solve the environmental crisis. 
The two SSC projects further confirm the limitations of institutions in 
terms of reflecting and coalescing various interests of domestic groups. For 
instance, GEI circumvents official procedures for approving foreign aid projects 
with the assistance of its interpersonal network in the Lao-China Land case.  
The collaboration between GEI and Sinohydro reveals that the institutional 
setup of CSR did not exist until GEI intervened in the overseas project. The 
Chinese experience, in general, is weakly institutionalised primarily because it 
is open to various interpretations.  
 The consequence of this weak institutionalisation is the ability of 
interest groups to shape the focus of SSC, thus highlingting the importance of 
identity and strategic concepts in decision-making. Both GEI projects lean 
towards economic logic rather than environmental concerns for two reasons. 
First, SSC-related affairs are allocated under MOFCOM, particularly foreign aid 
and foreign assistance. The focus of MOFCOM is intrinsically about commerce 
and trade. It is neither in the expertise nor in the interest of MOFCOM to 
represent environmental interests in overseas business projects. The 
monopolisation of MOFCOM in SSC is changing, however. In 2014, the Chinese 
government intended to establish a South-South Fund to deal with climate 
change, as confirmed by the vice-chair of the National Development and Reform 
Commission485.  In 2015, President Xi Jinping announced that the Chinese 
government would allocate $3.1 billion to establish a Climate Change SSC Fund 
                                                          
485 Qin Liu, “How NGOs Can Help Chinese Firms Do Better Overseas,” China Dialogue, September 
5, 2014, https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/7292-How-NGOs-can-help-
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and, furthermore, a centre to share the experiences of countries486.  This change 
may be indicative of the beginning of setting up an institutional infrastructure 
to effectively rationalise and integrate domestic preferences.  
The second reason why identity becomes a mechanism to represent 
domestic interests is linked to the semiotic aspect of “experience” which tends 
to be idiosyncratic.    The question of whose ‘experience’ matters depends on 
the preferences and interests of related domestic groups. As Lancaster points 
out, many vested interest groups in China are ‘involved in the existing aid 
system which is one reason why such systems throughout the world have 
usually proven hard to change in fundamental ways’487. Hence, understanding 
how different domestic interest groups work under the South-South 
Cooperation framework to obtain their parochial interests is one direction for 
the research community.  
The different identities of GEI explain why it failed in the foreign aid 
project but succeeded in the foreign investment one. The Lao-China Land 
Project positions GEI as a globalist player which uses the Chinese government’s 
ambition to become a leader to protect the environment in Laos. In contrast, the 
collaboration between GEI and Sinohydro depicts the former as a trustworthy 
Chinese social organisation which facilitates the overseas expansion of the 
business of a Chinese SOE. Although GEI attempted to persuade the officials in 
MOFCOM that the land project would eventually benefit the Chinese timber 
industry, the bureaucratic mind-set and the practice of routine fail to reflect this 
novel representation and approach to foreign aid. However, the creative 
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suggestion of GEI is adopted by Sinohydro in the NN5 dam construction. The 
differing results suggest that GEI’s experience is filtered through its identity 
which further designates specific experience to SOE’s business interests.   
The constructivist utilitarianist approach to SSC points to the question of 
how to reconcile Chinese NGOs’ identity and efficiently incorporate their 
experiences to the broad notion of the Chinese experience. It seems that GEI 
might be a bridge to channel the demands of the Lao government and the 
supply of the Chinese government. Furthermore, GEI represents a very different 
and unique identity from the Chinese government agency. In the eyes of 
destination country players, Chinese NGOs may be more neutral and 
professional than the Chinese government, yet more knowledgeable of the 
Chinese situation compared to their Western counterparts.  Most importantly, 
GEI as an environmental NGO can effectively mediate the developmental issue 
and environmental concerns.  The incorporation of societal actors’ interest 
requires not only institutional recognition, but more importantly, the 
acceptance of their unique identities.    
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Chapter 7 Composite Ideology of Ecological Civilisation and 
interest re-grouping through norm-setting 
 
 
7.1 Main argument 
This chapter examines the role of domestic groups in China’s engagement in 
international environmental cooperation from the perspective of norm-setting. 
In global environmental governance, China has been a follower and a “student” 
trying to benefit from foreign funding and the latest technology as well as being 
expected to fulfil its commitments such as cutting carbon emissions and 
enforcing environmental regulations. The notion of “ecological civilisation” 
(eco-civilisation) appears to challenge the liberal environmentalism in the 
global environmental governance. Furthermore, China’s interest in norms 
development and promotion indicate that it is taking a proactive role in the 
international system488. Eco-civilisation contains elements of environmental 
diplomacy and the Chinese experience which are discussed in the previous two 
chapters, and furthermore, it foregrounds the “Chinese-ness” in the discourse. It 
is regarded as a composite ideology and interest groups compete for its 
interpretation so as to make this ideology in favour of their respective interests. 
The proposal of eco-civilisation reflects interest-regrouping and the rise of 
weak interest groups. In this chapter, interest groups are MEP, leftist 
intellectuals, and economically backward provinces.  
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7.2 Context and Structure of the chapter 
China remains low-profile until a notion which appears to be 
distinctively Chinese, albeit vaguely-defined, draws the attention from the 
international society: ecological civilisation (shengtai wenming生态文明), or 
eco-civilisation for short489. Eco-civilisation was officially introduced in 2007 by 
the then president, Hu Jintao, in the Seventeenth Communist Party of China 
(CPC) Congress report in the section of “new requirement to realise a well-off 
society”490. Furthermore, in the Eighteenth CPC Congress, in 2012, the Party 
Constitution was revised and one noticeable revision was the inclusion of “eco-
civilisation”. This marked its elevation to a prominent place in the overall 
blueprint of “the cause of Socialism with Chinese characteristics”, together with 
the goals of economic, political, cultural and social development491. 
This promotion of eco-civilisation signals “a peak” of the Party’s rhetoric 
on environmental issues, and reflects changing attitudes of the ruling elites 
towards environmental problems492. The first environmental slogan which was 
agreed at the first environmental protection conference in 1973 called for 
“overall and rational planning, reduction of harm, a reliance on the masses, and 
the task to protect the environment and enrich the people”493. A decade later, 
environmental protection was confirmed as a basic national policy. The catch 
                                                          
489 Sam Geall, “Interpreting Ecological Civilisation (part One),” China Dialogue, July 6, 2015, 
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phrase in the 1990s was “sustainable development”, as highlighted by the ninth 
Five Year Plan (FYP) which was confirmed sustainable as a national 
development strategy. The new millennium saw an ever-growing vocabulary of 
green discourses such as the “circular economy” (2003), green GDP (2003), the 
“resource-conserving and environmentally-friendly society” (2005), and a low 
carbon economy (2010). The notion of eco-civilisation appears to be an 
encompassing ideology which aims to integrate all of these existing approaches 
to environmental protection within an overall green discourse.  
The emphasis on eco-civilisation sends two signals, primarily to 
domestic and the other to international audiences. For domestic purposes, it is a 
signal that the Party Central and those in the high echelon are determined to 
ameliorate environmental crisis by defining environmental protection in a 
decidedly political frame, which ties the fate of the ruling party with the 
achievement of eco-civilisation. As far as the international audience is 
concerned, the Chinese government attempts to respond to the expectation 
from the international society of its contribution to global environmental 
governance. Furthermore, the hope projected on eco-civilisation is to reverse 
the negative images of China perceived by the international community. This 
point was made quite vividly by one of my interviewees, who talked of the 
change from China as a “bad boy” to a “responsible power”494. The attention of 
building a good image for China is a top priority of foreign policy strategy under 
the leadership of Xi Jinping495.  
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Whereas the signal is there, however, the message is intentionally vague. 
Since the concept was proposed in 2007, the most commonly asked question is 
still “what does ecological civilisation mean”496? Meanwhile, domestic groups 
have started promoting this concept to the outside world, including ministries, 
the academic community, and municipal governments. This kind of external 
promotion started to occur even before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lists eco-
civilisation on its agenda, not to mention the development of a coherent stance 
on norm-setting in global environmental governance497.  This leads to a 
situation in which domestic debates on a catchphrase of eco-civilisation have an 
impact on the international community and non-traditional diplomatic actors 
start to promote a Chinese norm before a domestic consensus is arrived at. 
Furthermore, the promotion of eco-civilisation provides an illuminating case 
study to understand the question of the rationale of domestic actors to engage 
in international environmental cooperation, in the absence of international 
pressure. It has the potential to bring new light to the debate of to what degree 
international pressure or domestic drives provide a sound explanation of the 
decision to cooperate.  
This chapter explores such questions by looking at why certain domestic 
groups are motivated to promote the political slogan to the outside world and 
how their efforts influence China’s engagement in international environmental 
cooperation. It first examines eco-civilisation through the lens of a composite 
ideology which engenders opportunities for different groups to deploy for their 
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own purposes. The second part uses three case studies for a close look at the 
interest, resources, and strategies for concerned groups. The findings suggest 
that norm promotion is a by-product of domestic groups competing for political 
and economic resources. Lastly, the chapter attempts to address the question of 
the effectiveness of domestic groups’ efforts to promote a norm to the 
international audience.  
 
 
7.3 Ecological Civilisation as a Composite Ideology 
Over the course of my fieldwork, I have explored the very question of 
whether ecological civilisation is a contested ideology. On the one hand, a 
Chinese academic I interviewed –a leading expert in eco-civilisation in Peking 
University-asserts that eco-civilisation is an ideology to justify the legitimacy of 
the current leadership and the ruling party498; on the other hand, an official 
from Ministry of Environmental Protection insists that “regarding eco-
civilisation as an ideology only ruins this idea” because it provides fertile soil 
for the growth of the conspiracy theory that China has the ambition to export its 
civilisation and ideology to the outside world499. The very debate revolving 
around whether eco-civilisation is an ideology does, ironically, verify that the 
political slogan of eco-civilisation is, on many fronts, an ideology, more so, if we 
examine this concept against the features of “composite ideology” discussed in 
the theory chapter.  
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Briefly recalling what is discussed in Chapter 2, a composite ideology is a 
“congeries of ideas connected to each other to form what are purported (usually 
wrongly) to be logically coherent intellectual wholes”500. Smith identifies five 
characteristics of a composite ideology.  The first two commonplaces of a 
composite ideology are a loose logical connection and a circular pattern of 
reasoning and justification. The constituent ideas within a composite ideology 
“were originally independent of each other”501 but supported each other to the 
extent that the ideology as an intellectual whole is insulated from external 
evidence and takes on a life of its own.   
The essential conflict eco-civilisation aims to address is between 
economic growth development and environmental protection and this conflict 
is reinterpreted in the rhetoric of eco-civilisation as a harmonious coexistence. 
This can be seen in a defining policy document of eco-civilisation is “Opinions of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council 
on Further Promoting the Development of Ecological Civilisation” (or “the 
Opinions”) introduced in 2015 which “systematically addresses the obstacles to 
effective policy by setting out standards, mechanisms and assessments”502 and 
moreover, provides a timetable and roadmap to implement eco-civilisation503. 
Included under the banner of eco-civilisation are the national policies of 
“resource conservation and environmental protection”, “green, circular, and 
low-carbon development”, “ecological culture”, “green lifestyle”, and “beautiful 
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China”504. The conceptual hierarchy within eco-civilisation is listed in the “basic 
principle” section: “resource conservation and environmental protection” is the 
guideline which is realised by the means of “green, circular, and low-carbon 
development”, motivated by “deeper reform and innovation” with a combined 
efforts of the market and the state, and supported by ecological culture which 
incorporates eco-civilisation into the Socialist core value system. This narrative 
is a discursive compromise in which both environmental protection and 
economic development are priorities that can mutually benefit each other over 
the course of constructing eco-civilisation.  
This assumption of a co-existence of economic growth and 
environmental protection leads to the third and fourth features of a composite 
ideology: usage of simplistic ideas and the effect of displacement. The 
simplification of originally complicated ideas is aimed to achieve the “low 
common denominator of understanding” to produce “clear-cut, simple 
diagnoses of what is wrong with society and how, in straightforward, pragmatic 
terms, things can be changed” 505.  To make the simplistic ideas convincing is to 
distract the audience’s attention to another time or other places. Smith refers to 
imperialist displacement as a geographic focus which justified overseas colonies 
in the Nazi imperialism ideology. The displacement regarding eco-civilisation is, 
however, cognitive, reflected in the salience of traditional Chinese culture which 
is another important rhetoric constituent of eco-civilisation. The upshot of this 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Development of Ecological Civilization’],” May 6, 2015, 
http://money.163.com/15/0506/10/AOU6L8UB00253B0H.html. 
504 State Council, “Zhonggongzhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiakuai Tuijin Shengtai Wenming 
Jianshe de Yijian”中共中央国务院关于加快推进生态文明建设的意见 [Opinions of the Central 
Committee of CCP and the State Council on Accelerating the Promotion of Ecological Civilisation, 
2015, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2015-05/06/nw.D110000renmrb_20150506_3-
01.htm. 
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cognitive displacement is a reframing of the environmental problem through 
the lens of culture, which not only legitimates a culturally-specific solution but 
also establishes a culturally-rooted confidence in the ruling party to manage the 
environmental crisis. 
The way Chinese culture is treated in eco-civilisation echoes the third 
and fourth features of a composite ideology. The cultural essence of eco-
civilisation has changed from being the unity between human beings and nature 
(tianrenheyi 天人合一) to the so-called “two mountains theory” (Liangshan lun
两山论) advocated by Xi Jinping. “Tianrenheyi”, as a version of Confucian 
thought, has been widely discussed and debated. The linkage between 
“tianrenheyi” and eco-civilisation is made manifest in the political discussion by 
Pan Yue in his article “Eco-Civilisation will Promote the Construction of 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”506.  Yet, different interpretations of this 
Confucian thought lead to a contradictory conclusion regarding the relationship 
between “tianrenheyi” and effective environmental governance.  
Li Zehou, a reputed Chinese Marxist philosopher, applies this ancient 
philosophy in the context of an industrialising China. He equates tianrenheyi 
with humanisation in the Marxist language. He predicts that tianrenheyi fits the 
era of post-industrialisation in which nature is restored and protected with the 
advancement of material civilisation507. Li Zehou’s understanding of tianrenheyi 
through the lens of Marxism links this ancient wisdom with morality to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
505Smith, p.15.  
506 Yue 岳 Pan 潘, “‘Shengtai Wenming Jiang Cujin Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi jianshe’生态文
明将促进中国特色社会主义建设[Eco-Civilisation Will Promote the Construction of Socialism 
with Chinese Characteristics],” Xinhua News Agency Outlook Weekly, October 22, 2007. 
507 Zehou 泽厚 Li 李, “Zhongguo Gudai sixiangshi”中国古代思想史[History of Chinese Ancient 
History] (Beijing: People’s Press, 1985), p.321. 
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manufacture a global image of this Confucian state as a moral power in terms of 
environmental protection.  However, one cannot take the connection between 
tianrenheyi and environmental government as granted. The Nobel Peace Prize 
laureate Liu Xiaobo contends that tianrenheyi and environmental protection is 
of fundamental contradictions508. Liu criticises Li Zehou’s far-fetched efforts to 
revitalise Chinese tradition with Marxism and ignores the close tie between 
tianrenheyi and the endorsement of the feudal society. Liu insists that 
tianrenheyi requires an absolute obedience to nature and generates an over 
reliance of ancient Chinese on emperors. Modern environmentalism 
acknowledges that human beings are separate from nature, and recognise the 
conflicts between human beings and their environs. Consequently, 
environmentalism advocates a thorough understanding of nature and explores 
how nature can benefit the survival of human beings. Tianrenheyi, on the other 
hand, cultivates passive Chinese incapable of facing the challenges from nature. 
Locating Liu’s argument to environmental pollution in current China, this 
passivity of Chinese is not a solution to but a problem of environmental crisis.  
The intellectual debate among two greatest thinkers in the contemporary China 
indicates that ancient wisdom is usually massaged to fit the political agenda and 
each interpretation is more political than cultural.  
A further simplification of the cultural dimension in eco-civilisation is Xi 
Jinping’s two mountains theory translated as “lucid waters and lush mountains 
are invaluable assets”, employing the images of “golden and silver mountains” 
and “green mountains” in the original Chinese phrase to convey the belief that 
                                                          
508 Xiaobo 晓波 Liu 刘, “Xuanze de Pipan:yu Sixiang Lingxiu Li Zehou de duihua”选择的批判：与
思想领袖李泽厚的对话[Criticism of the Choice: Dialogues with Li Zehou] (Taipei: East Books, 
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economy and the environment can harmoniously coexist and that a good 
environment can be translated into an economic advantage509. The two 
mountain theory is quickly echoed in the academic community, and by local 
governors, entrepreneurs, and other domestic political actors.  
The last characteristic of a composite ideology is that it is oriented 
towards action. The relationship between action and ideology is symbiotic in 
that ideas justify actions, and actions further legitimate ideas. In other words, 
the action is both a means and an end for political ideology. Eco-civilisation calls 
for local governments to explore a new development path and encourages 
demonstration zones to generate a template of eco-civilisation guided growth. 
In this respect it is significant that the name of such zones changes from 
“Ecology demonstration zone” (shengtai shifanqu生态示范区) in 1995 to echo 
the national strategy of sustainable development at that time, through “ecology 
construction demonstration zone” (shengtai jianshe shifanqu 生态建设示范
区)in 2009, to “ecological civilisation construction demonstration zone” 
(shengtai wenming jianshe shifanqu 生态文明建设示范区) approved by the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1987), p.229. 
 
509 Xi Jinping has deployed this phrase when he was the governor of Zhejiang province. This can 
be seen in the book zhijiang xinyu, which compiles 232 short speeches of Xi Jinping in Zhejiang 
Daily. Xi first uses this phrase in 2003, which was not linked to ecological civilisation at all, to 
argue that environmental protection relies on voluntary behaviours . The more relevant article 
was written in 2005 using exactly the same phrase. In this article, Xi suggests that it is possible 
to make “green waters and mountains” into “gold and silver mountains”. In other words, the 
environmental and ecological advantage can be translated into eco-agriculture, eco-industry, 
and eco-tourism. Consequently, natural resources can generate fortune for provincial 
governments such as Zhejiang. He further links this rhetoric to “scientific outlook on 
development” in two of his articles written in 2006. He explains that this rhetoric reflects the 
transformation of economy growth mode. “The ‘two mountains’ theory is an ecological culture 
and a concept of development”. See Jinping Xi, “Zhijiang xinyu”之江新语[Zhijiang Comments] 
(Zhejiang People‘s Publishing House, 2007), p.21, p.148, p.174, p.202. 
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Party Central in 2013 to implement ecological civilisation510 . This zonal 
dimension of eco-civilisation reflects the cluster effect which is a strategy 
deployed in developmental states in East Asia, including China511. 
In addition to such changes, the associated demonstration projects are 
fragmented and ministries have overlapping responsibilities and functions. 
Although the Ministry of Environmental Protection is in charge of the 
“ecological civilisation construction demonstration zone”, six other ministries 
are allocated with the tasks to approve and facilitate projects. The National 
Development and Reform Committee, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of National 
Land and Resources, Ministry of Water Resources, Ministry of Agriculture, and 
the State Forestry Administration all jointly approve, oversee and monitor 
“ecological civilisation pilot demonstration zones” (shengtai wenming xianxing 
shifanqu 生态文明先行示范区), aiming to generate a template that can be 
replicated and emulated nationwide. The co-existence of differently-titled 
demonstration projects gives us an inkling of what happens when a political 
slogan is hastily converted into action through the implementation of projects.  
The trajectory of eco-civilisation as a composite ideology is different 
from Smith’s example of how German imperialist ideology developed in the 
period of late-industrialisation. What is distinct in this case is the signalling 
from the above. Once eco-civilisation is articulated by the highest authority, the 
President, different groups study the essence of a particular phrase and turn a 
slogan into concrete policies and seek benefits from the new catchphrase. It is 
                                                          
510 Ganjie 干杰 Li 李, “‘Shiying Xinchangtai Lizu Zhuzhendi:yi Gaige Chuangxin Tuidong Shengtai 
Wenming Buduan Tisheng’适应新常态 立足主阵地 以改革创新推动生态文明水平不断提升
[Adapt to New Normal, Stand on the Main Battlefield: Promote Ecological Civilisation Thorugh 
Reform and Innovation]” (Ecological Civilisation Forum Chengdu, Chengdu, 2014). 
511 Dent 2012, p.237. 
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necessary to clarify that domestic groups do not shape the meaning of eco-
civilisation from the beginning. Instead, it is in the process of cognitive learning, 
interpretation and implementation that the preferences of certain groups are 
reflected in eco-civilisation.   
 
 
7.4 Interests, coalition, and strategies 
 
 
7.4.1 Signalling from above 
To understand why the Communist Party leaders signal the importance 
of eco-civilisation, it is important to examine how it can be used to appeal to 
interest groups with various material interests. The most visible and direct link 
is found between President Xi Jinping’s family members and the green industry. 
Xi Jinping’s second wife, Peng Liyuan, has been the anti-smoking ambassador 
since 2009512. The brother of Xi Jinping, Xi Yuanping, claims the title of the 
President of International Energy Conservation Environmental Protection 
Association513.  His niece, Hiu Ng, is one founding member of Fairklima Website 
which specialises in strategic social responsibility, low carbon real estate, 
sustainable infrastructure, and sustainable financial systems514. Xi’s older sister, 
Qi Qiaoqiao, has invested in the field of real estate but her most successful 
investment is Hiconics Drive Technology Co., Ltd, together with her daughter, 
                                                          
512 Deng Londa, “Scientists Team up to Cut Smoking,” China Daily USA, April 19, 2016, 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2016-04/19/content_24660248.htm. 
513 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, Reform, Or 
Retrogression? (Routledge, 2015), p.39. 
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Zhang Yannan.  Hiconics is an expert in energy conservation technology and 
Zhang holds 8% of the stock of Hiconics with an investment of RMB4.35 million. 
The value of this company has quadrupled since 2009515.   
The connection between Xi Jinping’s family and the green industry does 
not, however, suggest that his determination to promote eco-civilisation is 
purely self-motivated. In fact, Xi has insisted that his family members should 
keep a distance from their investments under his leadership516. However, it can 
also be argued that environmental policy is less sensitive than many other areas 
because it does not appear to present a direct conflict between the of interests 
of the president and his family and the public good, which is to develop clean 
industry and serve the cause of environmental protection. This poses an 
intriguing situation in which the national leaders’ family interest is no longer in 
sharp contrast with those of the public. This seems to be a departure from the 
era of Jiang Zemin and Li Peng in which the national leaders’ family and friends 
monopolised oil and coal industries, constituting a special vested interest group 
whose interests were in direct conflict with the public good.  
Another motive for the leadership to promote eco-civilisation is that it is 
linked to Xi Jinping’s determination to consolidate his power. From this 
perspective, eco-civilisation is a means to facilitate Xi’s flagship anti-corruption 
campaign, which is used to purge rivals from the Party. A vigorous discussion of 
this linkage of environmental protection and elite power struggle was thus 
triggered by an influential documentary film, released on February 28, 2015, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
514 “FairKlima Capital,” accessed May 23, 2016, https://www.linkedin.com/company/fairklima-
capital. 
515 Yu 瑜 Gao 高, “‘Zhongnanhai Yinggai Chengwei Caichan Gongshi de chuangkou’中南海应该成
为财产公示的窗口[Zhongnanhai Must Be the Window to Publicise the Personal Wealth],” China 
in Perspective, June 17, 2012, http://www.chinainperspective.com/ArtShow.aspx?AID=16746. 
273 
 
called Under the Dome 517. The 103-minute documentary on China’s smog 
received 75 million clicks on Chinese video streaming sites within one day. 
Chai’s documentary pinpoints the “culprit” to be responsible for the chronic air 
pollution and public health crisis: the energy sector, in particularly coal and oil. 
It explains that 60% of air pollution in China results from burning coal and oil. 
Eco-civilisation thus becomes the site of a battle between public health and 
vested interests. “Under the Dome” opens the Pandora box of interest group 
conflicts, identifying the tug of war between oil and coal cliques and the public 
environmental interests. It was shown three days before the annual meeting of 
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and five days before the 
annual meeting of National People’s Congress. This timing fed speculation that 
Chai’s project is intimately linked to Xi’s political agenda.   
The documentary reminds people of the downfall of Zhou Yongkang, the 
former member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Zhou has been 
described by the Financial Times as “untouchable and all-powerful”, dominating 
a sprawling network in the energy and oil industry, national security system, 
and in Sichuan province518. The demise of Zhou exposed the exclusive and 
secretive nature of the oil industry and verified the intimate collision between 
money and politics. He had been the de facto boss of the China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and had taken advantage of his position to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
516 Ibid.  
517 Jing 静 Chai 柴, “Qiongdi zhixia”穹顶之下 Under the Dome, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rB6TA5g7Pg0. 
 
518 Caixin, “‘Zhou Yongkang de Hong Yu Hei 44’周永康的红与黑四十四‘你懂的’[The Red and 
Black of Zhou Yongkang, No.44],” Caixin, October 22, 2014, http://china.caixin.com/2014-10-
22/100742048.html. 
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benefit his family519. Zhou was positioned at the heart of the oil industry and 
nurtured almost unrivalled corruption520. The consequence of Zhou’s disgrace, 
whether intended or unintended, is that a vested interest group that opposes a 
strict environmental policy and its enforcement was shattered and a process of 
re-grouping is under way.   
The Hong Kong-based commentator, Joseph Lian Yizheng, sheds some 
light on this process when he observes that the Communist Party uses factional 
power struggle to push forward environmental protection. He warns that the 
use of environmental protection as a means to achieve ultimate authority is not 
sustainable because the craving for “unlimited money and power” renders 
environmental protection as another hotbed for corruption521 . A legitimate 
question is whether toppling down vested interest groups in the polluted 
industry is driven by the public interest, or reflects efforts to find another 
investment sector, the green industry in this case, to maximise the red capital. 
The combination of red capital and green industry makes it even more urgent to 
emphasise the normative dimension of eco-civilisation and highlight its salience 
to the public good instead of merely narrow interest. This encourages political 
actors to volunteer to emphasise the normative dimension of eco-civilisation. 
                                                          
519 “How Much Wealth Had Zhou Yongkang’s Family Amassed before the Former Security Tsar’s 
Fall?,” South China Morning Post, accessed May 23, 2016, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1568634/keeping-it-family. 
520 Caixin Datanews, “‘Zhou Yongkang de Ren Yu cai’周永康的人与财[The Network and Wealth 
of Zhou Yongkang],” November 17, 2014, 
http://datanews.caixin.com/2014/zhoushicailu/index.html. 
521 Joseph Yizheng 乙錚 Lian 練, “‘Jie Quandou Gao Huanbao Kao Zhuanzhi Shi Nancheng’借權鬥
搞環保 靠專制事難成[Use Power Struggle to Protect the Environment, Dictatorship Would Not 
Help],” 信報財經新聞, March 5, 2015, 
http://www1.hkej.com/dailynews/commentary/article/1000010/%E5%80%9F%E6%AC%8A
%E9%AC%A5%E6%90%9E%E7%92%B0%E4%BF%9D+%E9%9D%A0%E5%B0%88%E5%8
8%B6%E4%BA%8B%E9%9B%A3%E6%88%90. 
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Understanding the nature of the discourse they articulate thus requires an 
overview of their motives.  
 
 
7.4.2 The Rise of New Interest Groups 
In the process of interest re-grouping, the rise of new interest groups 
may indicate an opportunity for conventionally weak groups to enlarge their 
share of power and benefits. To understand what is meant by “strong” and 
“weak” in this context, it is useful to introduce actors in pairs, each of member 
of which attempts to take advantage of eco-civilisation to pursue their 
preferences. The first pair is on the ministerial level, namely the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection and the National Development and Reform 
Commission. Both are important ministries that operationalise eco-civilisation 
policies but the former has less power than the latter in the decision-making 
process. This is because the NDRC has an institutional advantage over MEP in 
formulating policy, shown by the fact that it drafted the abovementioned 
“Opinions” document.  
The director of NDRC, Xu Shaoshi, is also one of the co-leaders in the 
Reform Taskforce for the Promotion of Economic Development and Ecological 
Progress within the “Central Leading Group for Comprehensive Deepening 
Reforms (zhongyang quanmian shenhua gaige lingdao xiaozu 中央全面深化改革
领导小组)” set up by Xi Jinping in 2013522. In other words, Xu Shaoshi, as the 
director of NDRC, is directly in charge of eco-civilisation policy on the highest 
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level, whereas the Minister of Environmental Protection does not enjoy this 
privilege. However, the tremendous power enjoyed by Xu Shaoshi, does not 
automatically determine NDRC’s institutional leadership position in shaping 
and promoting eco-civilisation. There is, in fact, no document from Party 
Central to indicate which ministry is the leader in the project of eco-civilisation. 
This lack of a leader, moreover, generates hope within the MEP that it might 
itself be the leader, as its functions and responsibilities are self-evidently 
related to eco-civilisation523.    
The second pair of actors is composed of leftist intelligentsia and 
bureaucrats. The former include scholars with expertise in Eco-Marxism, Eco-
Socialism, and post-modernism. They are academics who contend that the 
theorising of the slogan through the lens of Marxism and postmodernism is 
critical for maintaining the political legitimacy of the Communist Party of China. 
The bureaucrats, however, distance themselves from ideological interpretation 
or colouring the political slogan, because they deem ideology to be irrelevant, or 
even a hindrance, to policy making. In terms of policy-making, academics are in 
a weaker position. Yet they can somehow incorporate their ideas into the policy 
framework through informal channels. The academic community has no 
interest in competing with bureaucrats. Instead, it is political influence that they 
pursue.  
The third pair of actors shifts to the local level: local governors and 
officials in the central government. One of the central messages of eco-
civilisation is to transform the economic development template in ways that can 
                                                                                                                                                                    
522 Ningzhu Zhu, “President Xi to Head Leading Group for Overall Reform,” December 30, 2013, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/30/c_133007127.htm. 
277 
 
create an opportunity for impoverished provinces to catch up with their 
prosperous counterparts. The most typical example is Guizhou province which 
has been at the frontline of experimenting with eco-civilisation. This has 
involved associating with the new slogan, and attracting international attention 
by holding a trendy eco-civilisation themed conference. Eco-civilisation thus 
becomes a card to play for boosting local economic development with the 
assistance of a good environment. Their practice seems to be a perfect 
illustration of how Xi Jinping interprets eco-civilisation as “green mountains 
and waters are gold and silver mountains 绿水青山就是金山银山”.  
 
 
7.5 Bureaucratic interests: Ministry of Environmental Protection and 
National Reform and Development Commission 
Ministries are thus at the forefront to operationalise eco-civilisation. Just 
as when environmental protection was introduced to China in 1972 and then 
scattered to various ministries as shown in graph 7-1, eco-civilisation now 
penetrates to a plurality of ministries and to a large degree replicates the 
existing structure of environmental protection as demonstrated in figure 7-2. 
Although the following two structures strike a resemblance, the slightly new 
element in the structure of the eco-civilisation policy system is Xi Jinping’s own 
attempt, from a comparatively early stage, to centralise and coordinate the 
project within “the Central Leading Group for Comprehensive Deepening of 
Reforms (or the leading group)”. It is composed of a 27-strong group, the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
523 Ministry of Environmental Protection official 2, interview by author, face-to-face, April 28, 
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majority of whom are Politburo members. Its task is to formulate and 
implement policy, systematically reforming the “economic, political, cultural, 
social, and environmental sectors”524.  Within this leading group there is a 
Reform Taskforce for the Promotion of Economic Development and Ecological 
Progress, co-led by Xu Shaoshi and Liu He, the director of the NDRC and the 
director of Office of Financial Work Leading Group (OFWLG)525. The primary 
reason for having a financial work leading group in this area is that the reform 
of ecological civilisation will touch upon certain ministerial interests. The 
dilemma is best described by Yang Weimin, the deputy director of the OFWLG, 
who states that “if you ask a ministry to conduct surgery on itself, it is difficult 
and unrealistic to ask them to cut themselves open. The purpose of the OFWLG 
is to coordinate different opinions from ministries and departments and reach 
consensus”526. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                    
2016. 
524 Zhu 2013.  
525 Highlighted in the second graph are the connections between the small leading group and 
ministries. 
526 Weimin 伟民 Yang 杨, “shengtai wenming tizhi gaige bupa chuji bumen liyi”生态文明体制改
革不怕初级部门利益[The Reform of Ecological Civilisation System is not afraid of ministerial 
interests], interview by Qinghui 清辉 Pang 庞, October 5, 2015, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/leadership/mroll/20151008/105823418056.shtml. 
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Figure 7-1 China’s Environmental Policy System: limited plurality under the control of the Party 
 
Source: Ran China’s local environmental politics, 2015, 41. 
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Figure 7-2 China’s eco-civilisation system: a replication of the environmental protection policy system  
Source:  compiled by the author based on “the Opinion” and 2015 UNEP report 
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This kind of structure is needed because the coordination among 
ministries is almost non-existent and each ministry understands and 
operationalises eco-civilisation in accordance with their own expertise, main 
functions and responsibilities. The position of the MEP is particularly delicate. 
On the one hand, from the historical perspective, environmental protection is 
given an unprecedented level of salience and the MEP shoulders more 
expectations and responsibilities than other ministries. On the other hand, 
although the MEP is the main “battlefield” of eco-civilisation policy, it is weak 
and “toothless”527. The introduction of eco-civilisation is very much a process in 
which hopes have arisen within the MEP, only to be followed by disillusion as 
more power is distributed to the NDRC. Moreover, the previously fragmented 
and decentralised environmental protection structure has been replicated 
rather than reformed, let alone restructured.  
The ministerial interest referred to here is, therefore, attaining the 
leadership position to coordinate the implementation of eco-civilisation, leading 
to the status of authority and the obtainment of resources. The interpretation of 
eco-civilisation differs, although not necessarily conflicts, between the NDRC 
and the MEP. As the macroeconomic management agency under the State 
Council, the NDRC’s primary concern is delivering the overall national economic 
and social development strategies highlighted in its functions. This includes 
formulating annual development plans, guiding the restructuring of economic 
systems, coordinating industrial policies, and setting and adjusting the prices of 
critical commodities like oil and electricity528. Hence, the language of eco-
                                                          
527 Ministry of Environmental Protection official 2, interview by author, face-to-face, April 28, 
2016. 
528 NDRC, “Main Functions of the NDRC,” http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfndrc/. 
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civilisation circulating within the NDRC is tied closely with the needs of the 
economy. As a consequence, the leadership competition between the NDRC and 
the MEP, to a large degree, is underpinned by the debate on the role of the state 
and the market in the reconfiguration between environmental protection and 
economic development. 
In fact, in the early entries under the eco-civilisation category from 2010 
to 2013 on the website of the NDRC’s Department of Resources Conservation 
and Environmental Protection, eco-civilisation is not mentioned and the entire 
discussion under this category was focused on the circular economy 
(xunhuanjingji 循 环 经 济 ), energy-saving and emissions reduction 
(jienengjianpai 节能减排). A more formal showcasing of the NDRC’s emphasis 
on the economy lies in the text of “the Opinions on Further Promoting Eco-
civilisation” drafted by itself and promulgated by the Party Central and the State 
Council. The economy is mentioned 27 times, industry 25 times, the market 15 
times, and development 67 times; this is in comparison to 12 mentions of 
environmental protection, 13 of pollution prevention and control, 9 of policy, 
and 8 of law enforcement. This document is thus a snapshot of what the highest 
authority agrees with the NDRC regarding eco-civilisation. It offers a vantage 
point for understanding how the composite ideology of eco-civilisation involves 
building a compromise between different bureaucratic actors, within which the 
distinct approach taken by the MEP plays a weak role.  
The MEP is different from the NDRC in that it stresses the importance of 
law enforcement and the centrality of the government in addressing 
environmental problems. As a consequence, the MEP’s vocabulary of eco-
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civilisation is distinguished by terms of government accountability, 
incorporating environmental barometers in the cadre evaluation system, law 
enforcement, and environmental responsibility. The centrality of the 
government in the MEP’s interpretation of eco-civilisation is also manifest in 
the opinions expressed by MEP officials. For example, the director of the Policy 
Research Centre for the Environment and Economy of the MEP, Dr Xia Guang, 
claims that forming a responsibility chain of “the critical minority” of Party and 
government cadres, is the key to building eco-civilisation529. The relationship 
between the NDRC and the MEP regarding eco-civilisation can thus be 
understood as the relationship between policy formulation by the former and 
oversight and law enforcement by the latter.  
This power asymmetry, however, provides a strong motivation for the 
MEP to take a leading position in building eco-civilisation. As Ran Ran observes, 
the environmental system in general, from central to local level, is plagued by 
the paradox of unlimited responsibilities and limited power530. The national 
leaders’ high-profile advocate of eco-civilisation, however, gives the MEP 
reasons to hope that it can change the existing structure and accrue more 
power and resources for itself. As it is difficult to compete for access to the 
decision-making process within the NDRC, the MEP adopts an outward strategy, 
using international platforms to maximise its share of the power. This involves 
promoting eco-civilisation to the international audience, particularly to its 
                                                          
529 Guang 光 Xia 夏, “‘Zhuazhu Guanjian Shaoshu, Rang Shengtai Huanbao Gongzuo Ying qilai’抓
住‘关键少数’，让生态环保工作硬起来[Focus on the Critical Minority, Strengthen 
Environmental Protection],” 环境战略与政策研究专报[Journal of Environmental Strategy and 
Policy Research], 2015, http://www.prcee.org/kw/hjzlyzcxjbg/253909.shtml. 
530Ran 2015, pp.64-65. 
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international partners, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
and the European Commission’s Directorate-General for the Environment.  
The strategy is a modified version of what Keck and Sikkink term a 
“boomerang pattern of influence”, in which domestic groups appeal to the 
outside world to exert pressure on their own government and ultimately bring 
change to the existing political situation531. In the case of eco-civilisation, MEP 
officials reckon that advocating eco-civilisation to the international community 
will please national leaders and demonstrate the MEP’s competence in 
representing eco-civilisation on the global stage. The accumulated international 
attention on (and hopefully recognition of) China’s eco-civilisation will generate 
a domestic effect, which lends the MEP more power and moves it towards a 
leadership position.  
The effectiveness of such a “boomerang pattern of influence” is premised 
on the condition that the international promotion of the concept attracts the 
attention of the higher-ranking authorities, who will in turn respond to the 
appeal of the actors deploying this method. The mentality of bureaucrats in the 
case of eco-civilisation promotion resonates with Jakobson and Manuel’s 
finding that “many actors…compete for the favour of higher-ranking bodies, 
ultimately Xi Jinping”, who is now the “sole coordinator of Chinese foreign and 
security policy”532. The advantage of the MEP’s outward strategy is that no 
other ministry is competing with it in the international community to promote 
eco-civilisation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for instance, has not yet 
                                                          
531 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998), p.13. 
 
532 Linda Jakobson and Ryan Manuel, “How Are Foreign Policy Decisions Made in China?” Asia & 
the Pacific Policy Studies 3, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): pp.106-108. 
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prioritised eco-civilisation in its agenda533. The position of being “first” gives the 
MEP greater opportunities to be more visible and achieve recognition from the 
national leadership.  
This dynamic can be seen from the way in which the MEP partners with 
the United Nations Environment Programme and the European Commission to 
mobilise resources in its favour by explaining the concept of eco-civilisation, 
collecting information on good practices from Europe, and sharing experience 
of the Chinese path to sustainable development. The first time high-level 
international promotion of eco-civilisation was initiated and conducted by the 
MEP was in the 27th Session of the UNEP Governing Council in 2013, in the wake 
of the Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development. The original 
proposal was to introduce a new resolution exclusively on “ecological 
civilisation” to showcase the determination of China’s current leadership to 
tackle domestic environmental problems and to further make a contribution to 
international environmental governance.  
Given the fact that China has rarely been seen as a discursive power, 
particularly in the international environmental community, the ambition of 
advocating a phrase containing the confusing word “civilisation” was 
guaranteed to arouse the suspicion of other delegations. The Chinese delegates, 
mainly from the MEP, were thus challenged with questions such as “What do 
you want?” and “Can you decide the future of our civilisation?”534 In fact, the 
choice of the term “civilisation” resulted from the fact that the main audience 
                                                          
533Party diplomat, interview by author, face-to-face, April 14, 2016. 
 
534 Ministry of Environmental Protection official 2, interview by author, face-to-face, April 28, 
2016. 
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for eco-civilisation discourse is domestic535. However, used in an international 
forum, the same phrase causes confusion and generates the impression that 
“eco-civilisation” is ideologically driven and conceals an aggressive attempt to 
export a political agenda536. The negotiation process on the resolution thus took 
longer than expected and as a compromise, ecological civilisation was included, 
together with three other country-specific concepts, in Decision 27/8, “Green 
economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication” as 
practices of “green economy” in the framework of South-South Cooperation537.  
The Chinese position is implicit in the action in Decision 27/8, which is 
to “request the Executive Director of the UNEP…to collect such initiatives, 
endeavours, practices and experiences on different approaches, visions, models 
and tools…”, where “such initiatives” refers to different approaches and 
experiences countries adopt, in accordance with the national contexts, including 
“ecological civilisation”. The MEP’s efforts to incorporate “eco-civilisation” in 
the platform of an international organisation in the format of a resolution have 
been rewarded by a three-year funding worth $6 million donated from China’s 
Ministry of Finance to the UNEP538.  The output of this project is a report with 
the title of “Multiple pathways to sustainable development” which is presented 
                                                          
535 Party diplomat, interview by author, face-to-face, April 14, 2016. 
536 Hai Yu et al., “‘Shengtai Wenming Guoji Xuanchuan:xianzhuang,wenti Ji Lujing’ [Internationa
生态文明国际宣传：现象问题及路径 l Promotion of Ecological Civilisation:Current Situation, 
Problems and Path],” China Environment News, September 29, 2015, 
http://www.prcee.org/wz/253698.shtml. 
537 Decision is included in Helsinki Commission’s report which also documents part of the 
process and its reaction. See Helsinki Commission, “Coordination and Information Related to 
the Implementation of the Ecosystem Approach and Related Policies,” May 4, 2013, 
https://portal.helcom.fi/Archive/Shared%20Documents/GEAR%204-2013_4-
4%20UNEP%20Governing%20Council%20Decisions.pdf. 
 
538 Ministry of Environmental Protection official 2, interview by author, face-to-face, April 28, 
2016. 
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by UNEP’s Economic and Trade Branch539. This is the first time that an 
international organisation, instead of a Chinese ministry, has endorsed the idea 
of eco-civilisations and advocated it to other countries, a symbolic international 
recognition of this made-in-China concept.  
The irony, however, is that the MEP’s domestic emphasis on governance 
and law enforcement regarding eco-civilisation ended up with putting the 
“green economy” and “sustainable development” at the heart of the UNEP’s 
understanding and endorsement of the concept. This, to a certain degree, 
echoes the emphasis of the NDRC. The paradox is the inevitable outcome of 
recognising the green economy and sustainable development as international 
norms. The most effective way for the new phrase to be accepted and 
understood is ultimately is to indicate that it is a specifically Chinese practice of 
sustainable development and a Chinese way for developing a green economy. 
The MEP thus has to find another platform to elaborate its interpretation in a 
way that specifies more clearly the role of state governance.  
If the MEP’s dialogue with the UNEP proposes the existence of “eco-
civilisation” and its relevance to the international community in general, its 
conversation with the EU is more specific insofar as it emphasises more 
explicitly the MEP’s preference for the role of institution-building, governance 
capability, and strict law and regulation enforcement, which ultimately implies 
the urgent need to expand the power of the MEP itself. This can be seen in the 
flagship EU-MEP cooperation project, namely “The Institutional Innovation of 
                                                          
539 United Nations Environment Programme, “Multiple Pathways to Sustainable Development: 
Initial Findings From the Global South,” 2015, 
http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/Portals/88/documents/GEI%20Highlights/MultiplePath
waysSustainableDevelopment.pdf. 
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Ecological Civilisation” that commenced in February 2014. This is part of the 
EU-China Policy Dialogues Support Facility II, cofounded by the EU and the 
Chinese government. Within this, the MEP is partnered with the Directorate-
General for Environment (DG Env) of the European Commission540. The 
implementer is the MEP’s Policy Research Center for the Environment and 
Economy, the same centre which played an active role in the Decision 27/8 
negotiation. The purpose of the project is to “promote the strategic exchange 
and cooperation between China and the EU in the environment and 
development” and to “push for the institutional innovation and policy 
application of eco-civilisation on the national and local level”, so as to “provide 
support to the mainstreaming of the environment to economic and social 
development” and to “offer the experiences of the EU and China for the sake of 
global sustainable development”541.  
The output of the project is the report “Institutional Innovation of 
Ecological Civilization: Conceptual Understanding and Experience Reference” 
(or “Institutional Innovation Report”) in which state governance (guojia zhili 国
家治理) is stressed and regarded as an essential factor of eco-civilisation. One 
section exclusively explains the difference between the “green economy” and 
“eco-civilisation”. Whereas the UNEP Decision 27/8 subjugated eco-civilisation 
to the green economy, the Institutional Innovation report clarifies that the 
green economy is actually a part of eco-civilisation. The former is a set of 
                                                          
540 “EU-China Sectoral Dialogues and the EU-China PDSF,” EU-China Policy Dialogues Support 
Facility II, 2014, http://www.eu-chinapdsf.org/EN/viewNews.asp?NewsId=869. 
541 Hai Yu et al., “Institutional Innovation of Ecological Civilization: Conceptual Understanding 
and Experience Reference” (EU-China Policy Dialogues Support Facility II, November 2014). 
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international principles on economic and social activities; the latter is a 
concrete strategy and policy542.  
As its title suggests, the MEP’s interpretation of eco-civilisation is that it 
is an institutional arrangement and a form of governance capability, instead of 
the market mechanism that is emphasised by the NDRC. It uses the example of 
Guiyang, a vanguard locality in China that is implementing ecological civilisation 
to demonstrate the importance of having a leading agency endowed with 
authority and resources to ensure the execution of eco-civilisation. By 
generalising from Guiyang’s experience, though, the MEP-EU report is able to 
suggest the need for a more powerful MEP with abundant resources as an 
institutional priority of eco-civilisation. The ambition of the report is thus to 
push the MEP’s agenda for policy formulation. It thus identifies its audience in 
the beginning of the report as the key policy and decision makers of eco-
civilisation, specifically pinpointing the China Council for International 
Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED). This is significant, 
because the CCICED is China’s most prestigious and highest-level advisory 
board, employing both Chinese and foreign experts. This makes it a kind of 
international platform that offers policy recommendations directly to top-level 
national leaders. In fact, the members of the council have the rank of vice 
minister at least543. Yet the CCICED was itself involved in the production of and 
completion of the Institutional Innovation Report.  
One month after the release of the Report, CCICED published its own 
special report, titled “Research on Environmental Protection Institutional 
                                                          
542 Ibid, p.10.  
543 Economy 2007, p.196. 
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Innovation under the Context of Ecological Civilisation” 544 . This further 
highlights the importance of governance and particularly environmental 
government. In fact, in the 42-page report, environmental governance appears 
117 times, compared to 19 mentions of the market. The report requests more 
authority, resources and capabilities for the MEP, which it sees as 
commensurate with its duties and responsibilities545. Moreover, the CCICED’s 
report hints at dissatisfaction with the NDRC’s leadership by suggesting that the 
State Council should establish an overarching agency to coordinate the different 
ministries and departments546.  These specific CCIED policy recommendations 
are eventually included in the “Integrated Reform Plan for Promoting Ecological 
Progress” introduced by the Party Central and the State Council547, which is 
indicative of the transition of eco-civilisation from an ideational dimension to 
the operational level. The outlines of the CCICED’s suggestions were then 
modified and incorporated into the top-level policy design that was approved 
by the Politburo548.   
                                                          
544 This report is cofounded by the government of China ($32700), Canada ($53216), Australia 
($11478), Sweden ($108933), and Germany ($139250). CCICED, “‘2014nian Gongzuo 
Baogao ’2014 年工作报告[2014 Annual Report]” (Beijing: CCICED, December 1, 2014), 
http://www.cciced.net/ztbd/nh/2014/download/201411/P020141125564749166897.pdf. 
545 中国环境与发展国际合作委员会  CCICED, “‘Shengtai Wenming Jianshe Beijing Xia de 
Huanjing Baohu Zhidu Tixi Chuangxin yanjiu’生态文明建设背景下的环境保护制度体系创新研
究[Institutional Innovation of Environmental Protection in the Context of Ecological 
Civilisation],” 2014, 
http://www.cciced.net/zcyj/ztbg/ztzcbg/201504/P020150413384340568925.pdf, iv.  
546 Ibid. 
547 “‘Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Yinfa ’Shengtai Wenming Tizhi Gaige Zongti Fang’‘ ’中共
中央国务院印发生态文明体制改革总体方案[CPC Central Committee and State Council 
circulateIntegrated Reform Plan for Promoting Ecological Progress],” Xinhua News, September 
21, 2015, http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2015-09/21/content_2936327.htm. 
548 CCICED, “‘Zhongguo Huanjing Yu Fazhan Zhongyao Zhengce Jinzhan Yu Guohehui 
Zhengcejianyi yingxiang(2014-15)’中国环境与发展重要政策进展与国合会政策建议影响(2014-
15)[Important Policies of China’s Environment and Development and the Policy Impact of 
CCICED]” (Beijing: CCICED, 2015), 
http://www.cciced.net/zcyj/yxbg/201512/P020151204556082832901.pdf. 
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From the UNEP’s resolution and the EU-China policy dialogue to 
CCICED’s report, we can thus trace the process of the MEP’s efforts to use the 
concept of eco-civilisation to augment its political power and attempt to occupy 
the leadership position in shaping and delivering the policy. Being in a 
disadvantageous position, the strategy of the MEP has been to use the context 
created by the discourse of eco-civilisation to expand its ministerial power. This 
has involved the strategy of promoting the concept to the outside world, which 
generates sufficient attention and momentum to have its requests heard.  
In other words, the promotion of the Chinese norm of eco-civilisation 
derives from the MEP’s bureaucratic struggle with other powerful ministries, 
specifically the NDRC. International environmental cooperation, in this case, is a 
means to build and consolidate the MEP’s leadership position. Luckily for the 
MEP, the CCICED has been able to help because it has direct access to the top 
national leaders and its suggestions can be incorporated into a definitive policy 
document. This raises the question of how other interest groups can achieve 
their ambitions by using eco-civilisation without the help of a formal institution 
to channel their suggestions to the national leaders.  
 
 
7.6 Intelligentsia: when idealism is heard 
This ministerial power struggle reflects the relationship between state 
and market: the NDRC emphasising the market mechanisms while the MEP calls 
for stricter governance. However, the underpinning logic shared by them is the 
developmentalist approach to sustainable growth. At the heart of 
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developmentalism is the accentuated importance of “state capacity”, which is 
expected to “bring about prosperity-generating transformative change”549, as 
Dent succinctly summarises. More explicit differences also appear between 
bureaucrats and the academics who provide the theoretical foundation of eco-
civilisation. These are along the lines of realism versus idealist interpretations 
of eco-civilisation, ideology versus pragmatism, and essentially address the 
relationship between the party and the state and question the developmentalist 
approach to environmental protection.  Over the course of my fieldwork, I have 
found that every time I tell my bureaucrat interviewees about the academic 
efforts to theorise eco-civilisation, their reaction is a predictable and almost 
universal disdain: “Their understanding of eco-civilisation has nothing to do 
with the policies we are talking about,” one interviewee working in MEP 
scoffed550. The “they” referred to by the MEP official are Marxists who theorise 
eco-civilisation under the framework of Marxism and Socialism and constitute 
an important intellectual community in promoting the study of eco-civilisation.  
The following graph, based on data retrieved from “China Academic 
Journals Full-text Database”, visualises the weight of Marxism and Socialism in 
theorising eco-civilisation among Chinese intellectuals. I obtained 5601 articles 
which attempt to theorise eco-civilisation by keyword searching. I further 
coded this corpus of text into the category of “Marxism and Socialism” 
(including keywords “Marx” and “Engels”), “Economics”, and “Tradition and 
Culture” (including keyword postmodernism) based on the keyword of each 
article.  As shown in Figure 7-3, “Marxism and Socialism” occupy two thirds of 
                                                          
549 Dent 2012, p.564. 
550 Ministry of Environmental Protection official 2, interview by author, face-to-face, April 28, 
2016. 
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all the scholarly efforts to theorise eco-civilisation, more than the broad 
category of “Economics”.  This pattern raises the question of why orthodox of 
Marxism and Socialism is relevant and what interest do leftist scholars have in 
making this theoretical connection.  
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Figure 7-3 Theorising Eco-civilisation in Chinese academic community 
 
Source: compiled by the author                                                                                                                                          
“Environmental protection will be marginalised if it is detached from 
Socialism”, asserts Fang Ning, the director of Institute of Political Science, 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, predicting the convergence of 
environmental protection and Socialism, in his phrase “green is turning red”551.  
Underpinning his claim is the theory of eco-socialism inspired by the green 
movement in the capitalist societies which was imported to China in the 1980s 
but received little scholarly attention or interest at that time552.  The logic 
behind the connection of ecological civilisation and Socialism further clarified 
by Pan Yue, as follows: “environmental problems are rooted in Capitalism, 
                                                          
551 Fang Ning 2006. 
552 Kang and Nie 2009. 
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ecological civilisation is the future of all the mankind, and therefore Socialism as 
an alternative to Capitalism which is the culprit of ecological crisis, is the only 
path to ecological civilisation”553. This quote is particularly important of Pan’s 
political status. A trained historian and journalist who became vice minister of 
Environmental Protection, Pan was reputed for his high-profile environmental 
campaign including the experiment of Green GDP.  He was then transferred to a 
party organisation, the Central Academy of Socialism, arguably due to being 
involved in a corruption scandal. Pan’s statement, though lack theoretical rigour, 
demonstrates the discursive possibility to mould eco-civilisation to fit the shape 
of political orthodox. 
Discord takes place, however, when this ideological discussion of eco-
civilisation causes inconvenience to bureaucrats who need to promote the 
concept to an international audience.  When I asked one of my bureaucrat 
interviewees “whether it is desirable to link Socialism with eco-civilisation”, he 
laughed and replied, “Definitely not. Other countries are already scared of the 
‘civilisation’ part in the wording of eco-civilisation. They will be scared to death 
if the civilisation turns out to be Socialist”554. Who then is advocating the 
ideological dimension of eco-civilisation? Who is their audience and what is 
their motivation?  
The main advocates of linking Marxism and Socialism to eco-civilisation 
include academics not only specialising in the philosophy of Marxism and 
Socialism, but also experts on environmentalism and the political strategies of 
                                                          
553 Yue 岳 Pan 潘, “‘Yi Makesi Zhuyi Shengtaiguan Zhidao Shengtai Wenming jianshe’以马克思
主义生态观指导生态文明建设[Guide Eco-Civilisation Construction with Marxist Ecological 
View],” 中国环境报 China Environment News, 2012, 
http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2012/1227/c1027-20035210.html. 
554 Ministry of Environmental Protection official 2, interview by author, face-to-face, April 28, 
2016. 
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green parties in capitalist societies. They are inspired by eco-socialist scholars 
such as James O’Connor, who describes the capitalist debacle as a “marriage 
broker between socialism and ecology”555 and Andre Gorz who reflects on the 
use of science and technology to achieve “an optimum quality of life” instead of 
“the maximisation of profitability”556. The leading Eco-Marxist Huan Qingzhi 
from the School of Marxism at Peking University epitomises the consensus 
within the academic circle that “the crux of China’s environmental problem is 
the one-dimensional economic ideology of modernisation and development, 
and obsession of developmentalism”557.       
Such scholars resemble but are different from what David Shambaugh 
categorises as “nativists” who chant that the West is evil and claim that 
exposing China to international multilateral involvement has corrupted its 
culture and damaged its socialist integrity558. The main difference is that the 
former, reflecting on the current development model, are less optimistic and 
more critical of the role of technology in environmental governance559. Instead, 
they propose a mixture of the planned economy and market mechanisms to 
help developing countries tackle environmental problems560. Unlike nativists, 
eco-socialist academics tend to be less hostile to the “capitalist” countries and 
set conditions for interactions with the international community.  
                                                          
555 James O’Connor, “Red-Green Politics,” in Green on Red: Evolving Ecological Socialism 
(Winnipeg: Halifax, N.S : Society for Social Studies, 1993), p.20. 
556 Gorz 1994,p.8. 
557 Qingzhi Huan, “Terminating the Growth Without Boundary,” Green Leaf, no. 10 (2009): 
pp.114–21. 
558 Shambaugh 2013.  
559 Hua-Jie Cai, “The New Exploration of the Historical Position of Ecosocialism,” Journal of 
Fujian Normal University (Philosophy and Social Science Edition) 178, no. 1 (2013): pp.7–12. 
560 Ren-sheng Liu, “On the Relationships between Marx and Ecology in the Western Maxism,” 
Journal of Yanbian University (Social Science) 36, no. 1 (2003): pp.5–9. 
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Their real dilemma is that their theories cannot be translated into 
concrete policies. Instead, they use eco-socialism as an instrument to critique 
the obsession with development for worsening the ecological crisis and, more 
fundamentally, for contravening the political values of the country, as enshrined 
in the first article of the Constitution, which stipulates that China is “a socialist 
state under the people’s democratic dictatorship”561. What benefit can leftist 
scholars derive from harping on the connections between the nominal ideology 
of Socialism and eco-civilisation? The most superficial answer is that they hope 
to take advantage of the political momentum generated by eco-civilisation to 
rejuvenate the political dogma. This claim is not completely unfounded. Among 
over 180 projects562 on eco-civilisation funded by the National Planning Office 
of Philosophy and Social Science, more than a third are concentrated in the 
discipline of Marxism, Leninism and Scientific Socialism, as shown in the 
following graph. Moreover, projects that come under the category of 
“philosophy” also take Marxism as the lens to theorise eco-civilisation. This 
indicates the mainstreaming of Marxism and Socialism in research on eco-
civilisation. However, the relationship between eco-civilisation and socialism is 
also two-directional because the deployment of socialism can also offer the 
opportunity to highlight and foreground the environmental elements that are 
marginalised in the more general thinking about developmentalism.  
  
                                                          
561 National People’s Congress, Constitution of People’s Republic of China, 1982, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm. 
 
562 The total number of funded projects is 182 and 16 are in the category of “zhongda xiangmu” 
(very important project) which is not associated with any discipline, hence excluded from the 
graph.   
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Figure 7-4 The National Planning of Philosophy and Social Science Funded 
Research Projects on Eco-civilisation  
 
Source: compiled by the author based on the project database on the official website of 
the national planning office. 
The idea that socialism is a powerful weapon to protect the environment 
is echoed in the remarks of one of the leading eco-civilisation experts, shedding 
some light on the question of the motivation of leftist scholars: 
 
We know we are radical in terms of questioning the common practice of 
environmental governance and challenging the capitalist logic. Our opinions are 
filtered out in the policy making process. However, why is our work needed 
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while it is impossible for us to propose concrete policy recommendations from 
our research? Because we can tell our decision-makers, how far 
developmentalism can go in China as we see clearly its limitations and the 
caveats of having developmentalism unbalanced by any other ideology563. 
 
One way to interpret this is to see leftist scholars not so much as helping the 
state to govern but more as helping the party to maintain control. To put it 
differently, they are intellectual referees who whistle to warn against an 
excessive focus on developmentalism.  
As a consequence, eco-socialist scholars attempt to guide the direction of 
eco-civilisation along the lines of socialism and their channels of influence are 
through the party system and informal networks. For instance, leading scholars 
like Huan Qingzhi are invited to lecture at the Central Party School to the special 
class on eco-civilisation, which is composed of high-level local officials. This 
does not suggest that local officials share the belief and Marxist approach to 
eco-civilisation, but more importantly that an informal network of Marxist 
scholars and local cadres is established to facilitate the communication and 
exchange of information among them. Apart from the party school, the channel 
through party system also includes organisations such as the Central 
Compilation and Translation Bureau, which has the primary responsibility to 
“compile and translate key works of Marxism and research the theory of 
                                                          
563 Qingzhi Huan, “Remarks on the Necessity of Eco-Marxism” (Seminar on Eco-civilisation, 
Peking University, March 8, 2016). 
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Marxism and its current development”564, all the while stressing that Marxism 
should be the guiding principle underpinning the cause of eco-civilisation565. 
Marxism and Socialism is like liquor: a small amount is pleasant but an 
overdose can yield negative consequences. The caveat of emphasising the 
relevance of socialism in eco-civilisation is its potential to challenge the 
legitimacy of the Party-State which is vulnerable as its practice deviates from 
the ideological dogma. In fact, the leftist intellectuals of the former Soviet Union 
were the most critical of the socialist regime and were, instigators of 
revolutionary change in the political system566.  Having learnt from the collapse 
of the USSR and to dilute the “liquor”, the rise of “indigenisation” in China 
functions as a balancer when applying Western theories by insisting on the 
“uniqueness” of China’s political system and the necessity to build “Chinese” 
approaches to serving the government567.  The indigenisation not only justifies 
Chinese practice of Marxism but also foregrounds the action of interpretation.  
To offset the potential for any backfiring effect from leftists, Chinese 
postmodernists suggest using the combination of Chinese traditional culture 
and Marxism to lay an ideological foundation for eco-socialism.  This academic 
appeal can be found in the article co-authored by Wang Zhihe, the director of 
the Center for Constructive Postmodern Studies and his colleagues. In an article 
titled “The Ecological Civilisation Debate in China: The Role of Ecological 
                                                          
564 “‘Zhongyang Bianyiju jianjie’中央编译局简介[Introduction of the Central Compilation and 
Translation Bureau],” Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, www.cctb.net. 
565 Rensheng 仁胜 Liu 刘, “‘Shengtai Makesi Zhuyi,shengtai Shehui Zhuyi Yu Zhongguo Shengtai 
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Socialism and China’s Eco-Civilisation],” 编译参阅[Compilation Reference], 2010, 
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566 Stephen Noakes, “The Role of Political Science in China: Intellectuals and Authoritarian 
Resilience,” Political Science Quarterly 129, no. 2 (2014): p.239. 
567 Ibid, p.249. 
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Marxism and Constructive Postmodernism - Beyond the Predicament of 
Legislation”, Wang and his co-authors call for a “joint effort of ecological 
Marxists, constructive postmodernists, and radical environmentalists” which 
will make it possible to “create a new civilisation: an ecological civilisation 
which will benefit China and the world as a whole”568. The contribution of 
constructive postmodernists represented by Wang and his colleagues is 
threefold: to rethink modernisation and development; to provide a 
philosophical foundation of ecological civilisation; and more distinctly, to “help 
the Chinese people revalue their own traditional ecological wisdom”569. 
Although Wang and his co-authors pit postmodernism against ecological 
Marxism, postmodernism is not a mainstream approach in the study of eco-
civilisation. Eco-Marxism and Eco-Socialism are far more prevalent, as shown in 
Figure 7-3. In the CNKI database, the number of articles adopting 
postmodernism as a tool to theorise eco-civilisation is just 14, whereas the 
number of those applying Marxism and Socialism amount to 3724.  There is no 
need to discuss the substantial relevance of constructive postmodernism in this 
chapter, because its advocates, like Wang Zhihe, believe that it is effective to use 
international academic conferences to demonstrate their intellectual input and 
align with internationally renowned scholars in ways that allow them to gain 
the attention of high-level officials in China.  
This can be seen in their activities at the key international academic 
event promoting eco-civilisation, the “International Forum on Ecological 
Civilization”, or “Claremont Forum”, so-called because it is held in the famous 
                                                          
568 Zhihe Wang, Huili He, and Meijun Fan, “The Ecological Civilization Debate in China: The Role 
of Ecological Marxism and Constructive Postmodernism-Beyond the Predicament of Legislation,” 
Monthly Review 66, no. 6 (November 2014): p.56. 
569 Ibid, pp.54-55. 
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Californian eco-city of Claremont. Its primary organiser and initiator is the 
Institute for Postmodern Development of China (IPDC), which, as it claims, 
“weds the best Chinese and Western resources to identify global pathways 
toward ecological civilisation”570. The Forum commenced in 2006, even before 
ecological civilisation was officially included in the party document. Wang Zhihe 
is a founding member of IPDC and secured an institutional partnership with the 
Central Compilation and Translation Bureau from its inception. The Forum is 
also co-sponsored by one of the Bureau’s subdivisions, the China Center for 
Marxism and China’s Current Affairs. Another partner of the IPDC is the Chinese 
Academy of Governance, a State Council institution training senior cadres571.  
Although this kind of institutional cooperation does not grant 
constructive postmodernism an entry into the policy-making process, the 
network derived from the Claremont Forum creates access to national leaders 
and gets their recognition. For instance, the importance of the Forum was 
recognised by Jiang Chunyun572, a former vice premier who is currently the 
general-counsel for Chinese Ecological Civilisation Research and Promotion, the 
first State Council-approved social organisation related to the promotion of eco-
civilisation. Furthermore, Jiang met IPDC’s Founding President Professor John B 
Cobb, Jr., whom Jiang lauded for his and IPDC’s efforts to promote eco-
civilisation on a worldwide scale. Though Cobb is known as a reputed 
environmentalist and philosopher, it is his avid belief in Chinese culture and his 
                                                          
570 The Institute for the Postmodern Development of China, “Our Mission,” 
http://postmodernchina.org/about-us/our-mission/. 
571 The Institute for the Postmodern Development of China, “Our Partners,” 
http://postmodernchina.org/about-us/our-partners/. 
572 Institute for Postmodern Development of China, “‘Shengtai Wenming Guoji luntan’生态文明
国际论坛[Eco-Civilisation International Forum],” 2006, http://postmodernchina.org/ch/our-
work/programs/conference-series/international-forum-on-ecological-civilization/. 
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claim that “China is the most likely place to achieve ecological civilisation in the 
world” 573that interests a national leader like Jiang.  
What Cobb represents is an international audience that is remarkably 
different from the UNEP delegates discussed above. Instead of being suspicious 
of the political agenda hidden behind the phrase “eco-civilisation”, academics 
like Cobb are keen to explore alternative ways of thinking to the dominant 
modernisation theory. Cobb himself sold his house and funded the IPDC as a 
convincing statement of his commitment to combining theory with practice574. 
His hope, however, is more based on his disillusionment with the American 
consumerist lifestyle than his genuine belief in and knowledge of how eco-
civilisation is used in China. Yet, allying with such an internationally renowned 
professor not only provides an intellectual justification of the appropriateness 
of Marxism and postmodernism in the theorisation of eco-civilisation, but also 
facilitates a network of academics – albeit loosely organised - who exchange 
their academic work and seek solutions to influence top national leaders in 
ways that can ensure that eco-civilisation goes down the right path. This kind of 
network that links them to party cadres is vital for having the views of the 
intelligentsia heard and articulated by top-ranking leaders.  
The efforts of Marxist and post-modernist scholars echo the “road maps” 
function of ideas in Goldstein and Keohane’s work discussed in the theoretical 
chapter. Their concern is to make sure that eco-civilisation policies are 
                                                          
573 John B Cobb, “Zhongguo Shi Dangjin Shiji Zuiyou Keneng Shixian Shengtai Wenming de 
Difang [China Is the Mostly Likely Place to Achieve Ecological Civilisation in the World],” trans. 
Yunxian Liu, Journal of China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong 4, no. 3 (2010): pp.5–10. 
574 Zhihai 志海 Sun 孙, “‘Shengtai Wenming Jianshe Guizai zhixingheyi’生态文明建设贵在知行
合一[The Important Part of Eco-Civilisation Is the Consistency between Words and Actions],” 
Guangming Daily, 2016, http://epaper.gmw.cn/gmrb/html/2016-
07/10/nw.D110000gmrb_20160710_3-03.htm. 
 
304 
 
conducted in an ideologically acceptable way and that the leftist intellectuals 
aim to set a limit to the development-driven policy frameworks. Even if what 
they advocate is too theoretical, abstract, and philosophical to be presented in 
the form of concrete policies, their role to demarcate the boundary of eco-
civilisation remains relevant, and even influential through informal channels 
and the Party system, rather than through the government institutions.  
 
 
7.7 Guiyang: Eco Forum (Guiyang) for city promotion 
If the first two pairs address horizontal power relations, the last one 
examines the vertical dimension: national and local government. In the context 
of the introduction of a new political slogan, the relationship between the 
central and local government is more symbiotic than competitive: the central 
government needs local governments’ support to implement its policy, while 
local governments see new policy initiatives as an opportunity to obtain 
resources from the central government and to boost local development575. The 
role of local governors, particularly the party-secretaries of cities, becomes even 
more relevant when it comes to environmental issues. They are the “number-
one leader” (yibashou 一把手) who penetrate all levels of local environmental 
policy implementation, from setting the strategic objectives for  his/her term, 
setting the policy agenda, overseeing personnel arrangement, and mediating 
conflicts576. 
                                                          
575 Ran Ran 2015. 
576 Ibid, pp.66-67. 
305 
 
Whereas the existing literature offers a rich understanding of how local 
cadres influence local environmental policy implementation, the question of 
how they use the international platform to facilitate their initiatives remains 
understudied. This is worth paying attention to because it sheds light on two 
questions. First, which localities receive preferential treatment? Second, how 
limited resources from the central government are allocated in the context of 
competition among provinces and municipalities? From this perspective, 
international eco-civilisation conferences are a way for local governments to 
attract attention. The following figure demonstrates how local governments 
attach themselves to eco-civilisation conferences and the resulting phenomenon 
of the cloning conferences. Secondly, the links between local cadres and 
international forums shed light on how international actors affect the 
implementation of eco-civilisation projects.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-5 Eco-civilisation conferences in various localities (2007-2015) 
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Source: compiled by the author. 
As shown in Figure 5, the first locally held international eco-civilisation 
conference took place in 2009 at Guiyang, the capital of Guizhou province in 
Southwest China. The fact that Guiyang initiated the trend of eco-civilisation 
challenges the correlation between the degree of industrialisation and 
environmental awareness. The common wisdom accepted in local governments 
in China is that economic prosperity comes before environmental protection 
(xian wenbao, zai huanbao先温饱再环保) and the common practice in the local 
level of governments is that “pollution comes before control” (xianwuran, 
houzhili先污染后治理). Yet the province of Guizhou was only at the early stage 
of industrialisation back in 2004, as shown in the following table. It has 
remained one of the most economically backward provinces of China since then. 
According to the China Statistics Yearbook 2006, the GDP per capita in Guizhou 
ranked the lowest at RMB 5052, only one tenth of the figure of Shanghai, which 
2009
•Guiyang Eco Forum 
Global
2011
•China Eco-Civilisation Forum
•2011 Suzhou
•2012 Zhuhai
•2013 Hangzhou
•2014 Chengdu
•2015 Fuzhou
2013
•Taihu World Cultural Forum  
"Strengthen International 
Cooperation, Construct Ecological 
Civilisation"
2014
•Jiangxi Ecological 
Civilisation Construction 
Forum
2015 •Qinghai Ecological 
Civilisation 
Construction 
Summit
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ranked highest577. Considering this economic backwardness, the embrace of 
ecological civilisation of Guiyang may be described as the “green leap forward” 
and can be seen as a litmus test of whether it is possible to avoid the 
environmentally-unfriendly path of development and, instead, provide an 
alternative template that would be worthy of the name of “ecological 
civilisation”. 
 
Table 7-1 A comparison of industrialisation process across China (2004) 
Stage Provinces and Municipalities (31) 
Post-
industrialisation  
 Shanghai, Beijing 
Late 
industrialisation  
Latter 
stage 
Tianjin 
Early 
stage 
Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu  
Mid 
industrialisation 
Latter 
stage 
Shandong 
Early 
stage 
Liaoning, Fujian, Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, 
Hebei 
Early 
industrialisation 
Latter 
stage 
Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Hubei, Chongqing, 
Shanxi, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Yunnan, Hunan, 
Henan, Gansu, Jiangxi, Anhui, Sichuan, Hainan 
                                                          
577 国家统计局 National Statistics Bureau, “‘Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 2006’中国统计年鉴-2006 
[China Yearbook 2006],” 2006, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2006/indexce.htm. 
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Early 
stage 
Guangxi, Guizhou 
Pre-
industrialisation 
 Tibet 
Source: Chen Jiagui, Huang Qunhui, Zhong Hongwu(2006)578, 
 
The Guiyang Eco Forum Global (or the Guiyang Forum)贵阳国际生态文
明论坛 started in 2009 in the context of the provincial strategic goal of 
“Environmental Establishment of the Province” (huanjing lisheng环境立省)579. 
It invites prominent politicians and academics to draw national and 
international attention. The summary of each annual conference is crystallised 
to establish a so-called “Guiyang Consensus”, providing a focal point for 
different actors to contribute to the cause of eco-civilisation. More specifically, it 
establishes a network of central government, scientists, local cadres, scholars, 
entrepreneurs and the media to jointly cooperate under the banner of eco-
civilisation. For instance, the 2009 Guiyang Consensus noted that cities are 
critical for the environment, technology is the cornerstone, enterprises are the 
main battlefield, education is the root, while the media is important for 
conveying the soft power of China580. This consensus is further underpinned by 
                                                          
578 Jiagui 佳贵 Chen 陈, Qunhui 群慧 Huang 黄, and Hongwu 宏武 Zhong 钟, “‘Zhongguo Diqu 
Gongyehua Jincheng de Zonghe Pingjia Yu Tezheng fenxi’中国地区工业化进程的综合评价与特
征分析[A Comprehensive Evaluation and Trait Analysis of the Regional Industrialisation 
Process in China],” 经济研究[Economc Study], 2006. 
579 Xie 邪 Zhu 朱, “‘Guizhou:huanjing Lisheng Zhanlue Jiakua Shengtai Jingji Quanmian fazhan’贵
州:环境立省战略加快生态经济社会全面发展[Guizhou: Environmental Establishment of the 
Province Accelerate the Full Development of Ecology, Economy, and Society],” 贵州日报
[Guizhou Daily], July 11, 2008, http://unn.people.com.cn/GB/14772/21738/7499270.html. 
580 “Guiyang Consensus” (Eco-Global Forum Guiyang, 2009), 
http://www.efglobal.org/Upload/201405/c57232a45cc74e65a1ffd9fe94158fb5.pdf. 
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the concerns of local development and industrial transformation. The key 
concept of the 2009 consensus is the “green economy”, followed by the 2010 
focus on “green growth”, which is specified more clearly in the 2011 
commitment to low carbon development.  This high-profile promotion of eco-
civilisation to the global audience cannot be taken as a simple acceptance of an 
environmentally-friendly norm which is diffused from the Party central to the 
local level, however. Instead, it indicates a way to leverage international 
attention to benefit from the new concept, especially in areas such as the 
promotion of cadres and special interests.   
This can be seen by looking at the crucial role played in environmental 
governance by the municipal Party-Secretary. The Guiyang Forum has thus 
benefitted from the vision, approach, and strategy of Li Jun, the Party-Secretary 
of Guiyang from 2007-2013 due to his expertise in the field of communication 
and propaganda. A Master in Classical Chinese Language and Literature with a 
PhD in Politics and Economics, Li advocates the marriage between Chinese 
traditional culture and sustainable development. After graduation, he started 
his career in the Ministry of Culture and transferred to the General Office of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party, working on propaganda and the 
United Front strategy for a decade581. Li thus knows well how to perform in 
ways that can catch the attention from central government for Guiyang and 
mobilise an international audience to increase the competitiveness of the city 
                                                          
581 Meanwhile, Li Jun was the secretary to Li Ruihuan, a reformer in the Politburo from 1989-
2002. 
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he governs. The Eco Global Forum is thus one of his strategic projects for 
exploring a new development path for an economically backward province582.  
The initiative of Li Jun also has been recognised by Li Zhanshu, the Party-
Secretary of Guizhou Province from 2010-2012. Li Zhanshu endorsed the idea 
of ecologically-oriented industrialisation and was lauded by the media as the 
“hope of Guizhou’s poverty eradication” and brought the “energy of Guizhou’s 
opening and reform”583. The fact that Li was on good terms with Xi Jinping was 
particularly convenient for the promotion of the Guiyang Eco Forum. In 2013, Xi 
sent a congratulatory letter to the Forum, which stated that “walking towards 
the era of eco-civilisation and constructing a beautiful China are important 
contents of the China Dream” by furthering green development, sustainable 
development, and low carbon development584.  In addition to such approval 
from China’s President, the State Council and the Party Central issued a paper 
on “The State Council’s Opinions on Further Promoting Good and Quick 
Economic and Social Development of Guizhou”585. According to Li Jun, this 
demonstrates the support from the central government for the development of 
Guizhou and is a generous gift to the populace of the province586. It is 
                                                          
582 The forum followed his footsteps when he was transferred to Hainan as the Provincial Party 
Secretary as Hainan became the first chief guest province in the Eco-Global Forum Guiyang. 
583 Xianmin Wang, “Jujiao Guizhou Zhenxing de Juecezhe Li Zhanshu 聚焦贵州振兴的决策者栗
战书 [Focus on the Decision Maker behind Guizhou’s Prosperity: Li Zhanshu],” Outlook China, 
August 29, 2012, http://www.outlookchina.net/template/news_page.asp?id=5642. 
584 “‘Xi Jinping Zhi Shengtai Wenming Guiyang Guoji Luntan 2013nian Nianhui de hexin’习近平
致生态文明贵阳国际论坛 2013 年年会的贺信[Congraluation from Xi Jinping to Eco-Global 
Forum Guiyang],” 新华网[Xinhua News Agency], July 20, 2013, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-07/20/c_116619687.htm. 
585 State Council, Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Cujin Guizhou Jingji Shehui Youhaoyoukuai Fazhan 
de Ruogan yijian国务院关于进一步促进贵州经济社会又快又好发展的意见[State Council’s 
Opinions On Further Promoting Good And Quick Economic and Social Development of Guizhou], 
Guofa, vol. 2, 2012, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-01/16/content_2045519.htm. 
586 “‘Li Jun Yaoqiu Geji Ge Bumen Shenru Xuexi Guanche Guofa 2hao wenjian’李军要求各级各部
门深入学习贯彻国发２号文件[Li Jun Requested All Levels of Governments to Study and 
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particularly important for confirming the leading position of Guiyang 
government in the application of eco-civilisation to make Guiyang the national 
ecological civilisation city. According to one interviewee, this makes Guiyang a 
“special ecological zone”, which is analogous to the existing “special economic 
zones”587. 
A municipal party-secretary who values the importance of an 
international audience and a provincial leader who has a good relationship with 
the President do not fully explain the competitiveness of Guiyang in the show of 
eco-civilisation, however, because the limelight might easily move to other 
cities. Figure 7-5 already shows that the model of hosting international 
conference is replicated in other local jurisdictions. Of particular significance is 
that the Guiyang Forum was officially recognised by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs as an international conference and moreover, as a legitimate platform to 
articulate the China’s voice to the international audience588. Behind this is the 
figure of Dai Bingguo, former Secretary-General of the Foreign Affairs Leading 
Small Group, vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and, more relevantly, someone 
who grew up in an impoverished village in Guizhou. Dai’s motivation to 
promote Eco Global Guiyang derives from his emotional attachment to his home 
province and his belief in the importance of ecology, and hence, he is 
determined to assist in the “grand show” of the Guiyang Forum to increase the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Implement No.2 Document ],” 贵阳新闻[Guiyang News], February 6, 2012, 
http://www.gygov.gov.cn/art/2012/2/6/art_12062_369395.html. 
587 Ministry of Environmental Protection official 1, face-to-face, August 12, 2013. 
588 “‘Li Jun Canjia Shengtai Wenming Guiyang Guoji Luntan Guizhousheng Fuwu Baozhang 
Gongzuo Lingdao Xiaozu Diyici Huiyi ’李军参加生态文明贵阳国际路南贵州省服务保障工作领
导小组第一次会议[Li Jun Attends the First Logistic Conference to Prepare for Eco Global 
Guiyang],” Guizhou Daily, April 12, 2013, 
http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n/2013/0412/c132289-21116639.html. 
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fame and popularity of Guiyang589. When discussing “interests”, it is important 
to note that Dai has no material or political interest in taking this stand because 
he was scheduled to retire in 2013. Instead, it brings him a sense of 
achievement and fulfilment in being able to use his position to contribute to his 
own province. The payback from the Forum is that Guiyang becomes an 
exemplar recognised and promoted at various international occasions. In the 
2015 UNEP report on “multiple pathways to sustainable development”, 
discussed earlier in this chapter, Guiyang’s experiences are thus deemed to 
“offer valuable lessons for other regions in China as well as for other 
development countries”590 based on the fact that it had managed to improve 
environmental quality while achieving an average annual GDP growth rate of 
14.7% from 2006-2011591. 
International cooperation between local jurisdictions and foreign 
countries is categorically important for local governors. Zweig describes local 
governors having “a feverish demand for global linkages” due to a “fear of being 
left behind”592. The limelight created by the Forum, however, not only promotes 
environmental values. It also attracts high-quality investment to the least 
developed areas. Eco Forum Global is thus hailed by Li Jun as an important 
vehicle to attract enterprises and investment (zhaoshang yinzi) 招商引资 to 
                                                          
589 Shaoting 邵庭 Xu 许, “‘Zhao Kezhi Baihui Dai Bingguo Bing Huijian Shengtai Wenming 
Guiyang Guoji Luntan Guoji Zixunhui Daibiao’赵克志拜会戴秉国并会见生态文明贵阳国际论坛
国际咨询会代表 [Zhao Kezhi Met Dai Bingguo and Received Delegates from Eco Global Forum 
International Advisory Board],” Guiyang Daily, June 28, 2015, 
http://www.gz.chinanews.com/content/2015/06-29/54180.shtml. 
590 UNEP 2015, p.13. 
591 Ibid, p.6. 
592 David Zweig, Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages, Cornell Studies 
in Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), p.44. 
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boost local development593. In other words, the benefits of eco-civilisation to 
this South-western inland city are opportunities and platforms to promote its 
image and generate popularity in ways that invite either foreign enterprises or 
enterprises from other provinces to prosper in and contribute to Guiyang. The 
capability of local jurisdictions to attract investment is crucial and the coastal 
provinces in the East have done qualitatively better than the western part of 
China. Tseng and Zebreg reveal that from 1983 to 1998, eastern provinces 
obtained 88% of foreign direct investment, and in sharp contrast, the number 
for western provinces was only 3.3%594.   
Officials organising the Forum, including those in the local 
environmental bureau, are actually indifferent to the idea of eco-civilisation and 
regard it more as a political task than an idea that they are personally keen 
on595. The question of whether the message of eco-civilisation gets recognised 
by the international audience remains to be examined. For instance, when I met 
Jeffery Sachs in London, who was invited to attend the 2014 Guiyang Forum as a 
distinguished guest, to talk about the idea of eco-civilisation, he showed no 
interest in or knowledge of the concept596.   
The most concrete achievement of the Forum is reflected and 
summarised in the language of investment attraction, presented by the 
increased number of enterprises, investments and projects moving to Guiyang. 
In the 2011 Guiyang Forum, for instance, 15 projects of the worth of RMB5.678 
                                                          
593 Guizhou Daily 2013. 
594 Wanda Tseng, Harm Zebreg, and Markus Rodlauer, “Foreign Direct Investment in China: 
Some Lessons for Other COuntries,” in China: Competing in the Global Economy, ed. Wanda 
Tseng (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2003), pp.70-71. 
595 Volunteer at Eco-Global Forum Guiyang, interview by Author, Wechat, March 25, 2016. 
596 Jeffrey Sachs, Brief interview after his public lecture The Age of Sustainable Development” at 
the London School of Economics, February 4, 2015. 
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billion were introduced to the city, covering tourism, low carbon industry, 
logistics, and solid waste disposal companies597. The amount of investment 
value doubled to RMB12.4 billion the next year598, indicating that the Forum 
was one of the major platforms to bring business and investment to the city.  
Guiyang tops the 2015 China emerging city rankings from the Economist 
Intelligence Unit599. It ranked first in terms of foreign direct investment, mainly 
from Taiwan and Hong Kong600. In general, the Economist, like many domestic 
observers, projects hope on Guiyang as a rising star with an innovative 
approach to growth, policy support from the government, and a political slogan 
to translate opportunities into a strategic plan of local economic development 
driven by the locomotive of investment and the need for poverty reduction.  
 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how the concept of eco-civilisation can be 
understood as a composite ideology that facilitates the process of the 
reconfiguring of political and material interests and enables the strengthening 
of conventionally weak domestic groups. Whereas the first two empirical 
                                                          
597 Taishi Wang, “‘2011shengtai Wenming Guiyang Huiyi Zhaoshang Yinzi Xiangmu 
qianyue’2011 生态文明贵阳会议招商引资项目签约[Signing Contracts with Investors in 2011 
Eco-Forum Gloal Guiyang],” Guizhou Daily, July 18, 2011, 
http://news.gog.cn/system/2011/07/18/011143010.shtml. 
598 Xingguo Shi, “‘2012 Shengtai Wenming Guiyang Huiyi shouri:Guiyang Qianxia 124yi 
Zhaoshangyinzi dadan’2012 生态文明贵阳会议首日:贵阳签下 124 亿招商引资大单[First Day 
of Guiyang Eco-Forum: Deal with 12.4billion Sealed],” Guiyang Daily, July 27, 2012, 
http://zx.gyu.cn/nr.jsp?urltype=news.NewsContentUrl&wbtreeid=1673&wbnewsid=2820&arc
hive=0. 
599 The Economist Intelligence Unit, “Rising Stars, Fading Comets: China Emerging City Rankings, 
2015” (The Economist, 2015), http://parkinternationalexport.com/wp-content/uploads/China-
emerging-city-rankings-English-Version.pdf, p.8. 
600 Ibid, p.16.  
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chapters indicate that the institutions are weak, this chapter reveals the efforts 
by conventionally weak groups to use norms to augment their share of power in 
the existing institutional structure. Eco-civilisation offers a crucial momentum 
for weak groups as it indicates the transformation of the economic structure 
and provides an opportunity for them to align their identities with the national 
image depicted in the eco-civilisation discourse. MEP, leftist scholars and 
economically-backward provinces modify the developmentalist logic with 
environmental awareness. In this way, they represent different interests 
compared to stronger groups and this difference is in line with the signal from 
the top echelon of the leadership.  
The identity of weak groups is critical because it is a way for them to 
signify their willingness to follow the lead and draw attention from the top 
leadership. Attention is a scarce resource which various groups in China 
compete for. It is because attention is limited, groups develop attention 
management and a competition for attention may induce behaviour which 
cannot be explained by rationality601. Zhou et al use attention allocation to 
demonstrate how central government uses mechanism such as inspection, 
cadre evaluation, and reviews to draw the attention of local governments. The 
findings in this chapter illustrate the other side of the story: that different 
interest groups compete for attention from the central government via 
international cooperation.  
The strategy of weak domestic groups involves using the international 
audience to compete for the attention of the national leadership, which is 
believed to be beneficial for maximising the interests of different groups. The 
                                                          
601 Zhou et al 2013, p.128. 
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MEP uses the platforms of the UNEP and the EU-China Policy Dialogue to 
increase its ministerial power by showcasing its willingness and capability to 
defend eco-civilisation and lead the cause of eco-civilisation. The leftist scholars 
deploy international academic conferences to establish their political relevance 
and build informal channels through which their intellectual input is received 
by the party organisation and functions as a guiding principle for policy-making. 
The case of Guiyang has been used to epitomise the green development of an 
economically-backward locality by showcasing its progressive actions and 
visions to the world through the Eco Forum Global, thereby promoting the city 
and attracting investment by suggesting that economic growth can be achieved 
without sacrificing the environment.  
The efforts of the MEP, leftist scholars and Guiyang to shine the global 
limelight on eco-civilisation raise the question of why domestic groups, in the 
absence of international pressure, are motivated to promote Chinese 
environmental norms. The composite ideology of eco-civilisation is intended to 
incorporate various interests to the extent that different domestic groups see 
benefits from this economic transformation towards sustainability. In the 
process in which the idea of eco-civilisation is translated into action, domestic 
groups maximise their own political and economic interests, which would 
otherwise be difficult to achieve. For the governor of Guiyang, the rapid growth 
of local GDP is the driving force of the genesis of the Guiyang Forum. For the 
MEP, eco-civilisation is useful for building relationships with ministerial 
leadership, access to policy making, obtaining authority and resources. The 
political interest of the leftist intelligentsia is more nuanced and subtle, namely 
gaining political relevance and influence over policy-making that may lead to a 
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political career. Another form of political interest that of retired officials such as 
Jiang Chunyun and Dai Bingguo, who act as a bridge linking different players 
and thereby gain a genuine sense of achievement and fulfilment. Eco-civilisation 
thus becomes a hook on which such figures can hang a political legacy.  
Understanding eco-civilisation as shaped by interest groups raises the 
question as to whether it can also be seen as a genuine Chinese environmental 
norm. It certainly has the appearance of a norm that suggests China’s ambition 
to be a leader in a new phase of civilisation for the whole of humanity. It 
appears to propose a philosophical challenge to the existing paradigm of liberal 
environmentalism which is interconnected with consumerism. Furthermore, 
eco-civilisation casts doubt on the unconditional reliance on technology and the 
market to solve problems. Its pilot project in Guiyang showcases an alternative 
way to economic development in which enlightened local governors embrace 
environmentalism which is based on Chinese philolosophy.    
Yet, the power of this norm is also limited by the competition among 
different interest groups, shown by the way in which it is domestically 
contested and in which it becomes linguistically confused in an international 
context. So far, the focus of domestic groups on eco-civilisation is on the 
question of how to take advantage of this vanguard concept, which is still open 
to interpretation. It has been effectively used by weak interest groups to 
connect their specific interests with the identity they attach to themselves. The 
effectiveness of domestic groups in the transmission of a Chinese norm is thus 
limited to raising the visibility of eco-civilisation instead of gaining its 
acceptance, not to mention securing its popularity. To what extent is eco-
civilisation a norm remains to be seen, but what is clear, as demonstrated in this 
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chapter, is that it is an example of a composite ideology used to justify domestic 
preferences, particularly that of the emerging and traditionally weak interest 
groups.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter detailed how different interest groups, from line 
ministries to ENGOs, exert their influence on China’s environmental foreign 
relations. This provides evidence to support the central hypothesis of this thesis 
that China’s environmental foreign relations correlates with the interest of 
particular domestic groups. The main finding echos the political pluralism 
literature suggesting the co-existence of diverse interests. What is special in the 
case of China, compared to other authoritarian regimes, is the intricate 
interplay among interests, ideas, and identity. The weakness of institutions 
limits their capacity to reflect and incorporate interests. Instead, domestic 
groups find an alternative medium to prioritise their interests: identity. As the 
empirical cases suggest, identity is a platform on which various interests are 
presented and ranked. As a consequence, the language of the bargaining process 
is tuned to either economic or environmental identity, both of which 
nonetheless are framed in the nationalistic light.   
It is evident that China’s foreign relations are undergoing a process of 
political pluralisation. Domestic groups play an active role in implementing 
international accords, accumulating experience for international exchanges and 
promoting an alternative environmental norm to an international audience. 
This concluding chapter now takes a step back and seeks to locate these 
findings within the bigger picture in terms of the empirical context, new 
knowledge in the relevant literature, and theoretical contributions in the field of 
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IR. I first discuss the empirical implications of this research, and in the process 
of doing so, I explain how I contribute to the existing literature on China’s 
environmental foreign relations and suggest directions for future research.  
Building on the empirical findings, my theoretical contribution explores 
how the case of China contributes to the IR debate on the interaction among 
interests, ideas, and identity. I proposed the framework of constructivist 
utilitarianism to bridge the gap between rationalistic institutionalism and 
constructivism, which allows us to better understand the question of how to 
understand China’s environmental cooperation behaviour. In addition, this 
framework addresses the question of the intricate interaction between interests, 
ideas, and identity in environmental cooperation for other developing countries, 
such as Brazil. This new framework is important, therefore, as it explains how 
developing countries exert their influence on the international order.  
 
 
8.2 Summary and extension 
I start with the simple suggestion that interest groups should not be 
treated by academics and practitioners as a taboo in domestic and global 
environmental governance. Regarding the realm of environmental protection 
merely as a normative issue masks much of the real political dynamics that lie 
beneath the surface. The downside of conceptualising environmental issues 
through a normative lens is that it fuels conspiracy theory which asserts that 
environmental protection is an excuse used by developed countries to contain 
developing countries, a recurring theme from the early period of environmental 
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foreign relations in the 1980s till present. Instead, it is better to understand that 
environmental protection itself is not always treated as a national interest; 
rather, the various economic, diplomatic, and trade interests hiding behind the 
curtain are the only genuine interest for states. In other words, environmental 
cooperation is evaluated against the non-environmental interests of states.  
This logic is manifest in the empirical chapters of this thesis. In Chapter 
Four, it is argued that whether environmental accords can be substantively, and 
not merely procedurally, implemented, is contingent upon whether industrial 
sectors can open the overseas market.  Environmental cooperation is thus tied 
tightly to exports and anticipated profitability. Chapter Five concludes in similar 
vein as Chinese experience is used to facilitate Chinese enterprises to invest 
overseas, instead of bringing policy change to foreign aid policy in the direction 
of sustainability. Chapter Six echoes this finding, and points out how local 
government calculates how to use international exposure to attract foreign 
capital and investment. Although entry into foreign markets (particularly those 
with higher environmental standards), investment overseas, and the attraction 
of foreign capital, are likely to improve environmental conditions within China, 
it is equally possible for them to increase environmental pollution. The key 
concern, therefore, is how interest groups perceive environmental interests in 
accordance with their own preferences.  
First and foremost, the findings suggest that environmental 
organisations will benefit from insisting on the importance of the environment 
as a national interest which they themselves represent, which makes them into 
an interest group. Although environmental and economic interests do not 
necessarily conflict, they cannot be equated with each other. Indeed, because of 
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the lack of other groups that see the environment as a vital interest, the 
domestic role of environmental organisations is reduced to providing services 
that are outsourced by the government. This pattern can be seen in the efforts 
of NGOs to take part in the “Going out” strategy. This is illustrated in Chapter Six, 
which looks at the case of how GEI offered assistance to facilitate a grant 
application between the Laotian government agency and the Chinese ministries. 
More specifically, GEI intended to help MOFCOM jump outside the box of 
traditional foreign aid patterns, with its heavy emphasis on infrastructure 
combined with little effort to engage in sustainable projects. In this way, it 
attempted to use the implementation of an environmental protection bilateral 
cooperation agreement to bring gradual change to the broader foreign aid 
strategy. On the other hand, the failure of GEI to launch a sustainable 
cooperation bilateral project proves the limitation of replicating the service-
providing mode of cooperation between environmental organisations and 
bureaucracies. At the heart of the failure is the fundamental mismatch between 
what kind of service is needed and what is important in foreign aid projects.  
When GEI refers to interest it is via the rhetoric of Chinese experience, in 
the sense of using environmental diplomacy to establish a positive image for the 
Chinese government. However, this rhetoric is weak when faced with the 
bureaucratic monopolising of decisions regarding foreign aid projects and the 
streamlining of line ministries that approve applications. Moreover, it 
challenges the interest of GEI’s primary partner, MOFCOM. As a result of this, 
GEI’s executive director proposed an alternative government partner which 
could envision the benefits of cooperating with GEI. The way to interpret this 
hindsight is that environmental organisations, in order to play a bigger role in 
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environmental foreign relations, should first identify what the environmental 
interest is, and then form a coalition with ministries sharing a similar interest. 
In this way, a new-type of government-to-government cooperation becomes 
more likely.  
The rationale for local governments is to understand environmental 
interests as coming from the desire to secure more “green opportunities” for 
local development. Moreover, there are benefits from being seen to take a lead 
in the competition between localities by wielding the environmental card. The 
case of Guiyang demonstrates the strategy of local governors to draw the 
attention of the central government via hosting international conferences to 
promote a special Chinese interpretation of environmental protection. The 
project of an Eco-Global Guiyang is thus seen by lower-level officials as a 
political task within the local jurisdiction, which is important for an 
economically-backward place to attract foreign investment and capital.  
Moreover, building a good reputation for environmental protection can 
in itself represent a way of attracting foreign investment. Contrary to the 
perception that local governments lower environmental standards and relax 
environmental regulation to attract corporate investment602, Guiyang’s model 
establishes criteria for inward investment that encourage environmentally-
friendly firms, or those that can both boost the local economy and protect 
environment. The ecological courts, demonstration zones, and the 
environmental protection industry invited to Guiyang603 all attest to the attempt 
                                                          
602 Phillip Stalley, “Can Trade Green China? Participation in the Global Economy and the 
Environmental Performance of Chinese Firms,” Journal of Contemporary China 18, no. 61 
(September 1, 2009): pp.567–90. 
603 Yun Huang, “The Reproducible Mode of Ecological Civilization of Guiyang,” World 
Environment, no. 5 (2014): pp.20–22. 
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of local governors to conduct the experiment of ecological civilisation and to 
ensure that the green card does not induce grey developments which lead to 
environmental pollution.   
The fact that environmental interest becomes relevant when it is linked 
to pecuniary benefit suggests that the criteria for ranking interest groups 
preferences is economic. This can be explained by a weak governance 
foundation, which intentionally dilutes the fundamental difference between 
economic and environmental interests. It is a legacy of the ecological 
modernisation mindset shared by the national leaders which emphasises the 
compatibility rather than the conflict between economic development and 
environmental protection.  This ostensible harmony between rapid 
development and environmental protection takes on a life of its own as the only 
option to incorporate environmental issues to the broad development agenda 
and garner supports from various domestic interest groups. This bias towards 
economic development at the expense of environmental concerns is present in 
other developing countries. What makes the case of China distinctive is the 
paradoxical role of the state. Persistent authoritarianism co-exists with a high 
degree of de-centralisation in the process of political pluralisation. Hence, China 
uses a state-signalling approach to steer policy in a direction which is in line 
with national strategy. Developing countries like India and Brazil, in contrast, 
resort to the market to align interests and navigate the economy towards 
sustainability604. The consequence of this difference is that it is easier for 
                                                          
604 Harrison and Kostka, 2014; Kathryn Hochstetler and Genia Kostka. “Wind and Solar Power in 
Brazil and China: Interests, State–Business Relations, and Policy Outcomes.” Global 
Environmental Politics 15, no. 3 (June 15, 2015): 74–94.  
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domestic groups in China to highjack national policy and justify their pursuit of 
parochial interests.   
SOEs represent one type of interest group that influences environmental 
foreign relations by launching and operationalising concrete projects overseas. 
They are treated in this thesis as being important interest groups primarily 
because of their investment in infrastructure and energy sectors. As Chapter Six 
argues, the environmental cost of this is tightly integrated with their ability to 
consolidate their trade relations with foreign governments and to expand their 
market share. The findings suggest that SOEs take environmental interest into 
consideration in investment decisions and project operation, as the business 
environment abroad differs from that in China insofar as it is the responsibility 
of the company to resolve conflicts of interest.  
In China, on the other hand, SOEs are protected and nurtured by local 
governments, and disputes with local residents are dealt with by local officials. 
In contrast, overseas SOEs are subject to oversight from NGOs, often negative 
exposure in the global media, pressure from local residents and activists, and 
the legislation and regulation of destination countries. Environmental issues are 
mostly portrayed as a challenge and ignorance of environmental issues will 
cause huge economic loss. In this light, WWF China605 uses examples of failed 
investment in the sectors of hydropower and mining in Southeast Asia and Latin 
America to promote stakeholder analysis, which incorporates social, political, 
and environmental dimensions, to assess the risk of overseas investment.  The 
case study of Sinohydro demonstrates that this makes it possible for SOEs to 
                                                          
605 “Environmental And Social Risk Management of Chinese Transnational Corporations” 
(Beijing: WWF, 2015), http://www.wwfchina.org/content/press/publication/2015/Yale-
WWF_final.pdf. 
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turn environmental issues into a positive concept which in turn generates more 
investment opportunities, with the assistance of NGOs and the realisation of 
CSR. This is not to say that environmental interests will become a primary 
concern of SOEs, to the extent that profitability becomes less important. Instead, 
SOEs can play an active role in environmental foreign relations through their 
own business conduct and hence contribute to the representation of a green 
national image at the front line.  
Chapter Five shows how scholars play a crucial part in aspects ranging 
from the decision to join the Montreal Protocol to the practical details of 
planning and implementation. The research team at Peking University, which 
was led by Professor Tang Xiaoyan, managed to change the way international 
funding was allocated in China away from an individual project approach to the 
sectoral approach. Whereas Chapter Five depicts a direct and decisive influence 
of intellectuals on China’s environmental foreign relations, however, the case of 
ecological civilisation promotion in chapter 7 suggests a more complicated 
picture.  Leftist scholars endorsing socialism and Chinese culture regard 
themselves as representative of environmental interests, largely because their 
eco-socialism theories set constraints on the dominant logic of 
developmentalism. Their path to influencing policies is less direct and mainly 
occurs through the party system, instead of government agencies. Although 
their influence appears to be trivial, the connection between socialism and 
environmental protection has the potential to challenge the claimed “political 
advantage” referred to in the rhetoric of Chinese representatives on the global 
stage. Furthermore, leftists’ criticism might undermine the “good image” that 
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the government tries to portray by exposing China’s environmentally 
destructive development pattern.  
The difference between the degree of influence of scholars like Tang 
Xiaoyan and the leftist scholars lies largely in their academic disciplines. Tang 
and her research team are regarded as scientists whose role is recognised in the 
existing literature on environmental foreign relations606. In contrast, leftist 
scholars are seen by bureaucrats as sycophants who seek to please national 
leaders by inflating the power of China on the global stage.  This comparison 
points to the trend of bureaucracies in charge of environmental foreign 
relations to place a heavy emphasis on scientific input and to expect academics 
to provide direct policy suggestions to the government, instead of challenging 
the current mode of development.  As a consequence, although leftist and 
postmodernist intellectuals are able to attract some sympathy from a select 
international audience which facilitates the promotion of ecological civilisation, 
failure to incorporate their suggestions in policy shows that their domestic 
efforts do not have much traction.  
It is evident that intellectuals and ministries represent different interests, 
the latter being widely perceived as more pragmatic. Line ministries, in this 
research, are also treated as one type of interest group. Instead of seeing them 
through the eyes of bureaucratic politics, though, I prefer to examine their role 
through the lens of interest groups, as this allows us to better examine how they 
interact with other groups. The immediate interests of ministries are to obtain 
more of the power and resources allocated by the central government. Efforts to 
                                                          
606See Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch : Science Advisers as Policymakers (Cambridge, Mass ; 
London: Harvard University Press, 1990); Economy 1997. 
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maximise ministerial interest include positive behaviour to compete for the 
leadership position, as Chapter Seven demonstrates, and negative behaviour to 
prevent other ministries from sharing their monopoly on power, as illustrated 
by the example of MOFCOM in Chapter 6.  
The fragmentation of authority over environmental cooperation creates 
competition over leadership among ministries involved in this policy area. This 
is particularly the case when the central government attempts to advocate an 
alternative norm to the international community, which allows the MEP to gain 
a leading position in international cooperation. Paradoxically, the MEP 
represents not only environmental interests, but also economic interests. Its 
interpretation of the rhetoric of ecological civilisation thus reflects the 
increasing assimilation of environmental interests into the logic of 
developmentalism. Combined with an institutional set up in which not a single 
government agency represents environmental interests, the seeds of eternal 
competition among state apparatus are sown, rendering coordination difficult.  
The above approach has broader implications for understanding Chinese 
foreign policy. By looking at how interest groups play a role in the shaping of 
foreign relations it is possible to explore how an authoritarian state like China 
can make use of domestic groups to achieve diplomatic objectives in a range of 
areas. A recent example is the so-called “cabbage strategy” (baoxincai zhanlüe 
包心菜战略) deployed in the South China Sea disputes between China and the 
Philippines. This term was introduced by Major General Zhang Zhaozhong to 
visualise China’s strategy to claim sovereignty over disputed islands. It involves 
wrapping the contested areas “layer by layer like a cabbage” by fishermen, 
fishing administration ships, marine surveillance ships and navy warships in 
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the outermost layer607. This originally aimed to cut off supplies to the “invading 
troops” of the Philippines. More importantly, it stations domestic interest 
groups - the fishermen -, at the forefront of the geopolitical hotspot. The 
primary reason why fishermen risk fishing in disputed areas is that the fishing 
stock in the South Sea is huge, and it is increasingly difficult to conduct offshore 
fishing608.  
Sending fishermen to a disputed island is only the first step in 
manufacturing domestic interests to achieve diplomatic goals.  The next step is 
to develop “economy, tourism, marine fishery and marine protection”, 
according to General Zhang. Indeed, the high-ranking officials in charge of 
foreign affairs from Hainan province are liaising with the School of Hospitality 
and Tourism Management in the University of Surrey, the best for this subject in 
the United Kingdom, regarding how to combine eco-tourism with diplomacy. 
The Chinese government thus not only deploys interest groups but also creates 
and manufactures domestic interests that can be used to pursue foreign policy 
objectives. In addition, the linkage between environmental protection and 
territorial sovereignty provides another fascinating case to examine the 
coalition formation among different groups and generates an avenue of fruitful 
research.   
                                                          
607 Kai Yee Chan, “China Boasts of Strategy to ‘recover’ Islands Occupied by Philippines,” China 
Daily Mail, May 28, 2013, https://chinadailymail.com/2013/05/28/china-boasts-of-strategy-to-
recover-islands-occupied-by-philippines/. 
608 Initium Media, “‘Women Hui Chiguang Haiyang Ma: Cong Taipingyang Dao Xifei, Liang’an 
Yuye Quanjing diaocha’我們會吃光海洋嗎？從太平洋到西非，兩岸漁業全景調查[Will We Eat 
up the Ocean? From the Pacific to West Africa, a Paranomic Investigation of the Fishing 
Industries across the Straits],” August 25, 2016, https://theinitium.com/project/20160825-
taiwan-fisheries-web/. 
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8.3 Theoretical implications 
This thesis makes a contribution to the development of theory by 
proposing the use of constructivist utilitarianism, which expands, modifies and 
synthesises components of rationalist institutionalism and constructivism 
based on empirical evidence from China. It thus provides an analytical 
framework that not only contributes to our understanding of Chinese foreign 
policy but also contributes to the IR debate over the interaction of interests, 
ideas, and identity.  
The basic argument is that domestic players shape foreign relations by 
deploying ideas—in this research, “environmental diplomacy”, the “Chinese 
experience”, and “ecological civilisation”—in order to justify their pursuit of 
interests. Furthermore, the interpretation of these ideas is strategic because 
they are used to identify special interests with the general problem of China’s 
participation in the international community. Whereas all three acknowledge 
that the constant challenge of China’s role in global environmental governance 
is the alarming level of domestic environmental pollution and ecological 
damage, the shift from environmental diplomacy towards the building of 
ecological civilisation indicates a change of emphasis in the way in which 
international cooperation is understood and deployed.  
The rhetoric of environmental diplomacy suggests that the lack of 
funding and technology is the primary difficulty, and hence resources from 
multilateral, regional, and bilateral relations are seen as a solution to the 
problem. The endeavour to obtain resources, however, develops the relevance 
of the “Chinese experience”. Although technology and funding remain critical, 
the combination of the foreign way with Chinese national conditions is of 
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growing importance. In this sense, the imported idea of environmental 
diplomacy is sinicised to become one that emphasises a special kind of 
experience, the nature of which is to ensure that international resources serve 
the interests of China. The most recent development in this evolution of policy 
rhetoric echoes the “constructivist” use of power by Chinese political actors. In 
this respect, one of the most pressing problems underpinning the interpretation 
of ecological civilisation is that of national image.  The fact that China has not 
yet become a leader in global environmental governance is said to essentially 
arise from the fact that it is crippled by a poor national image, which is 
tarnished by international media coverage and damaged by the authoritarian 
stereotype.   
Domestic interest groups will tend to embrace environmental 
cooperation when they expect their interests to be maximised, however. Even 
though environmental foreign policy is made by national leaders, such groups 
may still exert their influence via implementation. As demonstrated in Chapter 
Five, meeting the demands of concrete sectoral interests leads to a substantive 
pattern of implementation of the Montreal Protocol. In contrast, an 
international environmental accord that challenges sectoral interests is likely to 
be implemented only on a procedural level instead of substantively. The 
distinction between substantive and procedural patterns of implementation 
thus reveals the weakness of using institutions to aggregate domestic 
preferences.  
This means that it is misleading to assume that the establishment of 
institutions means a full commitment to the environment. Instead, they are set 
up as a way to boost the number of procedural acts that are gestures to show 
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the international community the efforts that the Chinese government is making. 
A substantive type of implementation, on the other hand, is linked with the 
active participation of interest groups and meets the demands of domestic 
preferences. In this light, institutions can actually have a negative impact 
because they are not designed to aggregate domestic preferences, but result in 
segmenting them. This is in direct contradiction with the assumptions of 
Milner’s rationalistic institutionalism. It is a phenomenon that is further 
demonstrated by the case of MOFCOM’s rejection of GEI’s suggestion to include 
environmental interests in foreign aid that is covered in Chapter Six. The 
reaction of MOFCOM reflects the fact that the capability of this ministry to 
incorporate other interests is limited, due to the ossified and inflexible 
understanding of the interest that the specific ministry represents.  
The argument put forward in this thesis thus provides a better 
explanation than rationalistic institutionalism for why the Chinese government 
emphasises the “Chinese characteristics” of its environmental cooperation, 
which is epitomised by the emergence of “ecological civilisation” discussed in 
Chapter Seven. This is because the focus of rationalistic institutionalism is 
placed on institutions, interests, and information while assuming that interests 
and information are objective and “out there”. The concept of “ecological 
civilisation” does not reflect a clear conception of interests, however, 
particularly when interest groups jump on the bandwagon when using this term 
and try to interpret it in their own favour. Moreover, the information factor 
matters less in the political slogan of ecological civilisation. More important is 
the question of what gives rise to changing attitudes towards global 
environmental governance?  
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It is tempting to assert that China’s economic power may eventually turn 
to discursive influence. However, as the difficulty in Chinese overseas 
investment demonstrates, it would be premature to bundle the realist 
perception of power in with one based on normative power. Although Chinese 
academics and officials believe that when China is economically strong, she will 
be more persuasive and have more international followers, the case of 
environmental cooperation suggests a more complicated picture.  
Instead of regarding the promotion of Chinese-ness as a natural next 
step after showcasing its economic might, my findings suggest that the Chinese 
government is trying to make use of environmental cooperation to benefit 
interest groups. This entails devising a nationalistic rhetoric that can be used to 
persuade both the domestic and the international audience to prioritise some 
special interests by elevating them to the status of the national interest. In this 
way, identity politics becomes a mechanism that can be used to rank and 
prioritise domestic preferences.  
While this perspective verifies the claim that interests are socially 
constructed, it is not the aim of this research to simply confirm constructivism. 
By testing theories against the empirical evidence it is possible to refine theory 
by proposing that constructivist utilitarianism can explain why the actions of 
certain domestic interests are more important in foreign relations than others, 
which is a gap left by both rationalist institutionalists and constructivism.  
The proposed theoretical framework of constructivist utilitarianism also 
provides an explanation for the “nationalistic turn” of environmental 
cooperation. By bridging rationalistic institutionalism and constructivism, it is 
possible to explain how interests are constructed and ranked around identities, 
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while the identity dimension is also underpinned by utilitarian logic as it serves 
the maximisation of national interests.  By breaking down the boundary 
between utilitarianism and constructivism, it is possible to allow for the 
importance of both the intersubjective understanding of interests and a 
utilitarian perception of norms.  
Bringing together “constructivist” and “utilitarianism” may seem to be 
contradictory, as the latter undermines the importance of ideas and identity as 
stressed by the former. However, my findings suggest that the observable 
utilitarian behaviours of states and domestic interest groups are conditioned by 
identities, images, and the ideational dimension of policy-making. In addition, 
identity can be adjusted in accordance to domestic preferences. The hierarchy 
between interests and identities that is assumed in both rationalistic 
institutionalism and constructivism is undermined by the evidence presented in 
the empirical chapters. Instead, identities and interests can be seen to be 
mutually conditioned.  The ranking and prioritisation of domestic preferences 
via the deployment of the ideational dimension, and the desire to pursue 
national interests on the global stage is intimately linked to how the state 
presents itself to the outside world. In this way, the nationalistic element of 
environmental cooperation not only serves diplomatic goals, but is also 
important for the aggregation of domestic preferences. 
I have identified two mechanisms through which identities aggregate 
and rank domestic preferences, which, in turn allow interest groups to influence 
environmental foreign relations: the mechanism of distraction and the proof of 
capability. The first mechanism draws from my observations of the Traditional 
Chinese Medicine industry in the implementation of CBD. During the process of 
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implementing this international accord, this industry was protected by the state 
and listed as a strategic industry whose fate is closely linked to that of national 
interest. The nationalistic element was most evident when an environmental 
activist criticised the advocacy that traditional Chinese medicine should be 
banned to protect biological diversity as being a kind of “nationalistic nihilism”. 
This criticism reflected the perception that the importance of traditional 
Chinese medicine outweighs that of biological diversity. This individual view is 
mirrored by the Chinese government’s reaction to the adverse impact of 
traditional Chinese medicine on biodiversity. Shown in the earlier discussion in 
Chapter Five, the biggest problem of the traditional Chinese medicine industry, 
according to the national reports submitted to the CBD Secretariat, is not the 
use of wildlife as ingredients. Instead, a more pressing issue is Intellectual 
Property Rights, as the whole industrial sector suffers from a lack of patents and 
a small market share of the traditional medicine market has been “invaded” by 
Japanese and Korean pharmaceutical corporations. The fact that these 
corporations are Japanese and Korean generates an enhanced sense of 
nationalistic sympathy and humiliation, which is used to drum up support for 
the domestic industry. Hence nationalism can be used to prioritise the domestic 
sector’s interest, and is used to avoid the negative impact of biodiversity 
protection on the industry. In this way, nationalistic identity justifies the trend 
of protectionist policy towards the Traditional Chinese Medicine industry, 
which constrains the degree of implementation of the CBD and China’s 
fulfilment of its international commitments.  
The second mechanism in which identity is deployed to weigh different 
preferences is through the proof of capability, a process which convinces 
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decision-makers that China is able to contribute more to the environmental 
governance and hence strengthens the confidence of the state to be a 
responsible power. The case of articulating a “Chinese experience” illustrates 
how this mechanism works. Environmental NGO’s nationalistic logic is such that 
the possibility of China’s leadership position among developing countries is 
contingent upon its ability to share this special experience with other 
developing states. This nationalistic component, based upon national pride, is 
used to encourage a pattern of environmental cooperation in which China takes 
more responsibility. SOEs are thus given a leading role in deploying the 
discourse in the hope that the success of the Chinese experience in fulfilling 
environmental and social responsibilities can establish the green image that 
Chinese companies need to further explore overseas markets.  
The above two mechanisms both tend to argue for more environmental 
cooperation. However, their logics differ. On the one hand, NGOs aim to use 
environmental cooperation to establish and consolidate the international 
leadership of China. On the other, the primary concern of SOEs is to pursue 
commercial interests, which requires establishing long-term partnerships that 
can strengthen the acceptance of environmental responsibilities and the need 
for more environmental cooperation so long as this leads to economic benefits. 
In the foreseeable future, using the Chinese experience to assert global 
leadership in environmental governance will thus be a growing trend in China’s 
attempts to woo the international community. This also provides insights into 
the way that nationalism can be used to aggregate domestic preferences and 
how this may change with the convergence of economic and environmental 
interests. 
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Analysis of the discourse of ecological civilisation verifies this tendency 
and suggests a future in which China is no longer satisfied with the dominant 
discourse of sustainable development that is centred on themes such as the low 
carbon economy, and other concepts invented in the West. Even after three 
decades of exposure to the international environmental community, the 
conspiracy theory that the West uses environmental discourse to undermine 
developing countries still prevails. This nationalistic sentiment towards 
environmental protection is underpinned by the perceived connection between 
discourse and interest among Chinese political actors, who believe that 
whoever owns the discourse can benefit the most from international 
cooperation. The Chinese government is no longer content with having interest 
“imposed” on it, to borrow Yu Hongyuan’s609 description of the hierarchy 
between domestic and international interests.  
The emergence of ecological civilisation thus indicates the efforts of 
Beijing to achieve greater discursive power, so that it can define environmental 
interests in accordance with national conditions. The need to use the concept of 
ecological civilisation in the discourse of environmental cooperation arises from 
the need of the government to protect the domestic interests that make up the 
national interest. Various interest groups can thus bandwagon on the political 
slogan, which is gradually evolving into a composite ideology that can appeal to 
various domestic interests. Every interest group has different motives for 
participating in environmental cooperation, but the commonality is the 
intention to take advantage of international cooperation to maximise their 
domestic preferences and the hope that China has more authority to interpret a 
                                                          
609 Yu 2008.  
338 
 
norm which is defined by itself. To a certain degree, the interpretation of norms 
overrides the importance of institutions and regulations.  
The mechanisms of distraction and proof of capability allow me to add 
another channel through which the dimensions of ideational factors and 
identity politics influence foreign relations, on top of the layering and ranking of 
preferences in the model of Keohane and Goldstein. Who we are and how we 
see others not only conditions what our interests are, but also guides us 
regarding how we proceed in terms of achieving those interests. The 
importance of ranking is predicated on the assumption that multiple interests 
exist and interests keep changing. Following this logic, the prioritisation of 
preferences reflects the temporality of interests.  
In order to fully understand who benefits more from international 
environmental cooperation, the factor of attention, which recurs in the 
empirical discussion, is also worth flagging up as a direction for future research. 
Under circumstances where weak institutions are not capable of establishing 
the ranking of domestic preferences, it can be expected that interest groups will 
compete with each other to gain the attention of the ruling elite. The attention 
of national leaders is relative, as focusing attention on one domestic interest 
group may imply the neglect of others. The relationship between international 
cooperation and attention is thus paradoxical, as the former can be both a 
means and end to gaining the latter. This can be seen in the scenario where 
interest groups use the ability to mobilise international resources to maximise 
their domestic share of attention, shown in the case of the Guiyang local 
government. In the case of MOFCOM, however, the existing attention of the 
political elite is used to prohibit international cooperation. The challenge thus 
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becomes how to understand the role of “attention” in explaining the influence of 
domestic interest groups on foreign relations. Is it an independent variable that 
leads to the incorporation of specific interests into the national agenda? Or is it 
an intervening variable that is used to set the conditions by which group level 
dynamics are reflected at the state-level of behaviour?  
 
 
8.4 Policy implication 
Regarding the understanding of Chinese foreign policy more broadly, 
constructivist utilitarianism may be used as a way to conceptualise China’s role 
on the global stage.  That is to say, my research suggests that China is a 
constructivist utilitarian power because various domestic interest groups seek 
interest maximisation through foreign relations, while also exerting discursive 
influence for the Chinese government on the ideational and normative sphere of 
the international community. Interest groups are thus utilitarian insofar as they 
see foreign relations as an avenue to pursue special benefits, and they are 
constructivist because they see the obstacle of achieving their goals is the lack 
of discursive power. Whether or not they believe in the ideas they articulate, the 
most relevant function of the ideational dimension is to establish the discursive 
power of China by demonstrating and justifying the new element it brings to 
international norm making.  
Ironically, in this process, the Chinese government is reproducing the 
“hypocrisy” of the developed countries. The Chinese norm may be Chinese and 
socialism in rhetoric but it is more like capitalism and the model used by 
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developed countries in practice. The rhetoric might be greener but the practice 
is driven by economic interests. In other words, while China may claim to be an 
alternative model, it is merely replicating what already exists. The only 
difference is that by constructing this “alternative”, the Chinese government 
assumes the power to interpret and judge that is needed to become a leader in 
the international community.  
This research is not the first attempt to tackle the contradiction between 
utilitarian intention and constructive ambition in China’s foreign relations. 
Callahan, for example, describes China as a “pessoptimist” country610 that is 
characterised by the coexistence of positive and negative dynamics.  A more 
articulate capturing of the contradicting attributes in China may be found in 
Shambaugh, when he describes China as:  
… confident but insecure, assertive but hesitant, occasionally arrogant 
but usually modest, a sense of entitlement growing out of historical 
victimisation, risk-averse but increasingly engaged, a cautious 
internationalism combined with strong nationalism and deeply 
embedded parochialism”611. 
Shambaugh observes that China is undergoing an “identity crisis”612 regarding 
its globalised role. His conclusion, however, is drawn from a cross-issue 
examination of the economic, cultural, and security dimensions of China’s global 
impact. My project, based as it is on China’s environmental foreign relations, 
echoes this complexity. However, this complexity is not merely a cross issue one: 
for instance, China is culturally arrogant but economically modest. The 
                                                          
610 Callahan 2010.  
611 Shambaugh 2013, p.316. 
612 Ibid. 
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contradiction is inherent as a globalised China needs to deal with different 
domestic interest groups, and the national leaders’ intention to use ideas and 
norms to maximise the national interest and achieve diplomatic goal gives rise 
to the awkward nouveau riche image of China which is trying to buy the 
elements that constitute a good image. In many ways, the idea of an “identity 
crisis” seems to lack the nuanced complexity of the challenge that China faces. I 
would argue that it is the difficulty of adjusting between the need of identity and 
those of special domestic interests that explains the contradictory presentation 
of China on the global stage.  
Environmental cooperation is just one piece of the puzzle of creating a 
good image for China. The Chinese government is establishing funds to allocate 
grants and loans to developing countries and investing in the green sector in the 
developed countries. MOFCOM and the MEP are hosting workshops to invite 
leaders in developing countries to share their experience in environmental 
governance and, more importantly, exhibit China’s leadership in sustainable 
development. The specially arranged sightseeing sessions and dumpling-
making activities in those foreign aid training workshops indicate that 
environmental cooperation613 may be closely linked to the desire of the Chinese 
government to be liked by other countries, if not imitated, because the Chinese 
experience is still too vague, loose, and sometimes easily dismissed.  
The linkage between environmental cooperation and good image puts 
interest groups into a special position. This is because they can use the 
promotion of a good image to instrumentalise environmental cooperation in 
                                                          
613 Zhijie Liu and Yunfeng Shi, “Build International Environmental Protection Friendship Bridge 
with Considerate and Warmhearted: Foreign Aid Training Project of CEEC” (World Environment, 
2014), http://www.wem.org.cn/images/20140820/201403_tbbd_yw.pdf. 
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ways that legitimise the pursuit of their selfish interests. Two scenarios emerge 
from this: on the one hand, interest groups can use environmental cooperation 
as a shield to hide environmentally-unfriendly conduct or the transfer of 
pollution to other countries; on the other hand, their interests are conditioned 
by the bandwagonning around environmental protection and are transformed 
to incorporate environmental concerns that may be against their selfish 
interests. Thus, returning to Qu Geping’s predicament that “it is more difficult to 
touch one’s interests than to touch their souls” with which this thesis began, my 
findings suggest that interests and ideals need not always be dichotomous.  
Finally, two policy recommendations may be presented based on the 
findings of this thesis. The first is the need to consolidate the priority of 
environmental interests by confirming an authoritative institution as a leader in 
the shaping of environmental foreign relations.  The MOFA is not a candidate for 
this role because it represents comprehensive diplomatic interests and is too 
understaffed to take on the responsibility for promoting environmental 
interests. The most suitable candidate is the MEP, as it is expected to be the 
place with the most evident and prominent environmental interests and has 
been active and experienced in environmental cooperation. The MEP, however, 
is not supposed to represent economic interests. Yet this does not mean that it 
should not use economic leverage to punish polluters. On the contrary, 
economic sanctions are the means to defend the environmental interests of the 
country and guard against pollution-transferring MNCs. Things may change 
with the establishment of the Leading Group for the Comprehensive Deepening 
of Reform in 2013, headed by President Xi Jinping himself. As noted above, one 
branch of this group is dedicated to attending to ecological civilisation. However, 
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it is too early to tell to what degree this top-level design reflects the presence of 
a leading agency that can genuinely represent the interests of the environment.  
Secondly, it is of critical importance to bring NGOs to our attention when 
analysing Chinese foreign relations, insofar as they increasingly constitute a 
type of interest group that may achieve the objective of using environmental 
cooperation to give China a more positive image. The current problem is that 
they are “free ranging” ambassadors who are striving mainly to clarify what 
they see as the distorted reports in the international media and to provide a 
positive story of China’s global role in environmental governance. Most of the 
time, their suggestions are appreciated, but not incorporated. A mechanism to 
channel NGOs’ experience proves to be not only necessary, but also pressing, as 
GEI’s encounter with MOFCOM demonstrates. NGOs provide abundant 
opportunities for the Chinese government and companies to use environmental 
cooperation to achieve long-term economic benefits. However, these 
opportunities have been missed, as NGOs are perceived domestically as foreign 
agents and viewed with suspicion. In this way, the legal protection of NGOs 
domestically is beneficial to establish bonds of trust between ardent and 
experienced Chinese NGOs and other interest groups that have a stake in the 
shaping of environmental foreign relations.  
In conclusion, environmental issues can be said to function like a mirror 
in which an eager but cautious image of China is reflected. Regardless of how 
China performs in global environmental governance, it is undeniable that it 
needs environmental cooperation more than ever. The future of China’s 
domination of the world order is perhaps not imminent, but the efforts of 
various groups and actors in China to take a leading role in environmental 
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governance are increasingly evident.  Rather than seeing special interests as a 
threat to the PRC regime, as implied by Qu Geping, this thesis has explored the 
ways in which their influence can be channelled in constructive ways into the 
shaping of China’s foreign relations. 
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Appendix I. Official procedure of Concessional Loan application 
(Chapter 5) 
 
Source: Davies, Martyn, Hannah Edinger, Nastasya Tay, and Sanusha Naidu. 2008. “How 
China Delivers Development Assistance to Africa.” Beijing: Centre for Chinese Studies, 
University of 
Stellenbosch. http://www.ccs.org.za/downloads/DFID_FA_Final.pdf. 
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Appendix II. GEI variation of the Concessional Loan Application 
 
 
